DPP v Glennon
| Jurisdiction | Ireland |
| Judge | Clarke C.J.,Dunne J.,O'Malley J. |
| Judgment Date | 16 April 2019 |
| Neutral Citation | [2019] IESCDET 85 |
| Court | Supreme Court |
| Date | 16 April 2019 |
[2019] IESCDET 85
THE SUPREME COURT
DETERMINATION
Clarke C.J.
Dunne J.
O'Malley J.
RESULT: The Court does not grant leave to the Applicant to appeal to this Court from the Court of Appeal
| COURT: Court of Appeal |
| DATE OF JUDGMENT OR RULING: 28 th June, 2018 |
| DATE OF ORDER: 28 th June, 2018 |
| DATE OF PERFECTION OF ORDER: 28 th November, 2018 |
| THE APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL WAS MADE ON 21 st December, 2018 AND WAS IN TIME. |
1. The general principles applied by this Court in determining whether to grant or refuse leave to appeal having regard to the criteria incorporated into the Constitution as a result of the 33 rd Amendment have now been considered in a large number of determinations and are fully addressed in both a determination issued by a panel consisting of all of the members of this Court in B.S. v Director of Public Prosecutions [2017] IESCDET 134 and in a unanimous judgment of a full Court delivered by O'Donnell J. in Price Waterhouse Coopers (A Firm) v Quinn Insurance Ltd. (Under Administration) [2017] IESC 73. The additional criteria required to be met in order that a so-called “leapfrog appeal” direct from the High Court to this Court can be permitted were addressed by a full panel of the Court in Wansboro v Director of Public Prosecutions (2017) IESCDET 115. Accordingly it is unnecessary to revisit the new constitutional architecture for the purpose of this determination.
The application for leave filed, and the respondent's notice thereto, are published along with this determination (subject only to any redaction required by law) and it is therefore unnecessary to set out the position of the parties in detail.
This application relates to the decision of the Court of Appeal dismissing the applicant's appeal against his conviction by the Special Criminal Court of the offence of membership of an unlawful organisation (see The People at the Suit of the Director of Public Prosecutions v Glennon [2018] IECA 211).
The date specified in the indictment was the 13th May, 2015. The trial court admitted and accepted, pursuant to s. 3(2) of the Offences Against the State Act 1972, the evidence of a Chief Superintendent that he believed the applicant to have been, on that date, a member of the organisation styling itself the Irish Republican Army, otherwise known as Óglaigh na hÉireann, otherwise known as the IRA. The trial court was satisfied that his belief was not based either upon the matters outlined in evidence by other witnesses or the conduct of the applicant in the course of interviews, but arose from his analysis of documentation, over which he had claimed privilege. The court was offered but declined an opportunity to read the material.
It is clear that the involvement of the Chief Superintendent in the case had come about relatively shortly before the trial, in circumstances where he had taken on additional responsibilities due to the retirement of another officer. He preferred not to answer a question as to how long he had held his belief, on the basis of potential unfairness to the applicant but also for fear that his answer might go behind the privilege claim. He stated that the information came from diverse sources. He did not offer any additional information about the applicant beyond the fact of his belief – for example, there was no evidence of association with persons previously convicted of membership, or of possession of what is commonly termed ‘Republican paraphernalia’.
The judgment sets out the lengthy experience of the Chief Superintendent and the relevance of his various roles to the issues before the Court. In accepting his belief evidence, the trial court stated that it had regard to his position in An Garda Síochána, his 30 years” experience in the Crime and Security Division, and the specific roles and responsibilities he had held in terms of the handling of particular forms of information.
7. Having referred to the judgment of Hardiman J. in Redmond v Ireland [2015] IESC 98, the court stated that it could not convict solely on the basis of the belief evidence, particularly since privilege had been claimed, since to do so would render the prosecution case effectively unchallengeable. In this context the trial court acknowledged that the defence could not test or challenge the evidence, particularly where privilege was claimed over the material that led to the formation of the belief. The court therefore considered that the evidence would have to be supported by independent corroborative evidence.
The court found such evidence in, firstly, the inferences drawn by it (under s. 2 of the Offences Against the State (Amendment) Act 1998) from what it described as the ‘deliberate’ and ‘comprehensive’ refusal of the applicant to answer material questions put to him on Garda questioning. The judgment sets out the questions put to the applicant over the course of five interviews in considerable detail.
Secondly, the trial court relied upon evidence of surveillance of the applicant. On the 9th May, 2015 he had been seen with two other persons, being his brother and a Mr Costigan. Amongst other sightings, they had been observed at a carpark in Wexford while a number of bags were transferred from one car into the boot of a car being driven by the applicant. The bags were described as a red holdall, canvas shopping bags with a beige logo and a Lidl reusable shopping bag. Some hours later the men were observed at a house in Co. Wexford. The house was a holiday home owned by the applicant's parents.
Thirdly, the court relied upon evidence resulting from a search of that house on the 13th May, 2015, when a large quantity of explosive material and associated paraphernalia was found. The applicant's fingerprint was found on a cart or trolley to which a water butt containing of some of the explosive...
To continue reading
Request your trial