DPP v Redmond

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Judge: Hardiman J.
• Judgment Date: 29 March 2001
• Neutral Citation: 2001 WJSC-CCA 2131
• Court: Court of Criminal Appeal
• Docket Number: [C.C.A. No. 9 of 2000]
• Date: 29 March 2001

2001 WJSC-CCA 2131

THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL

Hardiman J.

McCracken J.

Murphy J.

9CJA/00

DPP v. REDMOND

IN THE MATTER OF SECTION 2 OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT, 1993 and IN THE MATTER OF BILL NO. 81/00

Between:

THE PEOPLE AT THE SUIT OF THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS

Applicant

and

GEORGE REDMOND

Respondent

Citations:

CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT 1993 S2

COURTS OF JUSTICE ACT 1924 S34

DPP V HUGHES UNREP CCA 27.3.2000

MINISTER FOR LANDS, STATE V SEALY 1939 IR 21

DPP V KENNEDY 1985 IR 307

RSC O.125

RSC O.99 r1(i)

CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT 1993 S4(2)

CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT 1993 S3

Synopsis:

CRIMINAL LAW

Costs

Circuit Court - Review of sentences - Legal aid - Application of Director of Public Prosecutions - Courts of Justice Act, 1924 section 34 - Criminal Justice Act, 1993 section 2 - Rules of the Superior Courts, 1986 Orders 99 and 125 (9CJA/2000 - Court of Criminal Appeal - 29/3/01)

DPP v Redmond - [2001] 3 IR 407

The Director Of Public Prosecutions had sought a review of the sentences the respondent had received. The review was unsuccessful and the respondent sought his costs arising from the application. Hardiman J delivering judgment held that the court had the power to award costs both under statute and the Rules of the Superior Courts. The respondent would be awarded costs.

1 29th day of March 2001 by Hardiman J.

Hardiman J.

General.

2 In this case, the Applicant, the Director of Public Prosecutions, applied pursuant to Section 2 of the Criminal Justice Act, 1993for a review of the sentences passed on the Respondent in the Dublin Circuit Criminal Court on the 13th April, 2000.

3 The Court heard this application on the 18th December, 2000 and delivered a written judgment on the 21st December, 2000. The application was refused.

4 The Respondent now seeks his costs of the application. He contends that the costs are in the discretion of the Court and in the ordinary way that discretion should be exercised on the basis that costs will follow the issue. The Respondent says that on the only issue before the Court, whether the Applicant had shown that the sentences imposed on the Respondent were unduly lenient, he has been successful and the Applicant unsuccessful. He should, accordingly, be given his costs against the Applicant.

5 The Applicant did not in terms oppose the Respondent's application for costs but raised a question as to whether jurisdiction to award costs exists. He referred to Section 34 of the Courts of Justice Act, 1924which provides:-

"The Court of Criminal Appeal shall have jurisdiction to affirm or to reverse the conviction in whole or in part, and to remit, or to reduce, or to increase or otherwise to vary the sentence, and generally to make such order, including any order as to costs as may be necessary for the purpose of doing justice in the case before the Court".

6 The Applicant points out that the specific powers conferred on the Court in this section does not extend to the power to review the sentence or to ascertain whether it is or not unduly lenient. That power was not conferred until the enactment of the Criminal Justice Act, 1993. Possibly, says the Applicant, the general powers conferred by Section 34 must be read as being dependent on the Courts being first asked to exercise one of the specific powers conferred on it. Since the power invoked in this case is not one of the powers conferred by the Act of 1924, it is not obvious that the power to award costs exists in the context of an application such as the present. It is fair to say that the Applicant's submission was not put more strongly than that.

7 In DPP v. Hughes (Court of Criminal Appeal unreported 27th March, 2000), this Court dealt with the costs of an application under Section 2 of the 1993 Act. On page 7 of the judgment of Barron J. he said:-

"The basic facts we think are that the Director has brought this application on the basis that he has taken the view that the learned trial judge was unduly lenient. This Court has found that that was not so. The event has therefore gone in favour of the accused. It seems to the Court that the event having gone in his favour there is no particular reason why he should not get his costs, although 95% to 99% of these cases are on legal aid. This is an exceptional one where the Respondent is not on legal aid. In those circumstances the Court will award him his costs".

8 It seems to this Court that the approach to the exercise of the discretion (assuming it to exist) in relation to costs outlined in the judgment of Mr. Justice Barron is the correct one. It does not appear, however, that the question of the jurisdiction to award costs was raised in Hughes's case. We therefore approach the case on the basis that the issue as to the jurisdiction to award costs of an application under Section 2 is not one covered by express authority.

The statutory provisions.

9 Although the jurisdiction to review sentences on the grounds that they are allegedly unduly lenient was not conferred...