Director Public Prosecutions v Collopy

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Judge: Clarke C.J.,Dunne J.,Irvine J.
• Judgment Date: 25 November 2019
• Neutral Citation: [2019] IESCDET 276
• Court: Supreme Court
• Docket Number: S:AP:IE:2019:000088 Bill No LKDP0049/2016

DETERMINATION

THE PEOPLE AT THE SUIT OF THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS

AND

BRIAN COLLOPY

APPLICANT

[2019] IESCDET 276

Clarke C.J.

Dunne J.

Irvine J.

S:AP:IE:2019:000088

2016 No. 204

Bill No LKDP0049/2016

THE SUPREME COURT

APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL TO WHICH ARTICLE 34.5.3° OF THE CONSTITUTION APPLIES

RESULT: The Court does not grant leave to the Applicant to appeal to this Court from the Court of Appeal

REASONS GIVEN:

General Considerations

1 The general principles applied by this Court in determining whether to grant or refuse leave to appeal having regard to the criteria incorporated into the Constitution as a result of the 33rd Amendment have now been considered in a large number of determinations and are fully addressed in both a determination issued by a panel consisting of all of the members of this Court in B.S. v Director of Public Prosecutions (2017) IESCDET 134 and in a unanimous judgment of a full Court delivered by O'Donnell J. in Price Waterhouse Coopers (A Firm) v Quinn Insurance Ltd. (Under Administration) [2017] IESC 73. The additional criteria required to be met in order that a so-called ‘leapfrog appeal’ direct from the High Court to this Court can be permitted were addressed by a full panel of the Court in Wansboro v Director of Public Prosecutions (2017) IESCDET 115. It follows that it is unnecessary to revisit the new constitutional architecture for the purposes of this determination.

2 Furthermore the application for leave filed and the respondent's notice is published along with this determination (subject only to any redaction required by law) and it is therefore unnecessary to set out the position of the parties.

3 In that context it should be noted that the respondent does oppose the grant of leave.

Background

4 This case concerns an appeal against the ex tempore judgment delivered in the Court of Appeal on 10 December 2018 by Edwards J. The applicant herein appealed against the severity of a sentence imposed upon him by the Limerick Circuit Criminal Court. The background to the case is briefly that on 5 April 2016, the applicant signed pleas of guilty to a number of drugs offences, including an offence contrary to s. 15A of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977 as amended (“the Act of 1977”), an offence contrary to s. 15 of the Act of 1977 and an offence contrary to s. 3 of the Act of 1977. These pleas were later affirmed by the applicant at the Limerick Circuit Criminal Court on 15 April 2016.

5 The sentencing hearing took place at the Limerick Circuit Criminal Court on 18 July 2016, and judgment was reserved. On 20 July 2016, the applicant received a sentence of 8 years' imprisonment on the S.15A offence, backdated to 15 December 2015.

6 The Court of Appeal, in its judgment at paragraph 10, made reference to certain remarks made by the sentencing judge, including inter alia:

“… I do take into account, however, having considered all matters, that there are exceptional and specific circumstances which allow the Court to depart from the minimum presumptive, and in having considered this particular case, I would believe that the appropriate tariff in the mid-range of matters is between six and 10 years. And having considered all the aggravating factors and the mitigating factors in this matter, I'm going to impose a sentence of eight years on each of the accused on count number 1, and I'm going to backdate that to the 15th of December 2015 which is the date that both accused went into custody.”

7 The Court of Appeal then went on to engage with a detailed analysis of the mitigating and aggravating factors in the case and in dismissing the appeal, said at para 23:

“We consider that but for the fact that the appellant signed a plea, it would have been difficult for him to have avoided the...