Drew v DPP

JurisdictionIreland
JudgeMr. Justice Twomey
Judgment Date18 March 2016
Neutral Citation[2016] IEHC 144
Docket Number[2015 No. 331 JR]
CourtHigh Court
Date18 March 2016

[2016] IEHC 144

THE HIGH COURT

JUDICIAL REVIEW

Twomey J.

[2015 No. 331 JR]

BETWEEN:
PAUL DREW
APPLICANT
-AND-
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
RESPONDENTS

Crime & Sentencing – Criminal Justice Act, 1999 – Art. 27 of the Framework Decision – S. 80 of the Criminal Justice (Terrorist Offences) Act 2005 – Dangerous driving causing death – Judicial review – Prohibition of trial – Fair trial

Facts: The applicant sought an order of prohibition of his trial for dangerous driving causing death. The applicant contended that the delay of more than five years to charge him for the said offence was prejudicial to his right of fair trial as it would have profound impact on his rehabilitation, possibility of obtaining remission, and minimum chances of receiving a concurrent sentence with the sentences for which he was already undergoing imprisonment.

Mr. Justice Twomey refused to grant an order of prohibition to the applicant. The Court held that in order to avail the exceptional remedy of prohibition, the Court had to determine whether there was a blameworthy prosecutorial delay and whether public interest outweighed the interests of the applicant. The Court observed that notwithstanding the uncertainty about finding the appropriate legal mechanism to detain the applicant, there was a blameworthy delay by the prosecution in not taking the proper steps in a timely fashion. The Court, however, held that the nature and gravity of offence alleged to have been committed by the applicant, namely, causing death of a person, admissions made by the applicant, and fleeing the jurisdiction of Ireland by the applicant were demonstrative of actions contrary to public interest. The Court held that there was no breach of right of fair trial of the applicant, as he would be given every opportunity at the trial court to raise appropriate concerns wherever possible as mandated by the Constitution.

JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Twomey delivered on 18th day of March, 2016.
1

This is an application for judicial review in which the applicant seeks an order of prohibition. The applicant seeks to restrain the respondent from proceeding with a trial for dangerous driving causing death, in which he is the defendant.

2

The applicant pleads, inter alia, there has been;

(i) an inordinate, unjustifiable and unreasonable delay on the part of the respondent in the prosecution of the proceedings; and

(ii) this delay has resulted in a denial of the applicant's right to a fair and expeditious trial.

3

Further, the applicant seeks a declaration that his right to a fair trial, pursuant to Article 38.1° of the Constitution has been breached, by virtue of the said delay.

4

The background to this case is that on the 1st March, 2009, the applicant was arrested at the scene of a fatal road traffic accident at Cromwellstown, Co. Kildare. The applicant made admissions to the Gardaí at that time. Very shortly after the accident, on the 18th March, 2009, the applicant left Ireland for the United Kingdom and adopted a false identity. The High Court issued a European Arrest Warrant on the 25th March, 2009 for the arrest of the applicant for drugs offences and handling stolen property.

5

The applicant was surrendered by the United Kingdom authorities, to Ireland, on foot of a European Arrest Warrant on the 1st June, 2009, for prosecution in Ireland for the drug offences and the offence of handling stolen property. The offence of dangerous driving causing death was not included in the European Arrest Warrant, as the matter was still under investigation when the European Arrest Warrant was issued. The applicant did not consent to extradition, nor did he strenuously object to same. Counsel for the applicant pleaded that the applicant was not advised, nor was he made aware, that his failure to surrender voluntarily would have repercussions. The applicant has given sworn evidence that if he had known there were any negative repercussions for him, he would have consented to his extradition.

6

On the 3rd July, 2009, the applicant pleaded guilty to the unlawful possession of a controlled drug for the purpose of the sale or supply to another person and received a ten year sentence backdated to the 18th March, 2009. Separately the applicant received a five year sentence in relation to handing stolen goods, with the last two years suspended, also backdated to the 18th March, 2009.

7

An application to issue two summonses was made to Naas District Court Office on 28th August, 2009, for dangerous driving and careless driving. The applicant was not produced from custody to Naas District Court and subsequently these two summonses were withdrawn. An arrest warrant pursuant to s. 42 of the Criminal Justice Act, 1999, was granted on the 3rd March, 2010. The applicant was arrested at Mountjoy Prison on the 4th March, 2010. He was taken to, and detained at, Naas Garda Station. The applicant made no admissions and was released without charge.

8

From that day, the 4th March, 2010 until the 6th November, 2014, nothing of significance occurred in relation to this case. On the 6th November, 2014, an application was brought by the D.P.P. in the High Court before Edwards J. to sign a judicial authority request pursuant to Article 27 of the Framework Decision. This application was granted and this request sought permission from the U.K. authorities to prosecute the applicant for offences not contained in the European Arrest Warrant on foot of which he had been previously extradited. This permission was required because under the rule of specialty States seeking extradition of individuals are limited to taking prosecutions for offences specified in the European Arrest Warrant issued in relation to that person. However, under Articles 27(3)(g) and 27(4) of the Framework Decision, it is possible for the extraditing State to consent to the prosecution of an offence, other than that for which the person was surrendered and in this way to dis-apply the rule of specialty. This was the substance of the request made by the High Court on 6th November, 2014.

9

As a result of this request an undated consent from Westminster Magistrate's Court issued sometime after 6th November 2014 and on the 13th March, 2015, the applicant was charged with dangerous driving causing death. The applicant was remanded on the 18th March, 2015, for service of the book of evidence and was served with the book of evidence on the 1st April, 2015. Leave for judicial review was granted to the applicant by Noonan J. on 15th June, 2015.

10

The issue for this court to consider in this judicial review, is whether the delay of just over 6 years between the alleged commission of the offence on 1st March, 2009 and the applicant being charged with that offence on 13th March, 2015 is such that in all the circumstances the trial should now be prohibited from proceeding.

11

It is clear from the Supreme Court decision of Devoy v. DPP [2008] 4 IR 235, that the test to be applied in cases such as this is a two stage test. First the Court must consider whether there is blameworthy prosecutorial delay in this case, and if so, if the public interest in prosecuting crime takes precedence over the interests of the applicant. On this basis therefore, the first question to be considered is whether the delay in this case was blameworthy on the part of the D.P.P.

12

The critical delay in this case is the delay...

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1 cases
  • DPP
    • Ireland
    • High Court
    • 16 July 2018
    ...submitted to the Court case-law regarding the prohibition of domestic trials where there has been delay (see in particular Drew v DPP [2016] IEHC 144). The DPP submitted that in the context of the established jurisprudence regarding delay and fair trial, blameworthy delay simpliciter was no......

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