L.O. v The Minister for Justice and Equality
| Jurisdiction | Ireland |
| Judge | Mr. Justice Cian Ferriter |
| Judgment Date | 29 March 2022 |
| Neutral Citation | [2022] IEHC 182 |
| Court | High Court |
| Docket Number | [2020 631 JR] |
In the Matter of Section 5 of the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act, 2000 (As Amended)
[2022] IEHC 182
[2020 631 JR]
THE HIGH COURT
JUDICIAL REVIEW
Judicial review – Permission to remain in the State – Extension of time – Applicant seeking judicial review – Whether the interests of justice merited granting an extension of time
Facts: The applicant applied to the High Court seeking orders of certiorari quashing a decision of the respondent, the Minister for Justice and Equality, made under s. 49(7) of the International Protection Act 2015 dated 14 November, 2019 in which the Minister refused the applicant permission to remain in the State, a decision of the Minister made on the same date (and in the same document) under s. 50 of the 2015 Act holding that the applicant was not at risk of refoulement if returned to Nigeria and a deportation order made in respect of the applicant by the Minister pursuant to s. 51 of the 2015 Act on 13 December, 2019, and which was issued on 31 January, 2020 and which followed in consequence of the earlier two decisions. The grounds upon which the applicant sought those reliefs were to the effect that the Minister in reaching those decisions acted unlawfully and contrary to the relevant provisions of the Trafficking Directive (Directive 2011/36/EU of 5 April, 2011 on preventing and combatting trafficking in human beings), and related administrative arrangements for the protection of victims of human trafficking, by failing to take into account the designation of the applicant as a potential victim of human trafficking for sexual exploitation, in circumstances where, the applicant alleged, reasonable grounds remained for such belief and where she contended she was entitled as a matter of law to remain in the State when she had such a status. It was further alleged that the Minister failed, as part of the humanitarian considerations assessment under s. 49(3)(b) of the 2015 Act, to take into account, or have proper regard to the applicant’s status as a potential victim of trafficking and that there was a further error in failing to have proper regard to the applicant’s claim that she was at risk of refoulement as a victim of trafficking in the s. 50 decision. Finally, there was a complaint that the decisions were not adequately or at all reasoned and that the decisions relied on COI of no relevance to the basis of the claims made to the Minister by the applicant under s. 49 and s. 50.
Held by Ferriter J that he did not believe there was any failure to take into account the applicant’s alleged status as a victim of trafficking. Ferriter J held that it was clear that the applicant was properly initially treated as a suspected victim of human trafficking and that she was afforded appropriate protective mechanisms, including referral to the HSE Anti-Trafficking Unit, and engagement with the support services of Ruhama, in that context. Ferriter J noted that the IPO, and the IPAT on appeal, concluded that the applicant’s story that she was a victim of trafficking was not credible and rejected that story in its entirety. Ferriter J held that the applicant’s claim to remain entitled to protection as a suspected victim of trafficking was untenable in the circumstances. In Ferriter J’s view, the applicant’s case in alleged failure of the duty to give reasons was not well founded. Ferriter J held that it was clear from the face of the review document that the Minister expressly engaged with the case made by the applicant as to her medical circumstances and her connection with the State. Ferriter J saw no error of law in the circumstances. Notwithstanding that the applicant had an arguable case, Ferriter J was not satisfied that good and sufficient reason had been made out for the very lengthy delay in bringing the leave application, or that the interests of justice would merit granting an extension of time of the magnitude of the extension sought.
Ferriter J refused the applicant an extension of time to pursue the reliefs sought. In any event, Ferriter J was satisfied that the applicant would not have been entitled to any of the reliefs sought.
Relief refused.
JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Cian Ferriter delivered on the 29 th day of March 2022
In these judicial review proceedings, the applicant seeks orders of certiorari quashing a decision of the respondent (“the Minister”) made under s.49 (7) of the International Protection Act, 2015 (the “2015 Act”) dated 14 November, 2019 in which the Minister refused the applicant permission to remain in the State; a decision of the Minister made on the same date (and in the same document) under s.50 of the 2015 Act holding that the applicant was not at risk of refoulement if returned to Nigeria and a deportation order made in respect of the applicant by the Minister pursuant to s.51 of the 2015 Act on 13 December, 2019, and which was issued on 31 January, 2020 and which followed in consequence of the earlier two decisions.
In broad terms, the grounds upon which the applicant seeks these reliefs are to the effect that the Minister in reaching these decisions acted unlawfully and contrary to the relevant provisions of the Trafficking Directive ( Directive 2011/36/EU of 5 April, 2011 on preventing and combatting trafficking in human beings), and related administrative arrangements for the protection of victims of human trafficking, by failing to take into account the designation of the applicant as a potential victim of human trafficking for sexual exploitation, in circumstances where, the applicant alleges, reasonable grounds remained for such belief and where she contends she is entitled as a matter of law to remain in the State when she has such a status.
It was further alleged that the Minister failed, as part of the humanitarian considerations assessment under s.49(3)(b) of the 2015 Act, to take into account, or have proper regard to the applicant's status as a potential victim of trafficking and that there was a further error in failing to have proper regard to the applicant's claim that she was at risk of refoulement as a victim of trafficking in the s.50 decision.
Finally, there was a complaint that the decisions were not adequately or at all reasoned and that the decisions relied on COI of no relevance to the basis of the claims made to the Minister by the applicant under s.49 and s.50.
The material background is as follows. The applicant is a 31-year-old Nigerian national. She flew from Lagos to France on 17 January, 2016, on a Nigerian passport which contained an Irish visa issued by the Irish embassy in Abuja, Nigeria on 19 November, 2015. On 27 January, 2016, the applicant was transferred from France to Ireland under the provisions of the Dublin III Regulation. On her arrival in Ireland, the applicant applied for asylum here on the basis that if returned to Nigeria she would face persecution based on her religion and membership of a particular social group.
In the course of her refugee application process here, the applicant maintained that she had worked as a prostitute after leaving school, and that her parents had been killed by Boko Haram in October 2015, after which a man known to her as “Mr. Peter” who claimed to be from the Red Cross, brought her to a camp in Lagos. She says that she was used there for sex. She claimed that Mr. Peter arranged her travel from Nigeria and organised her travel documents, including making the application for her visa to the Irish embassy in Abuja where she gave her fingerprints.
The applicant maintained that Mr. Peter made her swear an oath on a shrine that she would die if she did not repay a sum of €50,000 which he was charging her to bring her to France and onwards to Italy. At various points in the process, the applicant asserted that she was born on 15 August, 1998, when her real birth date was 15 August, 1990. It appears that in the course of her visa application she submitted a marriage certificate evidencing her marriage to John O. and a birth certificate for her son with him.
The applicant's application for international protection was refused by the IPO in a report under s. 39 of the 2015 Act. In a decision issued on 3 April, 2018, the IPO rejected her claim that she had been trafficked. The applicant appealed to IPAT on 1 May, 2018.
A hearing proceeded before IPAT on 26 November 2018 and IPAT gave its decision on 12 December 2018.
It is clear from the terms of IPAT's decision that it rejected the applicant's entire story as regards her parents being killed by Boko Haram, her story as to the circumstances in which she came to get her Irish visa and her story in relation to her alleged trafficking by “Mr. Peter” and the sums said to have been paid to him for same.
The Tribunal determined (at para. 5.2 of its decision) that:
“In the view of the Tribunal, this appellant was not interested in responding to the questions put to her by the Tribunal, or any party, but only in putting forward a very particular narrative and version of events that she aligned with, and in so doing was very strident in her responses. In the circumstances, and for the reasons as set out also hereunder, the Tribunal does not accept that the balance of probabilities that the appellant's parents were killed in any Boko Haram attack, and/or that as a consequence, the appellant met the said Mr. Peter in the circumstances as described”.
The Tribunal went on to reject as “totally lacking in credibility” her claims that she had no involvement in the obtaining of her Irish visa and that everything was organised by Mr. Peter; that she was going to Europe against her will and that Mr. Peter was threatening to kill her if...
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