Jones v Coolmore Stud

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Judge: the President
• Judgment Date: 25 May 2017
• Neutral Citation: [2017] IECA 164
• Date: 25 May 2017
• Court: Court of Appeal (Ireland)
• Docket Number: Neutral Citation Number: [2017] IECA 164 [2016 No. 326]

[2017] IECA 164

THE COURT OF APPEAL

Ryan P.

The President

Irvine J.

Barr J.

Neutral Citation Number: [2017] IECA 164

[2016 No. 326]

BETWEEN

WILLIAM JONES

APPELLANT

AND

COOLMORE STUD

RESPONDENT

Injunction – Defamation – Constitutional rights – Appellant seeking injunctions restraining respondent from adopting measures to prevent or restrict dissemination of his book – Whether respondent was entitled to adopt those measures in relation to third parties when there had not been any determination of libel

Facts: The appellant, Mr Jones, worked for the respondent, Coolmore Stud, over a period of nine years until late 2014. After he resigned, he wrote a book and privately published it in November 2015. Coolmore’s solicitors corresponded with distributors and booksellers endeavouring to prevent them disseminating the book. They first alleged, before they saw the book, that it might be defamatory or in breach of an agreement between the parties. When they read it, they confirmed those protests and also claimed that it infringed the good name and interests of the Stud and the rights of employees, clients and others. Mr Jones brought High Court proceedings seeking injunctions restraining Coolmore from adopting these measures to prevent or restrict dissemination of the book. He also wanted the court to declare that his book was not defamatory. His case was that Coolmore was not entitled to adopt those measures in relation to third parties when there had not been any determination of libel. The High Court refused the reliefs that Mr Jones sought, holding that Coolmore was entitled to take the steps it did to protect its interests. Mr Jones appealed to the Court of Appeal against the decision of the High Court. In his notice of appeal, he listed as his grounds breach of rights and rules under the Irish Constitution and European Convention on Human Rights; he argued that there was bias, a breach of the right to freedom of speech and expression, the promotion of censorship and various errors of law.

Held by Ryan P that there was no valid objection in law to a person seeking to protect his good name by notifying a distributor or other secondary disseminator of his complaint of defamation with a view to preventing distribution.

Ryan P held that the appeal should be dismissed.

Appeal dismissed.

JUDGMENT of the President delivered on 25th May 2017

Introduction

1 This is an appeal by Mr. William Jones from a decision of Costello J. in the High Court refusing a declaration and interlocutory injunctions in proceedings against his former employers, Coolmore Stud (‘Coolmore’). He worked at Coolmore over a period of nine years until late 2014. After he resigned, he wrote a book and privately published it in November 2015. Coolmore's solicitors corresponded with distributors and booksellers endeavouring to prevent them disseminating the book. They first alleged, before they saw the book, that it might be defamatory or in breach of an agreement between the parties. When they read it, they confirmed those protests and also claimed that it infringed the good name and interests of the Stud and the rights of employees, clients and others. Coolmore did not, however, sue Mr. Jones for libel; he said that if it did, he would defend his book line by line, which is probably just what Coolmore did not want to happen. Mr. Jones brought High Court proceedings seeking injunctions restraining Coolmore from adopting these measures to prevent or restrict dissemination of the book. He also wanted the court to declare that his book was not defamatory. His case was that Coolmore was not entitled to adopt those measures in relation to third parties when there had not been any determination of libel.

2 The High Court refused the reliefs that Mr. Jones sought in an interlocutory application. Costello J. held that Coolmore was entitled to take the steps it did to protect its interests. Specifically, it was legally permissible to write in the terms of the solicitors' letters to distributors and sellers with a view to closing those avenues of dissemination. She said that the court could not in any case make the declaration of non-defamation that he wanted. In the circumstances, Mr. Jones had not made out a fair case to be tried, which was required for an injunction, much less a strong case which he would need for a mandatory order. Neither had he shown that damages were not an adequate remedy for any wrong he might establish. And finally, the court held that Mr. Jones, by his conduct in regard to an agreement he had made with Coolmore, had disentitled himself from equitable relief, even if the other proofs had been present.

3 Against these orders Mr. Jones appeals to this Court. He appears before the court as a litigant in person who is possessed of considerable literary and presentational skills as well as an impressive capacity for legal research. At the same time, his unfamiliarity with legal procedures and the way courts operate has also been evident. This would be a difficult case for an experienced lawyer and the challenge is so much greater for somebody not versed in the ways of courts, lawyers and judges.

4 The central question, although not the only one for determination, is whether it was legally permissible for the solicitors acting for Coolmore to correspond as they did with distributors and booksellers alleging possible or actual defamation and other wrongs with a view to dissuading them from dealing with Mr. Jones's book. The judgment appealed against and the submissions of Coolmore rely heavily on s. 27 of the Defamation Act 2009, and the implications that are said to arise from its provisions in relation to innocent dissemination. Because this statutory defence is open to a person who only distributes or sells a book and who does not know that it is or might be defamatory, it is legitimate as Coolmore argues for a person who apprehends that he may be libelled to notify the distributor. The section provides as follows: –

‘27. — (1) It shall be a defence (to be known as the ‘defence of innocent publication’) to a defamation action for the defendant to prove that—

(a) he or she was not the author, editor or publisher of the statement to which the action relates,

(b) he or she took reasonable care in relation to its publication, and

(c) he or she did not know, and had no reason to believe, that what he or she did caused or contributed to the publication of a statement that would give rise to a cause of action in defamation.

(2) A person shall not, for the purposes of this section, be considered to be the author, editor or publisher of a statement if—

(a) in relation to printed material containing the statement, he or she was responsible for the printing, production, distribution or selling only of the printed material,

(b) in relation to a film or sound recording containing the statement, he or she was responsible for the processing, copying, distribution, exhibition or selling only of the film or sound recording,

(c) in relation to any electronic medium on which the statement is recorded or stored, he or she was responsible for the processing, copying, distribution or selling only of the electronic medium or was responsible for the operation or provision only of any equipment, system or service by means of which the statement would be capable of being retrieved, copied, distributed or made available.

(3) The court shall, for the purposes of determining whether a person took reasonable care, or had reason to believe that what he or she did caused or contributed to the publication of a defamatory statement, have regard to—

(a) the extent of the person's responsibility for the content of the statement or the decision to publish it,

(b) the nature or circumstances of the publication, and

(c) the previous conduct or character of the person.

5 The facts of the case are set out in detail in the judgment of the High Court including details of the correspondence between Coolmore and Mr. Jones and Coolmore and Amazon and other distributors or sellers. It is unnecessary for the purpose of the appeal to repeat this history. Although Mr. Jones is very critical of the High Court judge and the judgment – a matter which I will address at a later stage – he does not challenge any of the facts that are central to the dispute. They are in truth relatively simple in their essential facts.

The Agreement of 12th December 2014

6 The appellant was an employee of the defendant for nine years. In circumstances that are not before the court, in 2014, he brought a claim arising from his employment to the Labour Relations Commission. The matter was compromised and parties reached agreement with the assistance of a Rights Commissioner and made a written agreement in the following terms:

‘1. It is agreed the claimant will retire on Friday 16 January '15 as per his normal retirement date and all staff of the respondent will be informed accordingly.…

3. The claimant accepts he was provided with the opportunity to get professional advice prior to signing this agreement but he declined this offer and that he was happy to sign this as written.

4. The claimant accepts he has no further claim against the respondent under any other relevant employment legislation (including, but not limited to, Unfair Dismissals, Employment Equality and Protected Disclosures Acts), Personal Injuries or common law whatsoever.

5. He withdraws his claim r 147483-ir-14 which is before the Rights Commissioner

…

7. This agreement is strictly private and confidential to the parties involved except where called upon by the statutory bodies or by law. Confidentiality is an essential term of this agreement on both parties.

8. It is a term of this agreement that no records relating to animals or clients will be disclosed by the claimant.

9. Both parties agree they will not...