O.D.N. (A Minor) v International Protection Office

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Judge: Mr. Justice Richard Humphreys
• Judgment Date: 21 December 2017
• Neutral Citation: [2017] IEHC 812
• Court: High Court
• Docket Number: [2017 No. 857 J.R.]
• Date: 21 December 2017

[2017] IEHC 812

THE HIGH COURT

JUDICIAL REVIEW

Humphreys J.

[2017 No. 857 J.R.]

BETWEEN

O.D.N.

AND

A.A.N. (A MINOR SUING BY HER MOTHER AND NEXT FRIEND O.D.N.) (NIGERIA)

APPLICANTS

AND

THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OFFICE, THE MINISTER FOR JUSTICE AND EQUALITY, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

AND

IRELAND

RESPONDENTS

Asylum, Immigration & Nationality - Refusal to re-enter asylum procedure - Certiorari - Procedures Directive - Subsidiary protection - S. 22 of the International Protection Act 2015 - Injunction - Best interests of the child - Right to be heard

Facts: The first named applicant/mother sought an order of certiorari for quashing the decision of the first named respondent for refusing the applicants' application for consent to re-enter the asylum process. The first named applicant/mother contended that the applicants were entitled to remain in the State pending the determination of the application for consent to re-enter the protection process under s. 22 of the International Protection Act 2015. The first named applicant/mother contended that the child should have been entitled for a personal interview. The respondents argued that the first named applicant/mother did not ask for an interview.

Mr. Justice Richard Humphreys dismissed the application filed by the applicants. The Court opined that a personal interview was not necessary for an effective hearing of the applicants. The Court held that the voice of the child had been heard in writing and it was not a breach of requirement to hear the voice of the child through a written procedure. The Court considered and applied the reasoning in the Okunade v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2012] IESC 49 and discharged the injunction restraining the deportation of the applicants.

JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Richard Humphreys delivered on the 21st day of December, 2017

1 The applicants in this case are a mother and daughter from Nigeria. The mother arrived in the State in February, 2006, at the age of 16. The child was born in the State on 24th February, 2006. The mother applied for asylum on 28th March, 2006, including the child in the application. That application was refused on 23rd May, 2006. An appeal against that refusal was dismissed on 27th July, 2006 by the Refugee Appeals Tribunal. A proposal to deport was issued on 25th August, 2006. An application for subsidiary protection was made in 2006 and was subsequently refused on 11th January, 2008.

2 Deportation orders against the applicants were made, and notified to the applicants on 15th September, 2009. However, the applicants failed to present to the GNIB. On 9th October, 2014 they applied for revocation of the deportation orders while being evaders, and ultimately presented on 16th June, 2016, thus having evaded for almost seven years. During that time they did not provide an address and apparently had up to three sets of solicitors. They seemed to have expected the Minister to reply to their correspondence despite being evaders. However, under those circumstances it seems to me that the requirement that legal or constitutional rights are first situated in a social contract, and in corresponding and relevant duties, has the consequence that there is no obligation whatsoever on the Minister or any decision-maker to consider any representations from a person who will not disclose their whereabouts and who is on the run (to that extent I would respectfully disagree with the views to the contrary of Eager J. in Ashade v. The Governor of the Dóchas Centre [2014] IEHC 643 on this issue). In any event, in November, 2016, the s. 3(11) application was rejected.

3 A subsequent application for permission to re-enter the asylum process was made on 31st October, 2017, and this case concerns that application. It was made after the mother was informed that the applicants would be deported. Both the timing and the legalistic content of the application make it clear that it is an abusive eleventh-hour application made for delay purposes. The applicant was due to be collected on...