John Jones, Lessee of The Midland Great Western Railway Company v Craig

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Judgment Date: 06 May 1850
• Date: 06 May 1850
• Court: Queen's Bench Division (Ireland)

Queenƒ€™s Bench.

JOHN JONES, Lessee of THE MIDLAND GREAT WESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY

and

CRAIG

Long v. Rankin 2 Sug. Pow. 513.

The King v. Wilson 5 M. & Ry. 157, note.

Curtis v. Wheeler 1 M. & Mal. 493.

Oxley v. JamesENR 13 M. & W. 214.

Hughes v. Howlin Fox & S. 7.

Eyres v. FaulklandENR 1 salk. 231.

Pluck v. Digges 2 H. & Br. 1.

Porter v. French 9 Ir. Law Rep. 514.

Pike v. EyreENR 9 B. & C. 914.

Lord Netterville v. Marshall Wallis Rep. 80.

Buttƒ€™s caseUNK 7 Rep. 98.

Richardson v. NixonUNK 7 Ir. Eq. Rep. 620.

Pluck v. Digges 2 Dow. & Cl. 180.

Doe v. walkerUNK 5 B. 7amp; r. 119.

CASES IN THE COURTS OF QUEEN'S BENCH, COMMON PLEAS, exchequer of Went AND EXCHEQUER CHAMBER. JOHN JONES, Lessee of THE MIDLAND GREAT WESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY, v. CRAIG. (Queen's Bench.) EJECTMENT for non-payment of rent, tried before the LORD CHIEF JUSTICE at the Sittings after last Hilary Term. At the trial the plaintiff gave in evidence a lease bearing date the 20th of September 1843, between John Drew and the defendÂÂant, by which John Drew demised the premises in question to the defendant for three lives therein named, and a term of ten years, to be computed from the 29th of September 1841, subject to the rent of 32. 6s. 2d. He also proved a conveyance bearing date the 31st of August 1846. This conveyance recited a lease bearing date the 17th of March 1823, between Lord Rathdowne and John Wilde, by which Lord Rathdowne demised certain premises (including the E. T. 1850. Apra 25, 26. May 6. A,holding preÂÂmises under a lease for lives and years conÂÂcurrent, de mises to B for the same lives and a shorter term of years. Held, that A had a legal reversion enÂÂtitling him to maintain an ejectment for non-payment of rent. (CRAMP-TON, J., disÂÂsentiente.) The case of Pluck v. Digges observed upon and commented on. 1 L 2 CASES AT LAW. E. T. 1850. premises the subject of the ejectment) to John Wilde for the saute Queen'sBench. lives as were named in the lease of the 20th of September 1843, MIDLAND " and in ease the said lives should die before the end and term, of G. W. RAIL- WAY CO. "thirty-one years, to be computed from the 29th day of September v. "then last past, then for such part of the said term of thirty-one CRAIG. "years as should be unexpired at the time of the death of the "survivor of the said lives ;" it also recited that the premises in question had come to John Drew by assignment. By this deed John Drew conveyed and assigned all his interest in the premises demised by Lord Rathdowne to the Railway Company. The plaintiff having closed his case, Counsel for the defendant called for a nonsuit, on the ground that the lives in the lease to the defendant being the same as those in the original lease from Lord Rathdowne to Wilde, no reversion was left in Drew, and conseÂÂquently the relation of landlord and tenant did not subsist under the Ejectment Statutes. His Lordship refused to nonsuit, but directed a verdict for the plaintiff, with liberty to the defendant to move to have that verdict set aside and a nonsuit entered. An order nisi having been accordingly obtained Fitzgibbon (with him Richard Armstrong and Boyce) showed cause. There is a sufficient reversion in this case to support the ejectÂÂment. The plaintiff's interest, in case the lives drop, would continue for two years longer than that of the defendant, and that constitutes a sufficient reversion. Here there is an estate for three lives and a concurrent term in possession in the lessee ; that is an existing estate ; for if the indenture were inoperative as to the freehold, it is quite clear that the term would pass. There being therefore separate and distinct interests in both there is a clear reversion : Long v. Rankin (a). The slightest residue of an interest conÂÂstitutes a reversion, and here there is a possibility that the term may be in existence when all the lives drop ; and a contingent reversion is quite sufficient to maintain ejectment or distress The King v. Wilson (b). It is there said :-" To constitute a reversionary interest (a) 2 &lg. Pow. 513. (1) 5 M. & Ry. 167, note. CASES AT LAW. 3 " it is not necessary that a particular estate be so limited that the land " will certainly return to the party creating the limitation, or his " representatives ; it is sufficient if the estate may so return :" Curtis v. Wheeler (a). In Oxley v. James (b), recognising Curtis v. Wheeler, Pollock, C. B., says :-" If a tenant from year to year " demises for a term of years, and the original tenancy from year to " year last beyond that term, such a demise is not an assignment ; " but there is a reversion :" Hughes v. Howlin (c); Eyres v. Faulkland (d). A Court of Law will recognise the residue of a term after the expiration of a life. We do not here seek to recover rent for a greater estate than the plaintiff holds. An estate is defined to signify " such inheritance, freehold, term for years, tenancy by "statute merchant, staple, elegit or the like, as any man hath in " lands or tenements : " Co. Lit., p. 345, a. A lease for a life, with a concurrent term, must have all the incidents of a freehold as long as the life lasts. The case of Pluck v. Digges (e) has been freÂÂquently dissented from, and the doctrine thereby established ought not...