I. I. (NIGERIA) v The Minister for Justice and Equality Determinations

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Judge: Clarke C.J.,Irvine J.,Baker J.
• Judgment Date: 21 January 2020
• Neutral Citation: [2020] IESCDET 4
• Date: 21 January 2020
• Court: Supreme Court
• Docket Number: S:AP:IE:2019:000209

BETWEEN

I. I. (NIGERIA)

APPLICANT

AND

THE MINISTER FOR JUSTICE AND EQUALITY

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

AND

IRELAND

RESPONDENTS

AND

THE IRISH HUMAN RIGHTS AND EQUALITY COMMISSION

NOTICE PARTY

[2020] IESCDET 4

Clarke C.J.

Irvine J.

Baker J.

S:AP:IE:2019:000209

2019 No. 85 JR

THE SUPREME COURT

DETERMINATION

APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL TO WHICH ARTICLE 34.5.4° OF THE CONSTITUTION APPLIES

RESULT: The Court does grant an extension of time to make this application and grants leave to the applicant to appeal to this Court directly from the High Court.

REASONS GIVEN:

ORDER SOUGHT TO BE APPEALED

COURT: High Court

DATE OF JUDGMENT OR RULING: 29 October 2019

DATE OF ORDER: 29 October 2019

DATE OF PERFECTION OF ORDER: 29 October 2019

THE APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL WAS MADE ON 25 November 2019 AND WAS NOT IN TIME.

Application to extend time

1 Order 58, r. 3 of the Rules of the Superior Courts provides, inter alia, that the Supreme Court may grant an extension of time to bring an application for leave to appeal when time has already expired.

2 The applicant is seeking to extend time for the bringing of the application as, following the delivery of his ex tempore judgment of 29 October 2019, Humphreys J. indicated that a written judgment would be circulated to the parties, which was done on or about 5 November 2019. The attested copy of the approved written judgment is dated 12 December 2019.

3 The application was lodged within three weeks thereafter.

4 The application to extend time is not opposed.

5 The Court will grant an extension of time to appeal in the circumstances as the delay was not due to any fault of the appellant and it was reasonable to await the full written judgement before drafting and lodging the application for leave.

Leave to appeal: General considerations

6 The general principles applied by this Court in determining whether to grant leave to appeal from a decision of the High Court or of the Court of Appeal have been considered in a number of determinations and are fully addressed in both a determination issued by a panel consisting of all of the members of this Court in B. S. v. Director of Public Prosecutions[2017] IESCDET 134 and in a unanimous judgment of a full Court delivered by O'Donnell J. in Price Waterhouse Coopers (A Firm) v. Quinn Insurance Ltd. (Under Administration)[2017] IESC 73, [2017] 3 IR 812.

7 In addition, because this is an application for leave to appeal directly from the High Court, it is necessary that it be established that there are “exceptional circumstances” warranting a direct appeal to this Court. The Supreme Court held in Mackeral v. O'Donoghue[2015] IESCDET 27 that it would generally allow a leapfrog appeal only where the exceptional factor or factors identified make it probable both that:

(a) the case will come to the Supreme Court in any event, and;

(b) the clarification of the legal issues raised would be unlikely to significantly benefit from an intermediate appeal to the Court of Appeal.

8 Furthermore, the application for leave filed and the respondents' notice are published along with this determination (subject only to any redaction required by law) and it is therefore unnecessary to set out the position of the parties.

9 Whilst the respondents do not oppose the grant of leave, this Court must itself be satisfied that the constitutional threshold has been met.

10 Any ruling in a determination concerns whether the facts and legal issues meet the constitutional criteria...