Dublin Corporation v Carroll

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Court: High Court
• Judgment Date: 01 January 1988
• Docket Number: [J.R. 1987 No. 137]
• Date: 01 January 1988

Dublin Corporation v. Carroll

The Right Honourable The Lord Mayor, Aldermen and Burgesses of Dublin

Applicant

and

His Honour Judge James Carroll

Respondent

[J.R. 1987 No. 137]

High Court

Malicious injuries - Limitation period - Statutory construction - Malicious Injuries Act, 1981 (No. 9), ss. 8, 14 and 23.

Section 8, sub-s. 1 of the Malicious Injuries Act, 1981, provides that "A person seeking compensation under this Act shall, within fourteen days after . . . the damage was caused . . . serve . . . preliminary notice . . . of his intention to apply for compensation."

Section 23 of the Act of 1981 provides:—

"(1) Proceedings under this Act shall not be commenced after the expiration of three years from the date on which the cause of action accrued.

(2) A cause of action under this Act shall accrue on the date of the service of a preliminary notice under section 8."

Section 14, sub-s. 3 of the Act of 1981 provides that "The court may, in relation to any act or proceedings under this Act . . . extend the time for, set aside either wholly or in part, amend or otherwise deal with in such manner and or such terms as the court may think just, such act or proceedings."

On the 12th April, 1983, M. Ltd. served preliminary notice of intention to claim compensation for damage done to its property on the 6th April, 1983. On the 9th May, 1986, the company commenced its proceedings under the Act. More than 3 years had elapsed since the accrual of the cause of action but an order was made by the Circuit Court judge, pursuant to s. 14 of the Act of 1981, extending the time for commencement of proceedings.

The applicant applied to the High Court for an order for certiorari by way of judicial review of the order of the Circuit Court on the grounds that s. 14 of the Act did not confer jurisdiction on the court to extend the time limit of 3 years prescribed by s. 23.

Held by Carroll J., in quashing the order of the Circuit Court, 1, that the time limit of 3 years for commencement of proceedings prescribed by s. 23 was — subject to the saver for persons under a disability — an absolute bar to the commencement of proceedings under the Act.

2. That the power conferred by s. 14 did not confer jurisdiction on the Circuit Court judge to extend that time limit.

Cases mentioned in this report:—

McCarthy v. Limerick Corporation (Unreported, Circuit Court, Judge Gleeson, 25th November, 1986).

Gardiner v. Dublin Corporation (Unreported, Circuit Court, Judge...