DPP v Taylor
| Jurisdiction | Ireland |
| Judge | O'Donnell J.,McKechnie J.,Dunne J. |
| Judgment Date | 12 October 2018 |
| Neutral Citation | [2018] IESCDET 139 |
| Court | Supreme Court |
| Date | 12 October 2018 |
[2018] IESCDET 139
THE SUPREME COURT
DETERMINATION
O'Donnell J.
McKechnie J.
Dunne J.
Conviction – Murder – Matter of general public importance – Applicant seeking leave to appeal against the judgment and order of the Court of Appeal – Whether the application raised a matter of general public importance
Facts: The applicant, Mr Taylor, on the 14th November, 2011, following a fifteen-day trial in the Central Criminal Court, was convicted by a majority jury verdict of the offence of murder, contrary to s. 4 of the Criminal Justice Act 1964. He received the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment. He appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeal. On the 16th March, 2018, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. He applied to the Supreme Court seeking leave to appeal against the judgment and order of the Court of Appeal. He sought leave only in respect of the part of the judgment which addressed the failure of the trial judge to direct the jury to return a verdict of not guilty. He submitted that the application raised a matter of general public importance and that in the interests of justice it was necessary that there be a further appeal so that the Court may clarify the position regarding R v Galbraith [1981] 1 WLR 1039 applications in circumstances where the evidence against him was purely circumstantial and where the case was “finely balanced”. The alleged issue of general public importance concerned the appropriate test in “borderline” cases in light of the constitutional status of the right to a fair trial. It was submitted that the law ought to afford greater weight to his interests given his presumption of innocence and the onus on the respondent, the DPP, to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The applicant submitted that only cases in which the prosecution has clearly proved a prima facie case ought to be left to a jury and that any doubt in that regard, which is implicit in the notion of “borderline” or “finely balanced”, ought to accrue to the accused.
Held by the Court that the decision of the Court of Appeal did not involve any matter of general public importance, nor was it in the interests of justice that leave be granted. The Court held that no point of law arose for clarification having regard to the fact that the Galbraith principles were well-established and the fact that the Court had already approved those principles in People (DPP) v A.D. [2012] 2 IR 332.
The Court held that it would refuse leave to appeal under Article 34.5.3° of the Constitution.
Leave to appeal refused.
| ORDER SOUGHT TO BE APPEALED |
| COURT: Court of Appeal |
| DATE OF ORDER: 16th March, 2018 |
| DATE OF PERFECTION OF ORDER: 2nd May, 2018 |
| THE APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL WAS MADE ON 8th May, 2018 AND WAS TIME. |
This determination relates to an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court from a judgment of the Court of Appeal (Ryan P., Birmingham and Edwards JJ.) delivered on the 16th March, 2018, and from the resulting Order of that Court made on the same date and perfected on the 2nd May, 2018.
Mr Michael Taylor, referred to in this determination as ‘the accused’ or ‘the applicant’, seeks leave to appeal to this Court from the said judgment and Order of the Court of Appeal. The Director of Public Prosecutions, who opposes the application, is referred to in this determination as ‘the DPP’ or ‘the respondent’.
The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to hear appeals is set out in the Constitution. As is clear from the terms of Article 34.5.3° thereof and the many determinations made by this Court since the enactment of the Thirty-third Amendment, it is necessary, in order for this Court to grant leave to appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeal, that it be established by the applicant that the decision sought to be appealed involves a matter of general public importance, or that it is otherwise necessary in the interests of justice that there be an appeal to this Court.
The general principles applied by this Court in determining whether to grant or refuse leave to appeal having regard to the criteria incorporated into the Constitution as a result of the Thirty-third Amendment have now been considered in a large number of determinations and are fully addressed in both a determination issued by a panel consisting of all of the members of this Court in B.S. v. Director of Public Prosecutions [2017] I.E.S.C. DET. 134 and in a unanimous judgment of a full Court delivered by O'Donnell J. in Price Waterhouse Cooper (A Firm) v. Quinn Insurance Ltd. (Under Administration) [2017] I.E.S.C. 73. It follows that it is unnecessary to revisit the new constitutional architecture for the purposes of this determination.
It should be noted that any ruling in a determination is a decision particular to that application and is final and conclusive only as far as the parties are concerned. The issue calling for the Court's consideration is whether the facts and legal issues meet the constitutional criteria as above identified. It will not, save in the rarest of circumstances, be appropriate to rely on a refusal of leave as having a precedential value relative to the substantive issues, if and when such issues should further arise in a different case. Where leave is granted on any issue, that matter will be disposed of in due course in the substantive decision of the Court.
The full facts and background of the case may be found in the written judgment delivered by Court of Appeal in the within proceedings ( [2018] I.E.C.A. 74) and in the parties” respective documents on this application for leave. Accordingly, what is presented here is a brief summary for contextual purposes only.
On the 14th November, 2011, following a fifteen-day trial in the Central Criminal Court (White J.), the accused was convicted by a majority jury verdict of the offence of murder, contrary to section 4 of the Criminal Justice Act 1964. He received the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment.
The offence in question was alleged to have been committed on the 6th April, 2007, at Winstonville Apartments, Charlemont Road, Clontarf, Dublin 3. The victim was a Mr Paul Kelly. At approximately 11:45pm that night, gun shots were heard in the Charlemont Road area. The victim was found dead inside the door of his apartment building, having suffered two shotgun wounds and multiple handgun wounds. A number of witnesses gave evidence of two men wearing balaclavas and gloves and carrying what looked like a shotgun and a handgun running from the apartment block up Victoria Villas, onto Charlemont Road, and then onto Cecil Avenue. None of the witnesses identified the men.
In the course of the subsequent Garda examination a glove was found on the corner of Charlemont Road and Cecil Avenue, 80 metres from where the deceased had been shot on the route which was taken by the murderers fleeing the scene; that glove is very significant in the context of the case because upon examination it was found that DNA of two individuals was present and that one of the two DNA profiles matched the profile of the accused. A DNA match was possible because the accused while in custody had provided a buccal swab which allowed a DNA profile to be generated. Though there was an issue at trial and on appeal as to whether the accused had consented to the taking of that swab, this point is not in issue on this application for leave.
The prosecution's case against the accused was based on circumstantial evidence and there were in effect three limbs to that case. The first was the DNA evidence obtained from glove and the swab. The second related to phone activity at the time of the murder from a phone number linked to the accused; phone records and cell site evidence disclosed that this particular number was in contact with the Clontarf Garda Station mast (which is in very close proximity to the crime scene) on four occasions...
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