DPP v Sweetman

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Judge: O'Flaherty J.
• Judgment Date: 23 July 1997
• Neutral Citation: 1998 WJSC-CCA 6150
• Docket Number: (68\97),[C.C.A. No. 68 of 1997]
• Court: Court of Criminal Appeal
• Date: 23 July 1997

1998 WJSC-CCA 6150

THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL

O' Flaherty J.,

Shanley J.,

O' Higgins J.,

(68\97)

DPP v. SWEETMAN

AN CH ÚIRT ACHOMHAIRC CHOIRI ÚIL

THE PEOPLE AT THE SUIT OF THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS

-v-

IVOR SWEETMAN

Applicant

1 Judgement of the Court (ex-tempore) delivered on the 23rd day of July,.1997, by O'Flaherty J.

2 This is an application brought on behalf of Ivor Sweetman to be admitted to bail pending the hearing of his substantive appeal. He was convicted at the Central Criminal Court of the murder of Danny Fanning on the 13th May, 1997.

3 The old jurisprudence in relation to application for bail in this Court required that before an application should be entertained leave to appeal would have to be granted by this Court and then the Court would go on to consider whether it was an appropriate case to grant bail. See Attorney Genral .v. Cashell [1928] 62 ILTR p. 31; The people .v. Hayden Vol 1 of Frewen and D.P.P. .v. Smith (2nd April, 1990 [CCA; unreported]). Before leave to appeal could be granted it had to be shown that an arguable case could be presented for consideration before the Court. This was but a preliminary step to entertaining an application for bail. There has now been a change brought about in the law by virtue of s.3(6) of the Criminal procedure Act, 1993.Section 32 of the Courts of Justice Act, 1924, now reads, with this amendment:-

"Leave to appeal shall be granted by the Court of Criminal Appeal in cases Where the Court is of opinion that a question of law is involved or where the trial appears to the Court to have been unsatisfactory, or there appears to the Court to be any other sufficient ground of appeal, and the Court shall have power to make all consequential orders it may think fit, including an order admitting the appellant to bail pending the determination of his appeal or application for leave to appeal."

4 While the requirement that leave to appeal should be granted before an application for bail can be entertained has been abrogated, nonetheless, it is clear that the Court retains a very wide discretion whether to grant or refuse bail in any instance. It is probably necessary to redefine how that discretion should be exercised in a murder case since this is the first case, as far as the members of the Court are aware, in which an application has been made to admit an applicant to bail arising on a murder conviction.

5 The Court is of the view that the strength of the case as it appears on the materials placed before it on this application is the proper matter to be brought into the reckoning in the first instance, and since the Court has reached a clear conclusion on this it does not need to consider the possibility of whether the accused will abscond so as not be present for his appeal. It is fair to say that he was on bail pending his trial and answered to his bail on all occasions.

6 However, the situation of a convicted person is in a different class. He now no longer enjoys the presumption of innocence. It is not a question of admitting a person to bail where he will answer to his bail pending the disposal of the hearing before judge and jury. The criteria that are relevant to pre-trial applications for bail are not the same as those that operate post-conviction.

7 Since, as already stated, the Court has reached a clear conclusion on the first point, it did not deem it necessary to hear any evidence in regard to the possibility of the accused absconding and does not think it is a critical issue as far as this application is concerned.

8 Having set out the legal principles that the...