Finnegan v Superintendent of Tallaght Gards Station

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Judge: O'Donnell J.,Mr. Justice Clarke
• Judgment Date: 15 May 2019
• Neutral Citation: [2019] IESC 31
• Date: 15 May 2019
• Court: Supreme Court
• Docket Number: [Appeal No. 2017/130] [High Court Record No. 2014/742 JR] [S:AP:IE:2017:000130]

Between /

MARK FINNEGAN

Applicant/Respondent/Appellant

-and-

THE SUPERINTENDENT OF TALLAGHT GARDA STATION

and

THE GOVERNOR OF WHEATFIELD PRISON

Respondents/Appellants/Respondents

[2019] IESC 31

Clarke C.J.

O'Donnell Donal J.

Clarke C.J.

O'Donnell Donal J.

McKechnie J.

MacMenamin J.

Finlay Geoghegan J.

[Appeal No. 2017/130]

[Court of Appeal Record No. 2017/137]

[High Court Record No. 2014/742 JR]

[S:AP:IE:2017:000130]

THE SUPREME COURT

Committal warrant – Culpable and inexcusable delay – Unlawful arrest and detention – Applicant seeking to appeal against a decision of the Court of Appeal – Whether there was culpable and inexcusable delay in executing a committal warrant

Facts: The Supreme Court (O’Donnell J) held that there was a point at which culpable and inexcusable delay in executing a committal warrant, normally coupled with other factors, may mean that the arrest and detention of even an absconding prisoner can become unlawful. O’Donnell J also held that this point had arrived when it could be said clearly that the arrest and detention was no longer the performance of the administration of justice, but rather had become so arbitrary and oppressive to the individual that it could not be permitted. O’Donnell J found that what was more difficult was determining at what point that was reached, particularly in the case of a person such as the applicant, Mr Finnegan, against whom a warrant of committal had been lawfully executed and who had escaped from lawful custody.

Held by O’Donnell J that if a principle was to be deduced from the case law which was capable of encompassing this case, it was the entirely general one that there must come a point where the interests of justice may lean against the enforcement of a valid warrant. While he agreed that there were circumstances where it would be no longer lawful to detain a person who had escaped from lawful custody, he remained of the view that such circumstances must be exceptional, and the considerations leaning against enforcement of a court order must themselves be exigent, so that it could be said that detention pursuant to a warrant is so arbitrary and invidious as to no longer be the administration of justice. He did not consider that the basic error made in failing to place the fact of the applicant’s absconding on the PULSE system, even coupled with the length of time which passed before the applicant was detained, would reach that point. Accordingly, he upheld the decision of the Court of Appeal on the analysis of delay in this case. However, he noted that there were particular and additional features in this case which also required consideration. He noted that the applicant was convicted of the original offence on 19 November 2008 and that he left Shelton Abbey on 31 October 2009; while the legal argument in this case had focussed on the delay of four years and seven months between 1 November 2009 and 1 June 2014, five more years had elapsed during which the applicant had been at liberty, and, moreover, in circumstances where his claim succeeded in the High Court. The issue of principle having been resolved, O’Donnell J thought it would be invidious to return the appellant to prison at this stage. In those circumstances alone, O’Donnell J held that he would set aside the decision of the Court of Appeal.

O’Donnell J held that the appeal should be allowed. Mckechnie J and Clarke CJ also handed down judgments agreeing to allow the appeal.

Appeal allowed.

Judgment of Mr. Justice Clarke , Chief Justice, delivered the 15th May, 2019

1 My purpose in writing this short concurring judgment arises from the fact that, while there is agreement from all of the members of the Court as to the correct result of this appeal, there are some slight differences of approach on which I feel that I should comment.

2 Both the judgments of O'Donnell and McKechnie JJ contain a very detailed analysis of the case law. I have nothing to add on that topic save to indicate that I agree that there are no cases directly on point and, insofar as a general principle can be determined, it is to the effect that there may be circumstances when it is not constitutionally proper to enforce an otherwise valid warrant or order for the committal of a person to prison.

3 Like O'Donnell J., I consider that the source of that principle lies in the fact that it is well established that the requirement that persons only be imprisoned ‘in due course of law’ goes beyond compliance with formal legal provisions so as to incorporate overriding obligations of constitutional fairness. Against that background it is, in principle, possible that such constitutional requirements may, in very limited circumstances, override what would otherwise be the obvious obligation to enforce an order committing a person to prison after a trial in due course of law and, if invoked, any appellate process.

4 I would also agree with the other judgments and, in particular, that of O'Donnell J. to the effect that a very significant weight indeed needs to be attached to the fact that a person who is the subject of a valid warrant has been convicted and sentenced to imprisonment after a constitutionally fair process. It follows that the circumstances which could warrant determining that other considerations outweigh the imperative that the person concerned serves the period of imprisonment duly imposed would need to be very weighty indeed. It follows in turn that the circumstances where the Constitution would require that a warrant not be enforced would be correspondingly very limited indeed.

5 I agree that the factors which broadly need to be considered are as identified in the other judgments delivered in this case but would add that they require to be assessed against the backdrop of the requirement that there be very weighty considerations indeed before a court could countenance determining that an otherwise valid sentence should not be served. The fact that matters may not have progressed in an ideal fashion from the perspective of the State and/or the fact that there may be some prejudice to the person whose incarceration is sought would, in my view, fall well short of meeting the necessary threshold.

6 However, I would not be inclined to place any significant weight on the factor identified by O'Donnell J. towards the end of his judgment being the fact that a further period of the order of five years has elapsed during the currency of these proceedings during which period Mr. Finnegan has been released on bail. If it were not appropriate to determine, at the time when these proceedings were commenced, that the wholly exceptional circumstances which would warrant the non enforcement of an otherwise valid warrant were present, then I do not consider that the fact that it has taken some time for these proceedings to come to a final resolution could weigh significantly in the balance. In making that point I appreciate that, even if one took a different view as to how things stood at the time when Mr Finnegan's proceedings were commenced, his case was at least sufficiently strong to persuade the High Court to find in his favour. Nonetheless I do not consider that the mounting of proceedings which had the effect of delaying a final determination for a significant period of time could, in itself, significantly alter the assessment of whether the threshold has been met. Indeed, to place significant weight on that factor might encourage the bringing of proceedings in the hope that any extra delay thereby engendered might itself tip the balance.

7 For myself I would be content to adopt the overall test identified in the judgment of O'Donnell J. but to indicate that the analysis of the various factors properly taken into account in that test which is set out in the judgment of McKechnie J. persuades me that, at the time when Mr. Finnegan was arrested and these proceedings were launched, the threshold had already been passed so that this case comes into the rare and unusual exception to the general requirement that persons who are the subject of valid warrants for their imprisonment should serve a term of imprisonment in accordance with the terms of the warrant concerned. In those circumstances I would agree with the order proposed by McKechnie J.

Judgment of O'Donnell J. delivered the 15th day of May, 2019.

1 I agree, not without some hesitation, that the appeal herein should be allowed. I agree with McKechnie J. that there is a point at which culpable and inexcusable delay in executing a committal warrant, normally coupled with other factors, may mean that the arrest and detention of even an absconding prisoner can become unlawful. I also agree that that point has arrived when it can be said clearly that the arrest and detention is no longer the performance of the administration of justice, but rather has become so arbitrary and oppressive to the individual that it cannot be permitted. What is more difficult, however, is to determine at what point that is reached, particularly in the case of a person such as the applicant, against whom a warrant of committal has been lawfully executed and who has escaped from lawful custody.

2 For my part, I would not regard the decisions since Cunningham v. Governor of Mountjoy Prison [1987] I.L.R.M. 33 as applying some pre-existing principle of general application. Rather, I would see them as merely individual instances where High Court judges, and in one case a three-person formation of this court, considered that, in the particular and differing circumstances of individual cases, an arrest and detention was, or was not, lawful. This is, therefore, the first occasion on which a full formation of this court is invited to address the question as a matter of general principle applicable to all types of warrants. There is a relative dearth of considered authority in this jurisdiction and, it appears, in any...