G(B) v G(M)
1999 WJSC-CC 2969
THE CIRCUIT FAMILY COURT
JUDICIAL SEPARATION & FAMILY LAW REFORM ACT 1989 S17
JUDICIAL SEPARATION & FAMILY LAW REFORM ACT 1989 S2(1)(e)
JUDICIAL SEPARATION & FAMILY LAW REFORM ACT 1989 S2(1)(f)
JUDICIAL SEPARATION & FAMILY LAW REFORM ACT 1989 S16(a)
JUDICIAL SEPARATION & FAMILY LAW REFORM ACT 1989 S11
JUDICIAL SEPARATION & FAMILY LAW REFORM ACT 1989 S16(g)
D (JP) V G (M), 1991 11 FAM LJ 11
W V W 1970 1 AER 1157
S V MCC 1970 1 AER 1162
S V S 1970 3 AER 107
F (A MINOR), IN RE 1993 3 AER 596
STATUS OF CHILDREN ACT 1987 S37
STATUS OF CHILDREN ACT 1987 S38(1)
CONSTITUTION ART 34.1
CONSTITUTION ART 38.1
CONSTITUTION ART 40.3
S (A) V B (R) & ORS
RUSSELL V RUSSELL
S V S
HAUGHEY, IN RE
STATUS OF CHILDREN ACT 1987 S38
STATUS OF CHILDREN ACT 1987 S39
STATUS OF CHILDREN ACT 1987 S42
STATUS OF CHILDREN ACT 1987 S38(2)
SUCCESSION ACT 1965
GUARDIANSHIP OF INFANTS ACT 1964 S11(1)
GUARDIANSHIP OF INFANTS ACT 1964 S11
GUARDIANSHIP OF INFANTS ACT 1964 S3
Words & Phrases:
RULING BY JUDGE CATHERINE McGUINNESSGIVEN THE 30th day of NOVEMBER, 1994
This is an application pursuant to the Judicial Separation and Family Law Reform Act, 1989in which the Applicant seeks a decree of judicial separation on the grounds of adultery and also an Order under Section 17 of the said Act in regard to the rights of the Respondent under the Succession Act, 1965. The Respondent counter claims for a decree of judicial separation pursuant to Section 2(1)(e) and (f) of the Act grounding her claim on length of separation and on physical, verbal and sexual assault by the Applicant. She also seeks a Section 17 Order and an Order pursuant to Section 16(a) granting her sole right of residence with the two children in the family home to the exclusion of the Applicant. Neither party seeks an Order pursuant to the Guardianship of Infants Act concerning the custody of the children or access to them.
The parties married on 29th October 1987. The family home is rented accommodation in which the husband has neither legal nor beneficial interest. There are two children E who is a child of the Respondent wife born prior to the marriage and of whom the husband is not the father and S born on 29 January, 1989 In his application, the Applicant husband claims that he does not believe that he is the father of S. It appears that the husband left the family home to take up employment in Jersey either in the last week of March or the first week of April, 1988. Some time later the wife contacted him and informed him that she was pregnant and he returned to the family home at the beginning of August, 1988. As I have said the child S was born on 29 January 1989.
The Applicant sought an Order under Section 11 of the 1989 Act which deals with interim orders directing blood tests to establish the paternity of the child S. This was refused by His Honour Judge Smith on 29 November, 1993. The matter was appealed to the High Court and was heard there by Geoghegan J. who dismissed the appeal. While no written judgement was given in the High Court, I was assured by both Counsel appearing before me that the Learned High Court judge expressed the opinion that he was dismissing the appeal on account of the fact that no issue as regards the child's paternity appeared on the pleadings and that if the pleadings were amended a further application could be made at the trial of the action in this court.
When the matter was listed before me in this court on 29th November, 1994, Counsel for the Applicant husband sought to amend the pleadings so as to include a claim for an Order pursuant to Section 16(g) of the 1989 Act for an Order determining whether or not the Applicant is the father of the infant S. and such further or other directions as to the welfare of the infant as the Court shall deem fit. It was also sought to insert at the end of paragraph 3 of the Applicant's application the sentence "It is in the best interests of S that it is established whether or not the Applicant is his father". The solicitor for the Applicant had given notice of the proposed amendments to the solicitor for the Respondent by letter dated 9 November 1994 and this letter was produced to me.
Counsel for the wife opposed this amendment on the grounds that the Applicant husband was relying on the presumption that he was joint guardian of the infant Sean in order to acquire locus standi under the Guardianship of Infants Act while at the same time seeking to deny paternity and thus his actual status as guardian. Counsel for the husband claimed that the present situation was that the husband by way of legal presumption was a joint guardian and therefore had locus standi to apply under the Guardianship of Infants Act and that he sought the ascertainment of the child's paternity in the interests of the child's own welfare. She...
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