Du Plooy v Sport Ireland

JurisdictionIreland
JudgeMr. Justice Meenan
Judgment Date10 September 2020
Neutral Citation[2020] IEHC 669
Docket Number[2019 No. 3749 P]
CourtHigh Court
Date10 September 2020
BETWEEN
PRISCILLA DU PLOOY
PLAINTIFF
AND
SPORT IRELAND

AND

SPORT IRELAND FACILITIES DAC
DEFENDANTS

[2020] IEHC 669

Meenan

[2019 No. 3749 P]

THE HIGH COURT

Personal injury – Damage – Statute barred – Defendants seeking an order dismissing the plaintiff’s claim – Whether the plaintiff’s claim was statute barred

Facts: The plaintiff, Ms Du Plooy, on 8 March 2013, was at a swimming pool and water activity centre at the premises known as the “National Aquatic Centre” situate at Snugborough Road, Blanchardstown, Dublin 15. As she descended the waterslide, the plaintiff alleged she suffered an impact injury to her coccyx, caused by what she described as being “a dangerous item or protrusion”. As a result, the plaintiff alleged that she sustained personal injury, loss and damage. The proceedings were initiated by personal injuries summons issued 13 May 2019. The defendants, Sport Ireland and Sport Ireland Facilities DAC, issued a notice of motion seeking an order dismissing the plaintiff’s claim on the basis that it was statute barred.

Held by the High Court (Meenan J) that, given the provisions of the Personal Injuries Assessment Board Act 2003 which disapply the limitation periods provided for in the Statute of Limitations, these proceedings were not statute barred.

Meenan J dismissed the defendants’ application.

Application dismissed.

JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Meenan delivered on the 10th day of September, 2020
Background
1

On 8 March 2013, the plaintiff was at a swimming pool and water activity centre at the premises known as the “ National Aquatic Centre” situate at Snugborough Road, Blanchardstown, Dublin 15. As she descended the waterslide, the plaintiff alleges she suffered an impact injury to her coccyx, caused by what she described as being “a dangerous item or protrusion”. As a result, the plaintiff alleges that she sustained personal injury, loss and damage. The proceedings were initiated by personal injuries summons issued 13 May 2019.

2

Under the provisions of the Personal Injuries Assessment Board Act 2003 (the Act of 2003), before initiating certain personal injury proceedings an application must be made to the Personal Injuries Assessment Board (PIAB). If the matter is not concluded by PIAB, an authorisation is given to commence proceedings. In this case, the authorisation stated as follows: -

“The plaintiff is authorised to bring these proceedings against the defendants having received an authorisation(s) dated the 18th February 2019 (and the 11th April 2019) from the Personal Injuries Assessment Board pursuant to section 46 of the Personal Injuries Assessment Board Acts 2003 and 2007, and bearing authorisation number…”

(The wording in brackets appears to have been added to the authorisation).

3

The provisions of the Act of 2003 introduce a number of mandatory steps that must be taken in certain personal injuries actions before court proceedings are issued. These provisions had to have regard to the provisions of the Statutes of Limitation Acts. These Acts provide for certain strict time limits within which proceedings must be issued. In the Act of 2003 provision had to be made to prevent personal injury proceedings becoming statute barred whilst being dealt with in PIAB. With this in mind, s. 50 of the Act of 2003 provides: -

“(50) In reckoning any period of time for the purposes of any limitation period in relation to a relevant claim specified by the Statute of Limitations 1957 or the Statute of Limitations (Amendment) Act 1991, the period beginning on the making of an application under section 11 in relation to the claim and ending 6 months from the date of issue of an authorisation under, as appropriate, section 14, 17, 32 or 36, rules under section 46(3) or section 49 shall be disregarded.” (This provision was subsequently amended post these proceedings).

What this means is, in effect, that for the period commencing on the application to PIAB and ending six months after the date of issue of an authorisation, the time period allowed by the Statute of Limitations Acts does not apply. At the end of the said six-month period time commences to run again.

4

On 11 April 2013, the plaintiff's then Solicitors sent a letter of claim addressed to “ National Aquatic Centre” at Snugborough Road, Blanchardstown, Dublin 15. This letter was not replied to. It does not appear to have been followed up.

5

The next step taken was an application to PIAB, making a claim. This application was “deemed complete” on 6 March 2015. It will be noted that this was within hours of the expiry of the time allowed by the Statute of Limitations for bringing such a claim. PIAB wrote to the “ National Aquatic Centre” but also does not appear to have received any reply. Having considered the application pursuant to s. 17 of the Act of 2003, PIAB decided that it would not be appropriate to make an assessment and gave an Authorisation to permit the plaintiff to commence legal proceedings to resolve her claim. This Authorisation was dated 30 June 2016. On 21 December 2016, High Court proceedings were initiated by the plaintiff naming “ National Aquatic Centre” as the defendant.

“National Aquatic Centre”
6

Although the name “ National Aquatic Centre” is used extensively in the marketing of the swimming facility at the National Sports Campus at Snugborough Road in Blanchardstown, a search of the Companies Registration Office revealed that, in fact, there was no such corporate entity under that name nor, at the time, was it an active registered business name. There had been a registered business name for “ National Aquatic Centre” which was registered in January, 2003, but this lapsed in 2005. This business name had been registered by a company named Dublin...

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1 cases
  • Tesleem Ojewale v Caroline Kearns and Frank Kearns
    • Ireland
    • High Court
    • June 16, 2021
    ...the Supreme Court in Renehan v. T & S Taverns Ltd (above) and the application of that decision by Meenan J. in Du Plooy v. Sport Ireland [2020] IEHC 669. In both cases, the courts applied the statutory provisions so as to uphold the validity of proceedings issued within the “ disregard” per......

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