Daly v DPP
| Jurisdiction | Ireland |
| Judge | Mr. Justice Garrett Simons |
| Judgment Date | 14 January 2020 |
| Neutral Citation | [2020] IEHC 2 |
| Docket Number | 2018 No. 1010 J.R. |
| Court | High Court |
| Date | 14 January 2020 |
[2020] IEHC 2
Garrett Simons J.
2018 No. 1010 J.R.
THE HIGH COURT
JUDICIAL REVIEW
Judicial review – Jurisdiction – Failure to remand – Applicant seeking judicial review – Whether a failure to remand a person, who has been released on station bail, to a sitting of the District Court within thirty days deprives the District Court of jurisdiction
Facts: The applicant, Ms Daly, had been released on station bail on 25 October 2018, and remanded to appear before a sitting of the District Court on 28 November 2018. The applicant chose not to attend before the District Court on 28 November 2018. Had she done so, it was clear from the established case law that her attendance before the District Court would have remedied or cured any defect in the remand period. The deliberate decision of the applicant not to attend before the District Court was said to bring the case outside the established case law. The principal issue for determination in these judicial review proceedings was whether a failure to remand a person, who has been released on station bail, to a sitting of the District Court within thirty days deprives the District Court of jurisdiction. The applicant submitted that: (i) the jurisdiction of the District Court to deal with the applicant’s case was dependent on the statutory preconditions, as set out in s. 31 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1967, being complied with, therefore the District Judge erred in law and acted without jurisdiction by issuing the bench warrant; (ii) the return date on the bail bond exceeded both the time limits as set out in s. 31 of the 1967 Act and the provisions of Order 17, rule 4 of the District Court rules, accordingly the Court did not have jurisdiction to deal with the matter in any fashion; (iii) in all the circumstances, to allow the warrant to stand would be contrary to fair procedures and constitutional justice and it would have the effect of placing the applicant in jeopardy of imprisonment, would sully his warrant record and adversely affect his chances of being admitted to bail in the future; and (iv) the impugned decision was made in excess of jurisdiction and it therefore lacked the essential characteristics of a lawful order.
Held by the High Court that the making of the complaint on 28 November 2018 conferred jurisdiction on the District Court. The Court held that the fact that the remand period stated in the recognisance had exceeded the thirty days prescribed under s. 31 of the 1967 Act did not affect the substantive jurisdiction of the District Court. The Court held that the appropriate response to the applicant’s non-attendance was for the District Court to issue a bench warrant for her arrest. The Court held that this was necessary to ensure that the applicant would be brought before the court and informed of her right to a jury trial before a decision was made as to whether to deal with the case summarily or on indictment.
The Court held that the application for judicial review would be dismissed in its entirety.
Application dismissed.
The principal issue for determination in these judicial review proceedings is whether a failure to remand a person, who has been released on station bail, to a sitting of the District Court within thirty days deprives the District Court of jurisdiction. The Applicant had been released on station bail on 25 October 2018, and remanded to appear before a sitting of the District Court on 28 November 2018. The supposedly novel feature of the case is that the Applicant chose not to attend before the District Court on 28 November 2018. Had she done so, then it is clear from the established case law that her attendance before the District Court would have remedied or cured any defect in the remand period. The deliberate decision of the Applicant not to attend before the District Court is said to bring the case outside the established case law. This judgment addresses whether that submission is correct.
The Applicant had been arrested at the Criminal Courts of Justice, Parkgate Street, Dublin 8 on the morning of 25 October 2018. The Applicant was conveyed to Castlerea Garda Station where she was detained pursuant to section 4 of the Criminal Justice Act 1984. The Applicant was subsequently released from detention, and then rearrested for the purpose of charging her with an offence. More specifically, the Applicant was charged with an offence of theft contrary to section 4 of the Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud Offences) Act 2001.
The Applicant was released from custody upon entering into a recognisance taken by the member in charge of the Castlerea Garda Station. The relevant statutory provisions governing this procedure are addressed in detail under the next heading below. In brief, the procedure requires that the remand be to a sitting of the District Court within thirty days. The shorthand “station ball” will be used to describe this procedure.
It seems that the next sitting of the District Court in District No. 4, following the date of the Applicant's arrest and charge, would have been a sitting of Castlerea District Court on 26 October 2018. Had the Applicant been remanded to this sitting, then the remand would have been well within the thirty-day period prescribed. In the event, however, the remand was to a sitting of Strokestown District Court on a date which fell outside the thirty-day period. (28 November 2018).
The precise form of recognisance entered into by the Applicant reads as follows.
“I will appear before the District Court to be held at Strokestown, Strokestown District Court, Strokestown, Co Roscommon on the 28 day of November 2018 at 10/30 am/pm to answer the charge(s)‡ as set out in the charge sheet attached and at every place and time to which during the course of the proceedings the hearing may be adjourned until my presence is no longer required to answer the said charge(s).”
The Applicant's solicitor has averred on affidavit that he advised the Applicant that he was of the opinion that the District Court did not have jurisdiction to deal with her case in circumstances where the thirty-day period had been exceeded, and that on the basis of this advice the Applicant “opted” not to appear before the District Court.
“11. I say that, accordingly, I spoke to the Applicant on the 27th day of November 2018 and advised her that I was of the opinion that the District Court did not have jurisdiction to deal with her case on the basis that the time period between her being released on station bail and the date she was due in court exceeded the thirty-day time period set out in section 31 of the 1967 Act.
12. I say that I informed the Applicant that, as the Court did not have jurisdiction to deal with her case, the correct Order for the court to make would be ‘No Order’. I say that I did also inform the Applicant that, notwithstanding my view that the Court lacked jurisdiction to deal with her case, if she did not appear in court and the issue pursuant to section 31 of the 1967 Act was not noticed by the Court, there was a slight possibility a warrant may issue for her arrest. I say that usually, in my experience, a court would examine the bail bond in a matter of this nature to ascertain the legal obligation of the accused to appear.
13. I say that having informed the Applicant of the situation, she opted not to appear at the court hearing. I say that I called the District Court Office in Strokestown to ascertain what had happened to the case on the 28th November 2018. I say that I was informed that a bench warrant had issued for her arrest as the Applicant had not appeared in Court.
14. I say that I was very concerned when I received that information as I did not believe the District Judge had jurisdiction to issue a warrant considering there had been a non-compliance with section 31 of the 1967 Act. I say that I was concerned that, should the Applicant be arrested on foot of this warrant, she would be in jeopardy of being remanded in custody. Furthermore, I say that the issuing of the warrant could prejudice the Applicant in terms of any future applications for bail.”
The Applicant herself has not filed any substantive affidavit in the proceedings, but has filed a short verifying affidavit in respect of the content of the statement of grounds and of her solicitor's affidavit.
A further affidavit has been filed on behalf of the Applicant by a legal executive. This affidavit exhibits the order of the District Court made on 28 November 2018. The operative part of that order reads as follows.
“At the sitting of the Court at STROKESTOWN, THE COURTHOUSE, STROKESTOWN, CO ROSCOMMON in the Court area and district aforesaid
on the 28-Nov-2018, the above entitled proceedings having appeared in the Court's list in respect of a complaint that the above-named accused of 10 TAFFES PLACE, BALLYBOUGH, DUBLIN
On the 16-May-2018 AT CENTRA TARMONBARRY ROSCOMMON, IN SAID DISTRICT COURT AREA OF STROKESTOWN, did steal property to wit 4 BOTTLES OF KOPPARBERG (2.50 X 4) AND 1 BOTTLE OF WHITE WINE TOTAL 20 EURO the property of CENTRA TARMONBARRY […]
Contrary to Section 4 of the Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud Offences) Act 2001.
AND WHEREAS the accused failed to comply with the terms of his/her bail recognisance.
IT WAS ORDERED AS FOLLOWS:
Arrest the said accused and bring him/her before me or another Judge to be dealt with according to the law.”
The within judicial review proceedings were instituted by way of an ex parte application to the High Court (Noonan J.) on 3 December 2018.
The Director of Public Prosecutions has raised an objection that the submissions made before the High Court went beyond the grounds upon which leave has been...
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