DPP v Pires
| Jurisdiction | Ireland |
| Judge | Clarke C. J.,MacMenamin J.,O'Malley J. |
| Judgment Date | 31 July 2017 |
| Neutral Citation | [2017] IESCDET 92 |
| Court | Supreme Court |
| Date | 31 July 2017 |
[2017] IESCDET 92
THE SUPREME COURT
DETERMINATION
Clarke C. J.
MacMenamin J.
O'Malley J.
IN THE MATTER OF SECTION 2 OF THE SUMMARY JURISDICTION ACT, 1857, AS EXTENDED BY SECTION 51 OF THE COURTS (SUPPLEMENTAL PROVISIONS) ACT, 1961
This determination relates to an application to this Court made by the defendant/applicant, for leave to appeal under Article 34.5.3 of the Constitution, from a ruling of the Court of Appeal (Sheehan J., Mahon J., Edwards J.), delivered herein on the 21st December, 2016. The judgment herein was delivered in conjunction with two other matters, where a similar issue is considered. Thus, the judgment of the Court of Appeal is entitled the Director of Public Prosecutions v. Cicero Pires & James Corrigan & Paul Gannon, accused/appellants. ( [2016] IECA 413).
As is clear from the terms of the Constitution and many determinations made by this Court since the enactment of the 33rd Amendment, it is necessary, in order for this Court to grant leave, that it be established that the decision sought to be appealed either involves a matter of general public importance or that it is otherwise in the interest of justice necessary that there should be an appeal to this Court.
The Court considers it desirable to point out that a determination of the Court on an application for leave, while it is final and conclusive so far as the parties are concerned, is a decision in relation to that application only. The issue is whether the questions raised, and the facts underpinning them, meet the constitutional criteria for leave. It will not, save in the rarest of circumstances, be appropriate to rely on a refusal of leave as having a precedential value in relation to the substantive issues in the context of a different case. Where leave is granted, any issue canvassed in the application will in due course be disposed of in the substantive decision of the Court.
The issues which arise in each of these cases are the same. In summary, these relate to relate to the scope of appeals brought pursuant to s.2 of the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1957, as extended by s.51 of the Courts (Supplemental Provisions) Act, 1961, on a point of law, and the rights of members of An Garda Siochana to use handcuffs in arresting persons for drunken driving, and kindred offences. All three cases, although unconnected with each other, were concerned with prosecutions for offences contrary to s. 4(4) (b) and (5) of the Road Traffic Act 2010.
As outlined in the judgment of the Court of Appeal, Mr. Pires was stopped on suspicion of driving while under the influence of alcohol; the arresting garda handcuffed him while affecting his arrest. The garda told the District Court he did so because Mr. Pires was intoxicated, larger in stature than he was, because he was on his own with him, and had to transport him in a garda vehicle without an internal protective barrier.
In the case of Mr. Corrigan, the arresting garda is said to have handcuffed Mr. Corrigan because he was ‘jittery’, hesitated when the garda put his hand on Mr. Corrigan to usher him to the back of the patrol car, but the arrested man was not aggressive, and was co-operative. The garda nonetheless testified he was concerned that Mr. Corrigan might become overwhelmed, or react in panic because of the position he found himself in. The arrest took place on a busy dual carriageway. The garda testified he had a duty of care to ensure the safety of that applicant and the public, and had to convey him to a garda station in a garda patrol car which had no internal protective barrier. In the case of Mr. Gannon, the arresting garda told the District Court that, having formed an opinion in relation to intoxication, the applicant was handcuffed for his own safety, for the safety of gardai, and other road users, as they were standing on the hard shoulder of the M50 which was very busy. It was accepted that Mr. Gannon was compliant and was not aggressive.
The validity of the arrest of the appellants was challenged in the District Court on the basis that handcuffing was unnecessary and unwarranted. Having considered submissions from counsel for the parties in each of the three cases, the District Judge, Bryan Smith, held that the handcuffing of the three appellants had not been justified as a precautionary measure, and thus rejected the evidence of the garda witnesses that handcuffing was necessary. The District judge proceeded to dismiss the basis of arrest, on his interpretation of the decision of this Court in DPP v. Cullen [2014] IESC 7, [2014] 3 I.R. 30. At the request of the prosecution, the District Court judge stated a case to the High Court posing the following question:
‘Was I correct in law to find the arrest(s) unlawful?’
The appeal by way of case stated, brought by the Director of Public Prosecutions, was heard by the High Court, (Barrett J.), and judgment was delivered therein on the 9th July, 2015. Barrett J. answered the question posed in the negative.
The High Court found that the District judge was incorrect in law in finding that the arrest of the applicant was unlawful. The court found that the District Court judge had contravened principles established in the decision of DPP v. Cullen [2014] 3 I.R. 30, in reaching the conclusion that the arrests were unlawful. ( [2015] IEHC 671 at par 39) The learned High Court judge found, at pars 40-41, that the District Court judge had afforded an ‘insufficiently generous measure of judgment’, and ‘insufficient latitude’ to the arresting members of the gardai in assessing whether handcuffing was necessary in arresting each applicant. The High Court judge held that the District Court judge had paid insufficient regard to the uncommonness of the situations in which...
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