DPP v Lynch

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Judge: O'Flaherty J.
• Judgment Date: 14 December 1998
• Neutral Citation: 2000 WJSC-CCA 7882
• Docket Number: (85/98)
• Court: Court of Criminal Appeal
• Date: 14 December 1998

DPP v. LYNCH

AN CH ÚIRT ACHOMHAIRC CHOIRI ÚIL

THE PEOPLE AT THE SUIT OF THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS

.V.

PAUL LYNCH

Applicant

2000 WJSC-CCA 7882

(85/98)

THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL

Abstract:

Criminal Law - Appeal - Legal profession - Change of plea - Whether improper pressure placed upon appellant by legal advisors - Whether court possessed necessary jurisdiction to hear matter.

The applicant pleaded guilty to murder, subsequently he wished to assert that he had not given a true consent to entering the plea of guilty and alleged that he had been pressurised in some way by his legal advisors. The court stated that when the matter came before the court no application had been made to the trial judge, understandably, for leave to appeal against conviction and on application to Flood J and order was made refusing leave to appeal but allowing an extension of time to the applicant to apply to the Court of Criminal Appeal. The court had to embark on an inquiry whether it could enter into a hearing on an application for leave to appeal against the trial judge’s refusal to grant leave to appeal in the circumstances of the case. Reliance was placed on the House of Lords decision in Crane v DPP [1921] 2 AC 299 where it was stated that the very purpose for which the Court was created was to consider whether the convictions of persons who had, in fact, been convicted were valid or the contrary, and deal with them accordingly. The court said the jurisdiction of the court on the hearing of appeals, as provided for in section 12 of the Courts (Supplemental ) Provisions Act, 1961 was very wide. Section 32 of the Courts of Justice Act 1924 gives the court a very wide power to deal with the problem in this case. If the accused’s agreement to enter a plea of guilty was vitiated then his trial becomes a nullity, and whether his consent was vitiated was a debate for another day. The court accepted jurisdiction for the time being and reserved the right of other persons who are of necessity not parties to the current application, to have their say when the time comes. The notice of appeal that was originally lodged was deemed as being a due notice of appeal.

Citations:

DPP, PEOPLE V DAVIS 1993 2 IR 1, 1993 ILRM 407

R V WOOLIN 1998 4 AER 103

CRANE V DPP 1921 2 AC 299

AG, PEOPLE V MARSHALL 1956 IR 79

COURTS (SUPPLEMENTAL PROVISIONS) ACT 1961 S12

COURTS OF JUSTICE ACT 1924 S32

1 14th day of December, 1998, by O'Flaherty J.

O'Flaherty J.

2 In this case Paul Lynch pleaded guilty to murder in the Central Criminal Court (Flood J. presiding) on the 10th February,1997. Afterwards, he wished to assert that he had not given a true consent to entering this plea of guilty as he would have preferred to have the case tried before a judge and jury as is, without any doubt, his constitutional right. He asserts that he was pressurised in some way by his legal advisors. Needless to say, we make no comment about that at this stage. It is so, that however strong a prosecution case may be, an accused is always entitled to say to the State: "prove it". The materials before us would appear on any view to suggest that there was almost overwhelming evidence that there was an intention on the accused's part at least to do serious bodily harm to Mr. Campbell, the deceased. The entitlement of a judge to direct a jury was described by Lord Chief Justice Mansfield in 1784 as: that while a judge could tell the jury how to do right they had it in their power to do wrong which is a matter entirely between God and their own consciences. Recently, in a decision of the Supreme Court in The People .v. Davis [1993] ILRM 407, this concept was recapitulated. There the trial judge had directed the jury that they must find the accused guilty of murder. The Supreme Court said that was going too far. Of course, it was open to a trial judge to direct the jury and to give his view what the correct verdict might be, but he had to stop short in directing them to make a particular finding. It should be emphasised, however, that we speak only of the materials as they appear to us; the way matters may change in the course of a trial is difficult to predict and, so, we must allow of the possibility at least that the jury might, quite properly, have brought in a verdict of manslaughter. See R. .v. Woolin [1998] 4 All ER 103 for a case that must represent the high water mark in relation to the entitlement of an accused to be found guilty of manslaughter rather than murder.

3 The matter...