DPP v C

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Judge: Birmingham P
• Judgment Date: 29 October 2020
• Neutral Citation: [2020] IECA 292
• Court: Court of Appeal (Ireland)
• Docket Number: [2019 No. 493]

BETWEEN

THE PEOPLE AT THE SUIT OF THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS

RESPONDENT

AND

E.C. AND MEDIA OUTLETS

APPELLANTS

[2020] IECA 292

The President

Kennedy J.

Ní Raifeartaigh J.

[2019 No. 493]

THE COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL

Reporting restrictions – Children Act 2001 s. 252 – Murder – Appellants seeking to lift the reporting restrictions that had been imposed by the High Court – Whether the definition of ‘child’ in the Children Act 2001 includes a deceased person who died before attaining their majority

Facts: The appellant allegedly suffocated her three-year old daughter. When charged with murder, she pleaded not guilty to murder by reason of insanity. On the application of the respondent, the Director of Public Prosecutions, the High Court ordered that reporting restrictions be imposed which would prevent the identification of the deceased child. The practical effect of the restriction meant that the accused could not be identified. Before the case was opened by the prosecution, an application was made by counsel on behalf of the appellant, seeking to lift the reporting restrictions that had been imposed by the High Court. Ruling on the matter, the High Court judge commented that the wording of s. 252 of the Children Act 2001 was clear and that she did not think that it was in conflict with the constitutional imperative in relation to the administration of justice in public. Accordingly, she felt it appropriate to continue the reporting restrictions. Appealing to the Court of Appeal, the media appellants argued that the definition of ‘child’ in the 2001 Act does not include a deceased person who died before attaining their majority.

Held by the Court that it was so clear as to be almost beyond argument that the Court proceedings involving the appellant were Court proceedings in respect of an offence against a child. In the Court’s view, it is not possible to interpret the section as not including a deceased person who was a child at the time of death. Neither, in the Court’s view, is it possible to exclude proceedings relating to offences committed against a child, as a child, if they come on for hearing after the child has attained his or her majority.

The Court held that the interpretation of the section in issue by the High Court judge was correct, and accordingly, the appeal would be dismissed.

Appeal dismissed.

JUDGMENT of the President delivered on the 29 ^th day of October 2020 by Birmingham P .

1 This case raises the question of whether restrictions apply to the identification of a child homicide victim when an individual stands trial in relation to the homicide; and whether, if the effect of identifying the person charged with an offence would be to identify the deceased child victim, that means that the person charged cannot be named or identified.

Background

2 The background to the case is that it was alleged that the respondent, Ms. C, had suffocated her three-year old daughter. In fact, Ms. C accepted responsibility for the death of her daughter, but when charged with murder, pleaded not guilty to murder by reason of insanity. A jury was empanelled in this matter on 21 ^st October 2019 before White J. who had charge of the list in the Central Criminal Court on the date in question. On the application of the DPP. with the apparent concurrence of the accused, White J. ordered that reporting restrictions be imposed which would prevent the identification of the deceased child. The practical effect of the restriction meant that the accused could not be identified. The trial did not commence that day, but was assigned to Stewart J. to start on 22 ^nd October 2019. Before the case was opened by the prosecution, an application was made by counsel on behalf of the appellant, seeking to lift the reporting restrictions that had been imposed by White J. It appears that counsel on behalf of a number of media outlets, who are now the appellants in the present proceedings, initially made an application to White J. on 22 ^nd October 2019, but that he took the view that Stewart J. now had seisin of the proceedings and that it was more appropriate that any such application should be made to her. Stewart J. declined to interfere with the order made by her colleague, but instead, determined to continue the order that had already been made by White J. The order of Stewart J. was set out in the following terms:

“IT IS ORDERED that no report in respect of the within proceedings which reveals the name, address or school of the deceased or includes any particulars likely to lead to the identification of the deceased and no picture which purports to be or includes a picture of the deceased or which is likely to lead to an identification of the deceased shall be published or included in a broadcast pursuant to section 252(1) of the Children Act 2001.”

3 In moving the application to annul the order that had been made by White J., counsel on behalf of the media commented that s. 252 related to circumstances where the victim of the crime is still alive and exists to protect that child in circumstances where they may be a witness. This prompted the judge to intervene to ask “but where does it say that in the section?”, to which counsel was forced to answer “[w]ell, it doesn't explicitly say it, Judge, in fact”. However, counsel said that the point he was making was that a reasonable reading would be that the section was about protecting living children and that the knock-on effect of the order of White J. was that it prohibited the identification of the accused in this case. He observed that the effect of the order was to unfairly prohibit the Press from reporting on the case as they were entitled to do under Bunreacht na...