Johnson v Dunnes Stores Plc
| Jurisdiction | Ireland |
| Judge | Ms. Justice Bolger |
| Judgment Date | 18 October 2022 |
| Neutral Citation | [2022] IEHC 580 |
| Court | High Court |
| Docket Number | [2017/11072 P] |
[2022] IEHC 580
[2017/11072 P]
THE HIGH COURT
Personal injury – Statute barred – Strike out – Defendant seeking to strike out the plaintiff’s proceedings – Whether the plaintiff’s proceedings were statute barred
Facts: The defendant, Dunnes Stores plc, applied to the High Court to strike out the proceedings of the plaintiff, Ms Johnson, as statute barred by way of a trial of a preliminary issue. The plaintiff’s personal injury summons pleaded that she was subjected to bullying and harassment in the course of her employment with the defendant, as a result of which she sustained personal injuries, loss and damage. She claimed to have suffered significant health problems including sleep disturbance and stress for which she first attended her GP on 21 May 2014. The parties agreed that the date of accrual of the plaintiff’s cause of action was 21 May 2014. The Personal Injuries Assessment Board application was lodged on 21 March 2017 which was some ten months outside the two-year time limit. In reply to the defendant’s plea that the proceedings were therefore statute barred, the plaintiff pleaded that her proceedings were lodged within two years of her date of knowledge and in the alternative, pleaded that she was under a disability throughout that time and was therefore entitled to an extension of time as provided for by the Statute of Limitations as amended.
Held by Bolger J that on the evidence in the case, regardless of whether the plaintiff was under a disability from May 2014 onwards or not, the plaintiff’s date of knowledge was on the 21 May 2014 when she attended her GP. Bolger J found that the plaintiff was experiencing significant stress from May 2014 and was diagnosed as suffering from mild to moderate depression from August 2014 for which she was treated with counselling and time off work. Bolger J held that this level of illness falls short of the type of condition that the courts have previously found to have satisfied the concept of “unsound mind” in s. 48 of the Civil Liability Act 1961. Bolger J would not allow the plaintiff the extension of time that she sought by reference to her claim that she was under a disability throughout the entirety of the two-year period from her date of knowledge on 21 May 2014.
Bolger J struck out the proceedings as statute barred pursuant to the Statute of Limitations Act 1991 as amended. In accordance with the provisions of s. 167 of the Legal Services Regulatory Act 2015 her indicative view on costs was that costs should follow the cause and that the defendant was therefore entitled to the costs both of this motion and of the proceedings.
Application granted.
JUDGMENT of Ms. Justice Bolger delivered on the 18th day of October, 2022
This is the defendant's application to strike out the plaintiff's proceedings as statute barred by way of a trial of a preliminary issue. The parties agree that this involves matters of fact and of law in relation to which the court heard evidence and submissions.
For the reasons set out below I am allowing the application and am striking out the proceedings as statute barred.
The plaintiff's personal injury summons pleads that the plaintiff was subjected to bullying and harassment in the course of her employment with the defendant, as a result of which she sustained personal injuries, loss and damage. The plaintiff claimed to have suffered significant health problems including sleep disturbance and stress for which she first attended her GP on 21 May 2014. The parties agree that the date of accrual of the plaintiff's cause of action is 21 May 2014.
The PIAB application was lodged on 21 March 2017 which was some ten months outside the two-year time limit. In reply to the defendant's plea that the proceedings are therefore statute barred, the plaintiff pleads that her proceedings were lodged within two years of her date of knowledge and in the alternative, pleads that she was under a disability throughout that time and is therefore entitled to an extension of time as provided for by the Statute of Limitations as amended.
The parties agreed that the plaintiff must satisfy the court that she was under a disability from 14 May 2014 in order for the proceedings to be within time, which requires an assessment of the medical evidence.
The court heard the evidence of the plaintiff's GP Dr. Mullins. No medical evidence was proffered by the defendant. The plaintiff attended Dr. Mullins for the first time in relation to her injuries the subject matter of these proceedings on 21 May 2014, the day after she left work for the last time. Dr. Mullins found the plaintiff to be extremely upset, tearful and distraught and certified her as unfit for work due to work related stress. Dr. Mullins continued to certify her as unfit due to work related stress over the following months. There were a number of attendances where Dr. Mullins noted an improvement, but on 6 August 2014 the plaintiff attended for review and Dr. Mullins diagnosed mild to moderate reactive depression secondary to work related stress. At that time the plaintiff was on a waiting list for counselling. Dr. Mullins discussed anti-depressant medication but the plaintiff was reluctant to take it and Dr. Mullins supported her decision. The possibility of medication was also raised by the plaintiff's counsellor in October 2014.
In her evidence Dr. Mullins emphasised the fluctuating nature of the plaintiff's mood from May 2014, which Dr. Mullins believed affected her executive functioning including her ability to work and possibly her ability to bring proceedings.
During this period the plaintiff attended with Citizens Advice and FLAC (Free Legal Advice Centre) and also signed a letter of complaint addressed to the defendant dated 11 June 2014. She also signed an LRC claim form dated 20 November 2014. All of those tasks were achieved with the considerable assistance of the plaintiff's husband who was very supportive to the plaintiff throughout her illness.
The plaintiff was admitted involuntarily to hospital as an inpatient under psychiatric care in May 2016 and was diagnosed with delusional disorder. Dr. Mullins was of the view that from in or around October 2015 “something was not right” and she seemed to date the onset of the plaintiff's psychosis to that time. During the earlier period of May 2014 to October 2015 Dr. Mullins described the plaintiff as following an atypical course to most people suffering from work related stress in that she was very up and down. There was never a period of time that Dr. Mullins could say the plaintiff had sustained improvement.
Counsel for the plaintiff laid heavy emphasis on Dr. Mullin's evidence of the plaintiff's lack of executive function and the absence of any medical evidence from the defendant to contradict Dr. Mullin's views. Counsel for the defendant contended that whether the plaintiff has capacity to instruct a solicitor during the period May 2014 (when she was first diagnosed with work related stress) to October 2015 (when her GP noted what seemed retrospectively to have been the onset of psychosis) is an evidential issue. They argued that Dr. Mullin's conclusions on the plaintiff's executive function during that time were inconsistent with the evidence of what the plaintiff was able to do including driving, banking, arranging her social welfare and attending Citizens Advice and FLAC for advice including meeting with representatives of those organisations on her own. Counsel also emphasised the plaintiff's ability to recount the details of her experience at work to her husband who used them to draft the letter of complaint and the complaint to the LRC, both of which were signed by the plaintiff.
Sections 2(1) and 2(2) of the Statute of Limitation (Amendment) Act 1991:
“2.—(1) For the purposes of any provision of this Act whereby the time within which an action in respect of an injury may be brought depends on a person's date of knowledge (whether he is the person injured or a personal representative or dependant of the person injured) references to that person's date of knowledge are references to the date on which he first had knowledge of the following facts:
(a) that the person alleged to have been injured had been injured,
(b) that the injury in question was significant,
(c) that the injury was attributable in whole or in part to the act or omission which is alleged to constitute negligence, nuisance or breach of duty,
(d) the identity of the defendant, and
(e) if it is alleged that the act or omission was that of a person other than the...
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