Doherty v Quigley

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Judge: Mr. Justice John Murray
• Judgment Date: 24 June 2015
• Neutral Citation: [2015] IESC 54
• Docket Number: [Appeal No. 303/2011]
• Court: Supreme Court
• Date: 24 June 2015

Between

Dana Doherty (A Person of Unsound Mind Not so Found by Inquisition) Suing by her Next Friend Fintan Gallagher

Respondent/Plaintiff

and

Michael Quigley

Appellant/Defendant

[2015] IESC 54

Murray J.

O'Donnell J.

Laffoy J.

[Appeal No. 303/2011]

THE SUPREME COURT

Personal injuries – Sexual assault – Statute of Limitations – Appellant seeking to appeal against High Court order on grounds of errors in fact and in law – Whether respondent”s action was statute barred

Facts: The respondent/plaintiff, Ms Doherty, was awarded €400,000 damages by the High Court for sexual assault and unlawful sexual intercourse with her by the appellant/defendant, Mr Quigley, which persisted over many years commencing when the respondent was 12 years old in 1982. It was common case that the last assault occurred in 1989. A letter of claim was issued by the plaintiff in September, 2006, and she received authorisations from the Personal Injuries Assessment Board (PIAB) in February, 2007. The plenary summons initiating the proceedings was issued in September, 2007. It was also common case that the respondent”s claim against the appellant was statute barred by virtue of the provisions of the Statute of Limitations Act, 1957, unless the respondent was entitled, as the High Court so held, to benefit from the provisions of s.48A of that Act, as inserted by s.2 of the Statute of Limitations Amendment Act, 2000, as being a person whose ability to bring proceedings was substantially impaired by reason of the sexual abuse committed on her by the appellant. The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court against the decision of the High Court on the grounds that the trial judge erred in fact and in law in holding that the respondent was entitled to rely on s.48A of the Act of 2000, by reason of which the proceedings were not statute barred. The appellant did not raise any issue concerning the liability, as such, of the appellant to the respondent for the sexual assault and abuse committed on her, nor the quantum of damages. The sole issue raised by the appellant in the appeal was whether, having regard to the facts of the case, the trial judge was correct in law in holding that the provisions of s.48A of the 1957 Act, as amended, applied to the claim as brought by the respondent, therefore not making the action statute barred. The core contention of the appellant in the appeal was that the entirety of the plaintiff”s claim was statute barred by virtue of the provisions of the 1957 Act. The appellant accepted that the principles set out in Hay v O”Grady [1992] 1 IR 210, applied to the manner in which the Supreme Court should approach the findings of the trial judge based on the evidence at the trial.

Held by Murray J that since s.48A is concerned with the existence of a psychological injury to a plaintiff, and the effects of that psychological injury on his or her capacity to make a decision about bringing proceedings, it must be a matter for the trial judge to determine whether the particular claimant, given her particular circumstances, has been ‘substantially impaired’ in the manner referred to in s.48A; the onus is on a plaintiff, relying on s.48A, to establish the necessary factual basis from which a trial court can properly conclude, on the balance of probabilities, that the section applies to him or her. Murray J did not consider the appellant”s objection to the trial judge”s conclusions on the grounds that they were not based on an objective, or sufficiently objective, analysis of the facts pertaining to the respondent to be well founded. Murray J held that the trial judge”s conclusions concerning the psychological condition of the respondent and the impact which it had on her capacity or ability to bring the proceedings was anchored in the evidence tendered by her. Murray J held that there was ample evidence before the trial judge which entitled him to reach the conclusions he did, namely, that the respondent”s ability to bring the proceedings prior to 2007 was substantially impaired due to psychological injury resulting from acts of sexual abuse perpetrated by the appellant. The appellant did not establish, in Murray J”s view, any grounds for impugning the findings and conclusions of the trial judge.

Murray J held that the Court should dismiss the appeal.

Appeal dismissed.

Mr. Justice John Murray

1 In these proceedings the above named plaintiff, who is the respondent in this appeal, was awarded €400,000 damages by the High Court for sexual assault and unlawful sexual intercourse with her by the appellant, which persisted over many years commencing when the respondent was 12 years old. The respondent was born in April, 1970, and the sexual assault and abuse commenced in 1982. It is common case that the last assault occurred in 1989. So far as these proceedings are concerned, a letter of claim was issued by the plaintiff in September, 2006, and she received authorisations from the Personal Injuries Assessment Board (PIAB) on 22nd February, 2007. The plenary summons initiating these proceedings was issued on 16th September, 2007.

2 It is also common case that the respondent's claim against the appellant is statute barred by virtue of the provisions of the Statute of Limitations Act, 1957, unless the respondent was entitled, as the High Court so held, to benefit from the provisions of s.48A of that Act, as inserted by s.2 of the Statute of Limitations Amendment Act, 2000, as being a person whose ability to bring proceedings was substantially impaired by reason of the sexual abuse committed on her by the appellant.

3 The appellant appealed against the decision of the High Court on the grounds that the learned trial judge erred in fact and in law in holding that the respondent was entitled to rely on s.48A of the Act of 2000, by reason of which these proceedings were not statute barred. This Court dismissed the appeal at the conclusion of the hearing in July, 2014, having stated that it was satisfied that the learned High Court judge's decision was correct in law and justified by the evidence which was before him. This judgment contains the detailed reasons for the Court's dismissal of the appellant's appeal.

4 In this appeal, the appellant did not raise any issue concerning the liability, as such, of the appellant to the respondent for the sexual assault and abuse committed on her, nor the quantum of damages. The sole issue raised by the appellant in the appeal is whether, having regard to the facts of the case, the learned trial judge was correct in law in holding that the provisions of s.48A of the Statute of Limitations Act, 1957, as amended, applied to the claim as brought by the respondent and, therefore, the action was not statute barred. The core contention of the appellant in the appeal is that the entire of the plaintiff's claim was statute barred by virtue of the provisions of the Statute of Limitations Act, 1957, as amended.

5 It is common case that the respondent's civil claim for damages against the defendant would, ordinarily, be statute barred by virtue of the provisions of the Statute of Limitations Act, 1957, as amended, because the respondent brought her proceedings well outside the limited statutory period for bringing such a claim.

However, the respondent had relied, in answer to any plea that her claim was statute barred by the effluxion of time, on s.48A of the Act of 1957, which had been inserted in that Act by s.2 of the Statute of Limitations (Amendment) Act, 2000. That inserted a new provision providing for an exception to the normal limitation period on the grounds of the disability of persons for the purpose of bringing certain actions arising out of acts of sexual abuse. The relevant provisions of that section are as follows:

‘2. The Statute of Limitations, 1957, is hereby amended by the insertion of the following section after section 48:

48A. (1) A person shall, for the purpose of bringing an action –

(a) founded on tort in respect of an act of sexual abuse committed against him or her at a time when he or she had not yet reached full age, or

(b) against a person (other than the person who committed that act), claiming damages for negligence or breach of duty where the damages claimed consist of or include damages in respect of personal injuries caused by such act,

be under a disability while he or she is suffering from any psychological injury that —

(i) is caused, in whole or in part, by that act, or any other act, of the person who committed the first-mentioned act, and

(ii) is of such significance that his or her will, or his or her ability to make a reasoned decision, to bring such action is substantially impaired.’

6 Central to the appellant's appeal was his contention that the learned High Court judge erred in fact and in law in holding that s.48(A) of the 2000 Act applied, and specifically as regards his conclusion that the will or ability of the respondent to bring proceedings ‘was so impaired as to prevent her bringing a civil claim’.

7 It was submitted that the learned trial judge, in his analysis of this issue, ignored such matters as the fact that the respondent had reported the abuse to a local G.P. in 1990, had confronted the appellant himself on two occasions between 1990 and 1992, and had made a formal complaint to the gardaí in August, 1993, which led to the questioning of the appellant. Also, it was submitted she was the principal prosecution witness in the prosecution of the appellant in the year 2000 and in the year 2007. She had been examined on behalf of the D.P.P. on two occasions in 1998 and 2001 by Dr. Steven Clarke, who compiled reports. She had issued a press release after the second prosecution failed stating that she would prosecute a civil claim against her abuser. It was also submitted that the learned trial judge erred in fact in accepting the conclusions of Professor...