DPP v Douglas
| Jurisdiction | Ireland |
| Judge | Mr. Justice Mahon |
| Judgment Date | 21 December 2015 |
| Neutral Citation | [2015] IECA 320 |
| Docket Number | Appeal No.: 269/2012 |
| Court | Court of Appeal (Ireland) |
| Date | 21 December 2015 |
[2015] IECA 320
THE COURT OF APPEAL
Mahon J.
Appeal No.: 269/2012
Birmingham J.
Sheehan J.
Mahon J.
Conviction — Murder — Admission of evidence — Appellant seeking to appeal against conviction — Whether certain statements ought not to have been admitted into evidence
Facts: The appellant, Mr Douglas, on the evening of 20th February 2010, while the deceased, Mr Byrne, was sitting in the front passenger seat of a motor vehicle, allegedly fired a total of ten bullets into his body at Drumalee Avenue in the City of Dublin. Mr Byrne was taken by ambulance to the Mater Hospital where he was pronounced dead. The appellant was arrested on suspicion of the murder of Mr Byrne on 6th March, 2010. Having being questioned over a period of time he was then released from custody and re-arrested on 11th March 2010, and was charged on that date with the murder of Mr Byrne. Following a trial at the Central Criminal Court, on 23rd July 2012 the appellant was convicted by a jury of the murder of Mr Byrne. He was duly sentenced to life imprisonment. The appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal against his conviction. The appellant contended that the trial judge erred in law and in fact in admitting into evidence the statements of Ms Douglas, a step-niece of the appellant, and her partner, Mr Sheridan, pursuant to s. 16 of the Criminal Justice Act 2006. It was argued that a number of features in the taking of the unsworn statements from the two individuals ought to have rendered them inadmissible. The respondent, the DPP, contended that the statements were properly admitted into evidence in circumstances where the trial judge, prior to making the decision to admit them into evidence had the opportunity to hear the evidence and assess the demeanour of the witnesses involved in the making of those statements. The appellant contended that the trial judge erred in law and in fact in wrongly refusing to discharge the jury following a reference to “gangland killings” by Det. Gda. Quirke in the course of his evidence. It was suggested that there was a repetitive use of the word “gangland”, and that the trial judge ought not to have referred to the term whatsoever when addressing the jury. The appellant contended that the trial judge erred in law and in fact in holding that Ms Douglas and Mr Sheridan were not accomplice witnesses, and that he failed to caution the jury of the danger of acting on the un-corroborated testimonies of both these witnesses. The DPP submitted that in no legal sense could Ms Douglas and Mr Sheridan be regarded as accomplices, and that in any event, it was most unlikely that they would have been charged with any offence. The appellant also submitted that the trial judge was incorrect in declining his application to discharge the jury.
Held by Mahon J that the trial judge did not err in his decision to admit the evidence of the statements of Ms Douglas and Mr Sheridan, on the basis that they were a matter ultimately for the jury to decide as to their truthfulness and voluntariness, and to do so in the context of their subsequent rejection of their content and the steps taken to withdraw the statements and/or make new statements. The Court was satisfied that the jury was, in the overall context of the trial, made aware that the issues arising in relation to the unsworn statements concerned their truthfulness and voluntary nature; it was held to be most unlikely that the jury did not fully understand and appreciate their task in relation thereto. Mahon J noted that the reference to “gangland murder” was made at a very early stage of a lengthy trial, and was comprehensively addressed with the jury on the following day by the trial judge, and in a manner which was likely to have negated any risk of prejudice towards the appellant that may have arisen from the use of the term. The Court held that Ms Douglas and Mr Sheridan were not accomplices in the sense that they had had any involvement in the commission of the murder, even at the most minimum level; furthermore, the active steps taken by both witnesses to repudiate the content of their written statements could only have very much diluted any suggestion that they could reasonably be considered as accomplices, or should reasonably be viewed as accomplices for the purposes of requiring a warning to be given to the jury. The Court was satisfied that the trial judge was correct when he declined the application to discharge the jury for any of the reasons submitted to him in the course of the trial.
Mahon J held that the appeal be dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.
Following a trial at the Central Criminal Court which lasted nine days, on 23rd July 2012 the appellant was convicted by a jury (on a majority vote of 11 to 1) of the murder of Aidan Byrne at Drumalee Avenue in the City of Dublin on 20th February 2010. He was duly sentenced to life imprisonment. The appellant has appealed against his conviction.
The prosecution case against the appellant was that on the evening of 20th February 2010, and while Mr. Byrne was sitting in the front passenger seat of a motor vehicle, the appellant fired a total of ten bullets into his body. He was taken by ambulance to the Mater Hospital where he was pronounced dead. The appellant was arrested on suspicion of the murder of Mr. Byrne on 6th March, 2010. Having being questioned over a period of time he was then released from custody and re-arrested on 11th March 2010, and was charged on that date with the murder of Mr. Byrne.
The appellant relies on seven grounds of appeal. For convenience, these can be considered under the following four broad headings:-
(i) The admission into evidence of certain statements
(ii) The reference to ‘gangland killing’ in the course of the trial
(iii) The accomplice issue
(iv) The refusal to discharge the jury
Section 16 of the Criminal Justice Act 2006
(1) Where a person has being sent forward for trial for an arrestable offence, a statement relevant to the proceeding made by a witness (in this section referred to as ‘the statement’) may, with the leave of the court, in accordance with this section, as evidence of any fact mentioned in it if the witness, although available for cross examination -
(a) refuses to give evidence,
(b) denies making the statement, or
(c) gives evidence which is materially inconsistent with it.
(2) The statement may be so admitted if –
(a) the witness confirms, or it is proved, that he or she made it
(b) the court is satisfied:-
(i) that direct oral evidence of the fact concerned would be admissible in the proceedings,
(ii) that it was made voluntarily, and
(iii) that it is reliable, and
(c) either –
(i) the statement was given on oath or affirmation or contains a statutory declaration by the witness to the effect that the statement is true to the best of his or her knowledge or belief, or
(ii) the court is otherwise satisfied that when the statement was made the witness understood the requirement to tell the truth.
(d) gives evidence which is materially inconsistent with it.
(3) In deciding whether the statement is reliable, the court shall have regard to –
(a) whether it was given on oath or affirmation or was video recorded or,
(b) if para (a) does not apply in relation to the statement, whether by reason of the circumstances in which it was made, there is other sufficient evidence in support of its reliability,
and shall also have regard to -
(i) any explanation by the witness for refusing to give evidence or for giving evidence which is inconsistent with the statement, or
(ii) where the witness denies making the statement, any evidence given in relation to the denial,
(4) The statement shall not be admitted in evidence under this court if the court is of the opinion –
(a) having had regard to all the circumstances, including any risks that its admission would be unfair to the accused or if there are more than one accused, to any of them, that in the interests of justice it ought not be admitted, or
(b) that its submission is unnecessary, having regard to other evidence given in the proceedings.
(5) In estimating the weight, if any, to be attached to the statement regard shall be had to all the circumstances from which any inference can reasonably be drawn as to its accuracy or otherwise.
(6) This section is without prejudice to s. 3 to 6 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1865 and s. 21 (Proof by Written Statement) of the Act of 1984).’
In the course of their investigation of the murder of Mr. Byrne, the gardaí, on 6th March 2010, called to 23 Ashford Street, Dublin 7 at about 8.55 am, being the home of Stacey Douglas and her partner, Andrew Sheridan. Ms. Douglas is a step-niece of the appellant. The gardaí, acting on foot of a search warrant, searched the couple's home. In the course of the search, a small number of drugs, believed to be the property of Mr. Sheridan were found and seized by the gardaí. Ms. Douglas and Mr. Sheridan were conveyed in separate garda patrol cars to the Bridewell Garda Station, where statements were taken from both individuals. The statements were not video taped, although video tape facilities were available in the Bridewell Garda Station. Subsequent to the taking of the statements, the statements were read back over to the two individuals whereupon they signed them page by page. The reading back of the statements and their signing was video recorded.
In her statement, Ms. Douglas said that the appellant, her step uncle, knocked at her front door at around ten to, or five to, nine on 20th...
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