Gibbons v Addington
| Jurisdiction | Ireland |
| Judge | Clarke C.J.,MacMenamin J.,O'Malley Iseult J. |
| Judgment Date | 07 December 2017 |
| Neutral Citation | [2017] IESCDET 137 |
| Court | Supreme Court |
| Date | 07 December 2017 |
[2017] IESCDET 137
THE SUPREME COURT
DETERMINATION
Clarke C.J.
MacMenamin J.
O'Malley Iseult J.
This is an application for leave to appeal in respect of an order made in the High Court hearing his appeal against a Circuit Court order. (The applicant has also raised issues in respect of other orders, such as the orders made in the Circuit Court and the refusal of a stay in the High Court. However the reality is that, firstly, the Circuit Court orders were overtaken by the High Court orders and, secondly, leave to appeal in respect of the High Court would, if granted, enable access to appropriate interim measures such as a stay.) The effect of the order was to grant possession of the house in which the applicant is living to his brother in law Mr. Gibbons, as personal representative of the estate of his aunt Vera Hanley (deceased). Mr. Gibbons and his sister Maria Gibbons, who is married to the applicant, are the beneficiaries of the estate.
As the applicant appears not to be aware of the effect of the 33rd Amendment to the Constitution, the text of Article 34.5.3 and Article 34.5.4 as they now stand is here set out in full:
34.5.3 – The Supreme Court shall, subject to such regulations as may be prescribed by law, have appellate jurisdiction from a decision of the Court of Appeal if the Supreme Court is satisfied that –
(i) the decision involves a matter of general public importance, or
(ii) in the interests of justice it is necessary that there be an appeal to the Supreme Court.
34.5.4 – Notwithstanding section 4.1 hereof, the Supreme Court shall, subject to such regulations as may be prescribed by law, have appellate jurisdiction from a decision of the High Court if the Supreme Court is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances warranting a direct appeal to it, and a precondition for the Supreme Court being so satisfied is the presence of either or both of the following factors:
(i) the decision involves a matter of general public importance;
(ii) the interests of justice.
It is clear from the terms of the Constitution and many determinations made by this Court since the enactment of the 33rd Amendment that it is necessary, in order for this Court to grant leave, that it be established that the decision sought to be appealed either involves a matter of general public importance or that it is otherwise in the interest of justice necessary that there be an appeal to this Court. An appeal from the High Court must also present exceptional circumstances.
The Court considers it desirable to point out that a determination of the Court on an application for leave, while it is final and conclusive so far as the parties are concerned, is a decision in relation to that application only. The issue is whether the questions raised, and the facts underpinning them, meet the constitutional criteria for leave. It will not, save in the rarest of circumstances, be appropriate to rely on a refusal of leave as having a precedential value in relation to the substantive issues in the context of a different case. Where leave is granted, any issue canvassed in the application will in due course be disposed of in the substantive decision of the Court.
The late Vera Hanley was the owner of a house in Clontarf. By agreement dated the 1st October 2009 Ms. Hanley let the house to Ms. Gibbons for one year at a monthly rent of €1,100. The agreement provided that if the tenancy went beyond one year it was to be deemed to be a tenancy determinable by one month's notice in writing. It also provided that the Circuit Court was to have jurisdiction in the event of a dispute.
Ms. Gibbons and the applicant continued to reside in the house. Ms. Hanley died on the 28th February 2014. Ms. Gibbons and her brother Declan are the only beneficiaries under the will. Mr. Gibbons was named as executor. He proved and registered the will in January 2015.
On the 24th October 2016 Mr. Gibbons's solicitor wrote to Ms. Gibbons indicating that the sale of the house had been agreed with a proposed closing date of the 5th December 2016. She was asked to vacate the house by that date. A copy of the letter was sent to the applicant. He replied on the following day, stating that he did not consent to the sale. However, on the 17th December 2016 he wrote stating that he was giving ‘irrevocable consent’ to his wife to do all things necessary as she saw fit pertaining to the property. This ‘irrevocable consent’ was withdrawn on the 19th December 2016.
The applicant has remained in the house ever since. However Ms. Gibbons left the house on the 21st December 2016. She has sworn an affidavit in the proceedings stating that she accepted that the tenancy was terminated and that her brother was obliged to sell the house in order to administer the estate.
In due course Mr. Gibbons issued proceedings by way of an Ejectment Civil Bill. He was granted an order for possession on the 18th July 2017, with a stay of 28 days.
The applicant's appeal against that order was heard in the High Court on the 13th October 2017. Judgment was delivered on the 1st December (see Gibbons v. Addington, Eagar J., 1st December 2017).
The issues dealt with in the High Court were: (i) whether the Circuit Court had had jurisdiction to deal with the matter; (ii) the claim made by the applicant that he had agreed with the deceased that he would reside in the house and be responsible for its maintenance; and (iii) that it was his family home. It appears that the applicant also made a number of allegations against persons involved in the case.
The High Court held that the Circuit Court had had jurisdiction, having regard to the statutory provisions relating to rateable valuation; that any claim the applicant had against the deceased should have been made within two years of her death; and that the Family Home Protection Act 1976 did not apply where a tenancy had been duly determined. He therefore dismissed the appeal.
Noting that the applicant had not left the premises after the order of the Circuit...
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