Goodman International v Hamilton (No. 3)

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Judgment Date: 27 May 1993
• Date: 27 May 1993
• Docket Number: [1992 No. 91 J.R.]
• Court: High Court

High Court

[1992 No. 91 J.R.]

Goodman International v. Hamilton (No. 3)

Goodman International and Laurence Goodman, Applicants

and

The Honourable Mr. Justice Liam Hamilton, sole member of the Tribunal of Inquiry into the Beef Processing Industry

Respondent

The Attorney General, Pat Rabbitte, Tomás MacGiolla, Dick Spring and Barry Desmond, Notice Parties (No. 3)

Cases mentioned in this report:—

Ambiorix v. The Minister for the Environment [1992] 1 I.R. 277.

Attorney General v. Hamilton (No. 2) [1993] 3 I.R. 227.

Cook v. Carroll [1945] I.R. 515.

D. v. N.S.P.C.C. [1978] A.C. 171; [1977] 2 W.L.R. 201; [1977] 1 All E.R. 589; 121 S.J. 119; 76 L.G.R. 5.

Geraghty v. Minister for Local Government [1975] I.R. 300.

Gravel v. U.S. (----) 408 U.S. 606.

Reference re: Legislative Privilege (1978) 83 D.L.R. (3d.) 161.

Murphy v. Corporation of Dublin [1972] I.R. 215.

In re O'Kelly (1974) 108 I.L.T.R. 97.

E.R. v. J.R. [1981] I.L.R.M. 125.

Evidence - Admissibility - Privilege - Private privilege - Statements made by members of the public to T.D.s - Allegations against applicants - Tribunal of inquiry established - Refusal of T.D.s to disclose identities of informants to Tribunal - Whether immune from disclosure - Public interest.

Judicial review.

The facts are summarised in the headnote and fully set out in the judgment of Geoghegan J., post.

On the 22nd March, 1993, on the ex parte motion of the applicants, leave was granted by the High Court (Geoghegan J.) to apply by way of judicial review for the following reliefs:—

• 1. A declaration that in the circumstances of the case the second, third and fourth notice parties were not entitled to refuse to disclose the sources of allegations made by them;

• 2. A declaration that there existed no common law privilege permitting former or sitting Dáil deputies to refuse to answer questions lawfully put to them as to the source of information given to them; and

• 3. If necessary an order of certiorari quashing the respondent's ruling of the 5th March, 1993, wherein he ruled that the second, third and fourth notice parties were entitled to refuse to answer questions as to the sources of allegations made by them.

The application was heard before the High Court (Geoghegan J.) on the 5th, 6th and 7th May, 1993 pursuant to notice of motion dated the 14th April, 1993.

The facts of this case are fully set out at in the report of Attorney General v. Hamilton (No. 2)[1993] 3 I.R. 227.

The second, third and fourth notice parties were members of the Oireachtas. They made serious allegations against the applicants before the respondent, the sole member of a tribunal of inquiry established by Dail Eireann to inquire into irregularities in the beef processing industry, and refused to disclose the identities of the persons who had supplied them with the information upon which these allegations were based.

Following the determination by the High Court (Geoghegan J.) in Attorney General v. Hamilton (No. 2)[1993] 3 I.R. 227 that Article 15 of the Constitution of Ireland, 1937, did not protect members of the Oireachtas from cross-examination in respect of utterances made outside the Houses of the Oireachtas, and, in particular, to the Tribunal, the respondent ruled that notwithstanding the said determination, the second, third and fourth notice parties were entitled to refuse to disclose to the Tribunal the identities of their informants by virtue of privilege arising at common law.

The applicants applied for judicial review of that ruling on the grounds that the respondent misdirected himself in law.

In the High Court, it was submitted on behalf of the notice parties, inter alia, that the relationship between a member of the public and a member of the Oireachtas in circumstances where such member of the public gave information of public interest to such member of the Oireachas on the understanding that his identity would not be disclosed, was a relationship falling within the conditions identified by Gavan Duffy J. inCook v. Carroll[1945] I.R. 515 and to which, accordingly, private privilege attached.

Held by Geoghegan J., in refusing the relief sought, 1, that the question of whether the notice parties were immune from disclosure of the identities of their informants fell to be decided on a narrow basis relating to the facts before the court. Accordingly, it was unnecessary to consider whether the relationship between the notice parties and their informants was one which fell within the criteria laid down in Cook v. Carroll[1945] I.R. 515.

Per curiam: That any unnecessary extension of the categories of relationship giving rise to a private privilege would offend against the jurisprudence of the Irish courts.

Murphy v. Corporation of Dublin [1972] I.R. 215; Geraghty v. Minister for Local Government[1975] I.R. 300 and Ambiorix v. The Minister for the Environment[1992] 1 I.R. 277 considered; dictum of Carroll J. in E.R. v. J.R. [1981] I.L.R.M. 125 followed.

2. That the exclusion of admissible and relevant evidence was in general contrary to the public interest in the administration of justice.

3. That where a communication was made in the context of a confidential relationship such that disclosure of the communication would be in breach of some ethical or social value involving the public interest, the court had a discretion to uphold a refusal to give evidence in relation to the communication, provided it was clearly demonstrated that the public interest would be better served by excluding such evidence.

Dictum of Lord Edmund-Davies in D. v. N.S.P.C.C.[1978] A.C. 171 approved.

4. That accordingly, the respondent had a discretion whether to insist on disclosure of the identities of the notice parties' informants.

Dictum of Lord Edmund-Davies in D. v. N.S.P.C.C.[1978] A.C. 171 followed.

5. That having regard to the fact that the informants could not reasonably have expected that the notice parties would lay themselves open to being obliged to disclose their identities, and to the fact that the respondent had stated that hearsay evidence would not be admitted to undermine the good names of the applicants, the respondent's discretion would have to be exercised in favour of non-disclosure of the identities of the informants.

Reference re: Legislative Privilege (1978) 83 D.L.R. (3d.) 161 distinguished; dictumof Lord Edmund-Davies in D. v. N.S.P.C.C.[1978] A.C. 171...