DPP v Galvin

JurisdictionIreland
JudgeMr. Justice Geoghegan
Judgment Date30 April 1999
Neutral Citation[1999] IEHC 227
Docket NumberNo. 1770 S.S./1998,[1998 No. 1770 SS]
CourtHigh Court
Date30 April 1999

[1999] IEHC 227

THE HIGH COURT

No. 1770 S.S./1998
DPP v. GALVIN
IN THE MATTER OF SECTION 2 OF THE SUMMARY JURISDICTION ACT, 1857AND IN THE MATTER OF SECTION 51 OF THE COURTS (SUPPLEMENTAL PROVISIONS)ACT, 196

BETWEEN

THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
APPELLANT

AND

MICHAEL GALVIN
RESPONDENT

Citations:

SUMMARY JURISDICTION ACT 1857 S2

COURTS (SUPPLEMENTAL PROVISIONS) ACT 1961 S51

COURTS (SUPPLEMENTAL PROVISIONS) ACT 1961 S51(1)

SUMMARY JURISDICTION ACT 1857 S4

KEAN V ROBINSON 1910 2 IR 306

CORK CO COUNCIL V COMMISSIONERS OF PUBLIC WORKS 1943 77 ILTR 195

SUMMARY JURISDICTION ACT 1857 S6

Synopsis

- [1999] 4 IR 18 - [1999] 2 ILRM 277

While the case stated procedure normally contemplated that the case would return to the same District judge because the case stated itself arose from a particular view which that particular judge took of the law, this case could not go back to Judge Clifford, who had acquitted the respondent by direction of a charge under s.49(2) and (6)(a) of the Road Traffic Act 1961 and had since been appointed a judge of the Circuit Court. The court had no jurisdiction to entertain the case stated. Even if it was thought sensible and reasonable that a judge of the District Court who had been promoted to the Circuit Court should be allowed to sign a case stated after the date of his promotion, it would require a statutory amendment to permit this to be done. The court was unable to interpret s.2 of the Summary Jurisdiction Act 1857 combined with s.51 of the 1961 Act as in fact permitting it. The High Court so held in refusing the relief claimed.

1

Mr. Justice Geoghegandelivered the 30th day of April, 1999.

2

This case came before me as a purported appeal by way of Case Stated from the District Court. The appeal is from an acquittal by direction at the end of the prosecution case in the trial of a charge under Section 49(2) and (6)(a) of the Road Traffic Act, 1961as inserted by Section 10 of the Road Traffic Act, 1994(as amended by the Road Traffic Act, 1995). The Appellant is therefore the Director of Public Prosecutions. A preliminary objection as to the jurisdiction of this Court to hear the Case Stated has been raised on behalfof the Respondent. The objection is that as of the date of the signing of the Case Stated. the Judge who had tried the case in the District Court had been appointed a Judge of the Circuit Court and was therefore no longer a Judge of the District Court. Indeed, the Case Stated itself commences with the words:-

"This is a Case Stated by me, John Clifford. Judge of the Circuit Court, pursuant to Section 2 of the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1857 as extended by Section 51 of the Courts (Supplemental Provisions) Act, 1961".

3

The case is signed by John P. Clifford with the words "Judge of the Circuit Court" underneath the signature.

4

It is of course well established that the observance of the preliminary requirements under the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1857 is a condition precedent to the jurisdiction of the High Court to hear the Case Stated. I think it important to cite in full Section 2 of the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1857. That section reads as follows:-

"After the Hearing and Determination by a Justice or Justices of the Peace of any information or complaint which he or they have power to determine in a summary way, by any law now in force or hereafter to be made. either party to the proceeding before the said Justice or Justices may, if dissatisfied with the said determination as being erroneous in point of law, apply in writing within three days after the same to the said Justice or Justices, to state and sign a case setting forth the facts and the grounds of such determination. for the opinion thereon of one of the Superior Courts of law to be named by the party applying; and such party, hereinafter called "theappellant" shall within three days after receiving such case transmit the same to the Court named in his application first giving notice in writing of such appeal. with a copy of the case so stated and signed. to the other party to the proceeding in which the determination was given hereinafter called the respondent."

5

That section has been extended by Section 51 of the Courts (Supplemental Provisions) Act. 1961. For the purposes of this judgment I find it necessary only to cite Sub-section (1) of that section which reads as follows:-

"Section 2 of the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1857, is hereby extended so as to enable any party to any proceedings whatsoever heard and determined by a Justice of the District Court (other than proceedings relating to an indictable offence which was not dealt with summarily by the Court) if dissatisfied with such determination as being erroneous on a point of law. to apply in writing within fourteen days after such determination to the said Justice to state and sign a case setting forth the facts and the grounds of such determination for the opinion thereon of the High Court."

6

Although the jurisdiction of the Justices of the Peace is now vested in the District Court rather than in an individual Judge of the District Court, it is exercisable by the particular Judge of the District Court assigned to hear the particular case. The expression "the said Justice" is used in Section 51(1) of the 1961 Act and it is therefore clearly intended that the Judge of the District Court who hears the case signs the Case Stated. But in my view it is also implicit particularly in the wording of Section 51 that at the time of the signing of the Case Stated the particular Judge is still a Judge of the District Court. If for instancebetween the hearing of the summons and the signing of the Case Stated the particular Judge of the District Court had resigned from the bench and become say a company director or secretary of a golf club, could it seriously be suggested that he would still be entitled to sign the Case Stated? I do not believe it could...

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3 cases
  • DPP v Robert Canavan
    • Ireland
    • High Court
    • 6 February 2007
    ...Case Stated. There is considerable authority for the proposition that s. 2 must be strictly construed. For example in D.P.P. v. Galvin [1999] 4 I.R. 18 the D.P.P. appealed an acquittal in the District Court by way of Case Stated. The judge who heard the case in the District Court was made ......
  • DPP v Larkin
    • Ireland
    • High Court
    • 21 January 2019
    ...jurisdiction to entertain an appeal by way of case stated if the judge who stated it was no longer a member of the District Court. In DPP v. Galvin [1999] 4 I.R. 18 it was held that the case must be remitted to the judge who stated the case. In that case, the District Court judge who state......
  • ELG (a minor suing by her mother and next friend SG) v Health Service Executive
    • Ireland
    • Supreme Court
    • 20 December 2021
    ...question the parties seek an answer on is moot. 28 . Jurisdiction in the true sense was the issue before the High Court in DPP v. Galvin [1999] 4 I.R. 18, where Geoghegan J. considered an appeal by way of case stated, and concluded that the court had no jurisdiction to hear a case stated be......

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