O'Keeffe v Irish Motor Inns

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Judge: O'HIGGINS C.J.,KENNYJ.:
• Judgment Date: 27 January 1978
• Neutral Citation: 1978 WJSC-SC 668
• Date: 27 January 1978
• Docket Number: (182/77),[1974 No. 3176 P.]
• Court: Supreme Court

O'KEEFFE v. IRISH MOTOR INNS LTD

High - 21.7.77

O'KEEFFE

v.

IRISH MOTOR INNS LIMITED

1978 WJSC-SC 668

O'Higgins C.J.

Henchy J.

Griffin J.

Kenny J.

Parke J.

(182/77)

THE SUPREME COURT

1 JUDGMENT delivered the 27th day of January 1978by O'HIGGINS C.J. [namely J. Griffin J. & Parke J. Concurring]

2 This is an appeal by the Defendants against a Judgment and Order of the High Court made on the 22nd July 1977 following the findings of the jury which tried the Plaintiff's claim against the Defendants. The jury found the Defendants guilty of negligence, the Plaintiff not guilty of contributory negligence and assessed damages at £305,088.

3 In this appeal the Defendants submit, in the first place that the action should have been withdrawn from the jury and that the verdict and findings of the jury are not supported by the evidence. They rely, in this regard, not only on the nature of the evidence adduced at the trial, but also on the conduct of the trial itself. If this submission is correct it would follow that the verdict and findings of the jury should be set aside and that this appeal should result in Judgment being entered in favour of the Defendants.

4 As an alternative the Defendants complain that thetrial which resulted in these findings was unsatisfactory. They say that the questions on liability left by the learned trial Judge were inappropriate and unfair to the Defendants. They also say that the learned trial Judge failed to preserve a fair balance in his charge to the jury. The Defendants" complaints in this regard, if accepted by this Court, would result in a new trial being ordered.

5 It is further submitted on behalf of the Defendants that the particular finding of no contributory negligence against the Plaintiff was a perverse finding and contrary to the evidence and the weight of the evidence. They submit that this finding should be set aside and a new trial ordered. Finally, the Defendants contend that the damages awarded were wholly excessive and unreasonable and that, if necessary a new assessment of damages should take place.

6 The Plaintiff's claim arises out of a serious accident in which he was involved on the morning of the 21st April 1974 at the Hilltop Hotel, Youghal, which is a hotel owned by the Defendants. As a result of this accident the Plaintiff received very grave injuries. These included a fracture-dislocation of the fifth and sixth cervical vertibrae and severance of the spinal cord which have rendered himpermanently and extensively paralysed.

7 A short time before this tragic accident, there had been a dance in the function-room of the hotel. This function-room is situate to one side of the hotel building. It has its own entrance and appears to be a self-contained unit separate from the residential or main part of the hotel. The dance had concluded at 2 o'clock in the morning and within half an hour of its conclusion the ballroom had been cleared of all guests. According to his evidence Mr. Dorgan, the hotel manager, had earlier locked the main door of the hotel at the conclusion of the permitted period for the sale of drink. This was 12 o'clock. After the end of the dance he saw to the locking of all the doors on the function-room side of the hotel, once the guests had departed. Having done so, he and those of the staff who had been involved with the dance proceeded to have a drink in the dining-room of the hotel, prior to their going to bed. Mr. Dorgan then noticed the Plaintiff in the reception area of the hotel, endeavouring to extract cigarettes from a cigarette machine. Being, ofcourse, concerned that a non-resident should still be on the hotel premises, Mr. Dorgan went to the Plaintiff, assisted him in getting the cigarettes, and escorted him to the front door which was then locked. Mr. Dorgan says that he opened the door, saw the Plaintiff out and each bade one another good-night. The time was between 3.15 and 3.30 in the morning. The Plaintiff, while he does not recollect the incident of the cigarette machine, accepts that it could have happened because as he said there were certain parts of what happened that night which he could not recall. Again the Plaintiff, while he thought he had left the main hotel premises earlier than Mr. Dorgan said, was prepared to accept, in cross-examination, that Mr. Dorgan's account as to time was more likely to be accurate than his.

8 It was common case, therefore, that some time after the conclusion of the dance in the function-room the Plaintiff was let out of the front door of the hotel. The area in front of the hotel leading from the public road to the hotel was lighted by means of flood lights and these were then lighting. What exactly the Plaintiff did after he left the hotel proper will probably never be fully known. The dance was over andtheguests had gone. Nevertheless, the Plaintiff, instead of going out of the hotel premises towards the public road, went in the direction of the function-room. He says that he did so because he thought that the dance was still on and he was anxious to secure a lift home. He further says that the lights were on in the function-room. He could have been correct in this because the cleaners or sweepers might well have been in possession of the function-room at the time. However, in his evidence he said that when he went to the function-room the door was open, that he went in but there was no one there. At this stage the dance must have been over for something between an hour and a quarter and an hour and a half. Mr. Dorgan had sworn that the function-room door was at this stage locked but the Plaintiff was adamant that it was open. The jury was, of course, entitled to accept and act on the Plaintiff's evidence in this respect. The Plaintiff's account continued that, seeing that the function-room was empty, he left, turned to his left around the corner of the function-room building, still seeking a lift. Along the side of this building there is, for some distance, a narrow footpath and, outside that, a tarmacadam car park, which is acontinuation of a similar tarmacadam car park situate at the front of the hotel building. This tarmacadam car park continues down the length of the function-room as far as a concrete yard which gives access to the cold-room, goods entrance, rear entrance and other private areas of the hotel. This concrete yard was distinguished on the date in question, by a short wall, which appears to have been under construction or repair. In his evidence the Plaintiff said that having gone around the corner of the function-room he was immediately in complete darkness. While he had said that the lights were on in the function-room, the windows of the function-room would have been situate some little distance further down towards the concrete yard. He said that he had gone no more than five yards when he tripped and fell and received these terrible injuries. What was blamed for causing him to trip and fall was the presence in his path of a collection of beer barrels and timber of some kind. Had this continued to be the case as presented on behalf of the Plaintiff,thenthe jury would have had to consider such questions on liability as might arise from the happening of this accident five yards around the corner and along by the side of this tarmacadam car park.

9 This continued to be the sworn evidence of the Plaintiff. However, evidence was later adduced, which was not contradicted or challenged, that at the time of the accident there was no obstruction of any kind along this particular pathway and that the only collection of barrels was at the corner of the short wall, which I have already mentioned. If, therefore, the accident was caused by the plaintiff colliding with a collection of beer barrels after he had gone around the corner of the building, it would follow that the accident must have happened at the corner of this wall and not on the pathway five yards or so around the corner. From a perusal of the transcript it seems quite clear that plaintiff's counsel, faced by this evidence, were content to abandon the plaintiff's own account of where the accident happened in favour of the inference that it happened at the place where the barrels were, namely, at the corner of the wall.

10 According to the evidence, some little time after he had been shown out the front door by Mr. Dorgan, the Plaintiff was found by the night porter, lying on the ground, face down and unconscious, outside the back kitchen door of the hotel. This was within another yard situate beyond the one previously mentioned and was some forty feet from the collection of beer barrels already referred to. The medical evidence was to the effect that with a fracture-dislocation of the severity suffered by the Plaintiff it was almost certain that his spinal cord was severed at the same time and that he would be for all practical purposes immobile from the time of the happening of the accident. The Plaintiff some time after being discovered was moved into the hotel and put lying on a bed. According to the medical evidence, the dreadful injury which the Plaintiff suffered required considerable force, which was described as decelerating force - somebody moving at some speed suddenly coming to a full stop, thereby causing a bending of the neck with considerable force on impact. On the basis that the accident was caused by a collision between the Plaintiff and the collection of beer barrels, this medical evidence clearly suggests that his injuries could not have been sustained by merely walking into or against them.

11 At the conclusion of the evidence (apart from that of two witnesses dealing with damages) Mr. Condon on behalf of the Defendants applied to have the case withdrawn from the jury and a verdict entered for the Defendants. After argument the learned trial Judge refused this application and having heard submissions he left the following questions...