Hegarty v Mercy University Hospital Cork Ltd
| Jurisdiction | Ireland |
| Judge | Denham C.J.,Charleton J.,O'Malley J. |
| Judgment Date | 11 May 2016 |
| Neutral Citation | [2016] IESCDET 60 |
| Court | Supreme Court |
| Date | 11 May 2016 |
[2016] IESCDET 60
THE SUPREME COURT
DETERMINATION
Denham C.J.
Charleton J.
O'Malley J.
This determination relates to an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court from a judgment of the Court of Appeal delivered on the 10th February, 2016 and order made and delivered on 17th February, 2016.
Paul Hegarty, the applicant/appellant, referred to as ‘the applicant’, seeks leave to appeal to this Court from the said judgment of the Court of Appeal.
Mercy University Hospital, the respondent, is referred to as ‘the respondent’.
The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to hear appeals is set out in the Constitution.
Article 34 of the Constitution provides for the public administration of justice; describes the courts established by the Constitution, and those which may be established by law; provides for the full and original jurisdiction of the High Court; establishes the Court of Appeal under Article 34.2; and sets out its appellate jurisdiction under Article 34.4.1°. This states:
‘1° The Court of Appeal shall –
(i) Save as otherwise provided by this Article,
(ii) With such exceptions and subject to such regulations as may be prescribed by law,
have appellate jurisdiction from all decisions of the High Court, and also shall have appellate jurisdiction from such decisions of other courts as may be prescribed by law.’
Article 34.4.3° of the Constitution also provides for the finality of decisions of the Court of Appeal, save for appeals that may be taken to the Supreme Court from its decisions under Article 34.5.3°.
Under Article 34.5.4° it is possible for a decision of the High Court to be directly appealed to the Supreme Court, bypassing the Court of Appeal. This type of appeal is sometimes referred to colloquially as a ‘leap-frog’ appeal.
The Article relevant to this appeal, where the Court of Appeal has already given judgment in a matter, is Article 34.5.3°, which states:-
‘The Supreme Court shall, subject to such regulations as may be prescribed by law, have appellate jurisdiction from a decision of the Court of Appeal if the Supreme Court is satisfied that -
(i) the decision involves a matter of general public importance, or
(ii) in the interests of justice it is necessary that there be an appeal to the Supreme Court.’
The decision of the Supreme Court under Article 34.5.6 is, in all cases, ‘final and conclusive’.
Primarily, this Court is now ‘subject to such regulations as may be prescribed by law’, an appellate jurisdiction from the Court of Appeal. Such an appeal may only be exercised provided that this Court is satisfied, either that the relevant decision of the Court of Appeal ‘involves a matter of general public importance’, or, alternatively, that it is ‘in the interests of justice’, necessary that there be an appeal to this Court. The constitutional framework established by the 33rd Amendment of the Constitution thus requires, in order for a party to be entitled to appeal to this Court from a decision of the Court of Appeal, that it be demonstrated that either ‘a matter of general public importance’ arises, or that, ‘in the interests of justice, it is necessary that there be an appeal’ to this Court.
The statutory framework for the exercise of the right to appeal to this Court for such leave is to be found in the Court of Appeal Act, 2014, and, in particular, the provisions of s.44 of that Act, which inserts a new s.7 into the Courts (Supplemental Provisions) Act, 1961.
The Rules of Court are set out in the amended Order 58 of the Rules of the Superior Courts.
The Constitution has retained the entitlement of one appeal as a right from the High Court, subject to express exclusions or regulation by statute from the High Court to the Court of Appeal. What is sought here is a second appeal. The jurisdiction to bring an appeal to this Court is confined principally to cases where, as a result of the determination of the Court of Appeal, the decision of that court is such that the issues raised on a proposed appeal would involve a matter of general public importance, or would be such that it is in the interests of justice that there be a further appeal to this Court.
Any ruling in a determination is between the parties. It is final and conclusive as to the application for leave to appeal. The issue determined on the application for leave is whether the facts and legal issues meet the constitutional criteria to enable this Court to hear an appeal. Only in the rarest of cases could any such ruling have any precedent value. Where leave is granted, the legal issues on which leave is allowed will be decided in the due course of the appeal.
The applicant commenced proceedings in the High Court against the respondent hospital, its servants and agents in relation to the care he received in the respondent hospital between 6th February and 5th April 2007.
The applicant was admitted to the Mercy Hospital, Cork on 6th February 2007 with ulcerative colitis. His condition did not improve and on 12th February 2007 he had an emergency subtotal colectomy, following on from which a number of complications arose. The applicant had a second round of surgery on 20th February 2007, the result of which, in short, meant he had two colostomy bags inserted into two openings in his abdomen.
As a result of complications arising from the first two surgeries, the applicant developed an abdominal infection and underwent twelve procedures in all, in order to remedy the infection.
Another complication arose for the applicant on the 1st March, 2007, when it became apparent that a pelvic swab used in the course of his procedure on the 27th March, 2007 was reported positive for MRSA. He was thus treated in isolation and was continually monitored for infection and MRSA.
Seven to ten days before the applicants discharge from hospital, he was aware that he had at least one negative test result for MRSA. He had been earlier advised that he required three negative results in order to be declared clear of the infection. Following three successive negative test results, he was discharged from hospital on 5th April, 2007. It is agreed that this fact was communicated to him with a reassurance that he was no longer at any risk in respect of MRSA.
Before the High Court, the applicant claimed that the hospital was liable for negligence and breach of duty in failing to advise the applicant or to communicate properly with him with regard to the diagnosis of MRSA and his subsequent progress. In particular, he argued he was negligently allowed to believe his life was threatened by MRSA when it was not and that he suffered ‘extreme emotional suffering’ as a result, but did not allege any specific psychiatric injury. He also argued that the hospital was negligent in failing to explain properly the nature of the complications that arose from the first operation.
Judgment was delivered in the High Court by Irvine J. on the 25th of November, 2011. In dismissing the applicant's claim it was held that the applicant had been given all of the relevant factual and clinical information. The learned judge concluded that as a matter of fact, there were no lacunae in the medical or clinical information furnished to the applicant, which had been explained to him in terms that he should have readily understood. The applicant's claim was deemed as a...
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