DPP v K.A.
| Jurisdiction | Ireland |
| Judge | McKechnie J.,O'Donnell J. |
| Judgment Date | 12 December 2019 |
| Neutral Citation | [2019] IESCDET 292 |
| Date | 12 December 2019 |
| Court | Supreme Court |
| Docket Number | S:AP:IE:2019:000125 2017 No. 149 Bill No CCDP 0081/2015 |
[2019] IESCDET 292
THE SUPREME COURT
DETERMINATION
O'Donnell J.
McKechnie J.
Dunne J.
S:AP:IE:2019:000125
2017 No. 149
Bill No CCDP 0081/2015
RESULT: The Court does not grant leave to the Applicant to appeal to this Court from the Court of Appeal
REASONS GIVEN:
ORDER SOUGHT TO BE APPEALED
| COURT: Court of Appeal |
| DATE OF JUDGMENT OR RULING: 26th February, 2019 |
| DATE OF ORDER: 26th February, 2019 |
| DATE OF PERFECTION OF ORDERS: 10th June, 2019 |
| THE APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL WAS MADE ON 25th June, 2019 AND WAS IN TIME. |
This determination relates to an application for leave to appeal a judgment of the Court of Appeal delivered by McCarthy J. (Birmingham P. and Whelan J. concurring) on the 26th February, 2019 and the resulting order of the 26th February, 2019 which was perfected on 10th June, 2019. Mr. K.A. was convicted on the 27th March, 2017 on a charge of rape, contrary to s. 48 of the Offences Against the Person Act, 1861 and s. 2 of the Criminal Law (Rape) Act 1981 as amended by s. 21 of the Criminal Law (Rape) (Amendment) Act 1990 and was then sentenced on the 29th May, 2019 to a ten-year sentence with the final year being suspended, by Kennedy J.
The Court of Appeal delivered two judgments in the matter however this application relates only to the judgment on his appeal of the sentence ( [2019] IECA 53) and not the judgment relating to the conviction ( [2018] IECA 186).
The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to hear appeals is set out in the Constitution. As is clear from the terms of Article 34.5.3° of the Constitution, it is necessary, in order for this Court to grant leave to appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeal, that the Court is satisfied that there are circumstances which have the presence of either or both of the following factors: i) that the decision sought to be appealed involves a matter of general public importance, or ii) the interests of justice.
The general principles applied by this Court in determining whether to grant or refuse leave to appeal having regard to the criteria incorporated into the Constitution as a result of the 33rd Amendment have now been considered in a large number of determinations and are fully addressed in both a determination issued by a panel consisting of all of the members of this Court in B.S. v Director of Public Prosecutions [2017] IESCDET 134 and in a unanimous judgment of a full Court delivered by O'Donnell J. in Price Waterhouse Coopers (A Firm) v Quinn Insurance Ltd. (Under Administration) [2017] IESC 73. The additional criteria required to be met in order that a so-called ‘leapfrog appeal’ direct from the High Court to this Court can be permitted were addressed by a full panel of the Court in Wansboro v Director of Public Prosecutions [2017] IESCDET 115. It follows that it is unnecessary to revisit the new constitutional architecture for the purposes of this determination.
It should be noted that any ruling in a determination is between the parties. It is final and conclusive as far as the parties are concerned, and is a decision in relation to that application only. The issue determined on the application for leave is whether the facts and legal issues meet the constitutional criteria to enable this Court to hear an appeal. It will not, save in the rarest of circumstances, be appropriate to rely on a refusal of leave as having a precedential value in relation to the substantive issues in the context of a different case. Where leave is granted, any issue canvassed in the application will in due course be disposed of in the substantive decision of the Court.
Furthermore, the application for leave filed and the respondent's notice are published along with this determination (subject only to any redaction required by law) and it is therefore unnecessary to set out the position of the parties.
In that context it should be noted that the respondent does oppose the grant of leave and neither party has requested the making of a preliminary reference under Article 267 TFEU.
On the 27th March, 2017, following a unanimous jury verdict, Mr K.A. was convicted of one count of rape contrary to s. 48 of the Offences Against the Person 1861 and s. 2 of the Criminal Law (Rape) Act 1981 as amended by s. 21 of the Criminal Law (Rape) (Amendment) 1990. The applicant appealed both his conviction and sentence to the Court of Appeal however his application to this Court concerns solely the sentence he was given by Kennedy J. in the Central Criminal Court on...
To continue reading
Request your trial