Launceston Property Finance Designated Activity Company v Wright
| Jurisdiction | Ireland |
| Judge | Mr. Justice Patrick McCarthy |
| Judgment Date | 18 December 2019 |
| Neutral Citation | [2019] IECA 324 |
| Court | Court of Appeal (Ireland) |
| Docket Number | [480/2017] |
| Date | 18 December 2019 |
[2019] IECA 324
[480/2017]
THE COURT OF APPEAL
Summary judgment – Loan facility – Recusal – Respondent seeking summary judgment – Whether the President of the High Court erred in law in failing to recuse himself from engaging with the respondent's application for summary judgment
Facts: The defendant/appellant, Mr Wright, by facility letter dated the 23rd September, 2008, obtained a loan facility in the amount of €2,252,000 from Anglo Irish Bank Corporation Plc. It was contended that the said loan was acquired by the plaintiff/respondent, Launceston Property Finance Designated Activity Company, on the 23rd May, 2014. Due to default on the part of Mr Wright in meeting his obligations under the loan facility, Launceston, by notice of motion dated the 24th May, 2017, applied to the High Court for summary judgment to the sum of €2,553,830.80 together with continuing interest from the 23rd May, 2017, until judgment. The motion was heard on the 5th of October, 2017. The High Court (Kelly P) granted judgment against Mr Wright in the sum of €1,742,842.27 and remitted the balance of the plaintiff's claim to plenary hearing. Mr Wright appealed to the Court of Appeal against an order of Kelly P made on the 5th October, 2017. Mr Wright asserted that Kelly P erred in law in failing to recuse himself from engaging with Launceston's application for summary judgment and in failing to adjourn the proceedings. Mr Wright criticised Kelly P for the manner in which the hearing, when commenced, was conducted.
Held by McCarthy J that, having considered the ex tempore ruling of Kelly P, he could find no fault in the reasons which Kelly P advanced for refusing to recuse himself from entertaining Launceston's application or with his refusal of Mr Wright’s adjournment application. McCarthy J held that the extent of the interruptions of Kelly P were minimal and that they were directed to clarifying what was in issue. Further, insofar as enquiries were made or questions asked of Mr Wright, McCarthy J held that they were of the class of questions which are commonplace in cases of this kind and could not have adversely interfered in any way with his presentation of the case. McCarthy J held that there was no issue of credibility or of law on any relevant point, and apart altogether from the fact that there were no grounds for criticism of Kelly P, there was no defence in law.
McCarthy J held that he could see no basis for this appeal and that he would accordingly dismiss it.
Appeal dismissed.
This is an appeal by the defendant Mr. David Wright, (“Mr. Wright”) against an order of the High Court (Kelly P.) made on the 5th October, 2017. The Court granted judgment against Mr. Wright in the sum of €1,742,842.27 and remitted the balance of the plaintiff's claim to plenary hearing.
By facility letter dated the 23rd September, 2008, Mr Wright obtained a loan facility in the amount of €2,252,000 from Anglo Irish Bank Corporation Plc. (“Anglo”). In these proceedings, it is contended that the said loan was acquired by Launceston Property Finance Designated Activity Company (“Launceston”) on the 23rd May, 2014. Due to default on the part of Mr Wright in meeting his obligations under the loan facility, Launceston, by notice of motion dated the 24th May, 2017, applied to the High Court for summary judgment to the sum of €2,553,830.80 together with continuing interest from the 23rd May, 2017, until judgment. The motion was heard on the 5th of October, 2017.
Further to the notice of expedited appeal written submissions were exchanged between the parties. This Court does not intend to engage in detail with all of the matters which Mr Wright committed to his written submissions, as the same do not marry well with his amended notice of expedited appeal which he delivered with the respondent's consent. I will however address each of the arguments which he advanced before this Court in support of his contention that the order of Kelly P. should be set aside.
Mr Wright first asserts that Kelly P. erred in law in failing to recuse himself from engaging with Launceston's application for summary judgment. Allied to this ground of appeal is his further submission that the High Court judge erred in law in failing to adjourn the proceedings. He supports both grounds of appeal on the basis that at the time, he had engaged lawyers with a view to pursuing a claim against the entire Irish judiciary in the European Court of Human Rights. In such circumstances his proceedings should have been postponed because of apprehended bias.
Having considered the ex tempore ruling of the President of the High Court, I have to say that I can find no fault in the reasons which he advanced for refusing to recuse himself from entertaining Launceston's application or with his refusal of Mr Wright's adjournment application. The judge correctly, in my view, observed that whilst Mr Wright may have prepared a statement of claim for the purpose of pursuing a claim in the European Court of Human Rights, no such proceedings had been admitted to that court at that time. Furthermore, the judge was also correct to conclude that any such claim as might be advanced by Mr Wright would likely be rejected in circumstances where Article 35 of the European Convention on Human Rights requires that the applicant must first exhaust his or her domestic remedies. More particularly, however, the learned President relied upon the constitutional mandate which requires judges to hear and determine claims brought before the Court with the result that it was not open to Mr Wright to contrive a situation whereby Launceston could be denied access to the courts by reason only of the fact that he intended to bring proceedings before the European Court of Human Rights against the entire judiciary thereby ensuring, on the basis of his argument, that no judge could properly try any case against Mr Wright. The application was clearly an effort to frustrate the plaintiff's entitlement to access to the courts to have its claim resolved.
I am also satisfied the High Court judge did not err in law or in the manner in which he exercised his discretion when he refused to adjourn the proceedings to await the outcome of Mr Wright's appeal in other proceedings which indirectly concerned the same loan agreement and which had been brought by the receiver (Record No. 2016/9072P).
Having considered the nature of those proceedings, wherein the claim advanced was for an injunction and the delivery up by Mr Wright of vacant possession of the property securing the underlying loan, it is clear that the outcome of those proceedings could never have had any bearing upon Launceston's entitlement to summary judgment in respect of the liquidated sum claimed on foot of the loan agreement. In my view, Kelly P. correctly refused the adjournment and exercised his discretion in an appropriate manner having regard to the nature of the receiver's proceedings.
Mr Wright criticises the learned President for the manner in which the hearing, when commenced, was conducted. He submits that the President: -
“Interfered with the presentation of the defence by the defendant in a grossly excessive and unjustified extent in a manner that went well beyond interruption needed to clarify the defendant's application by questioning him as to whether or not he had borrowed the money or not.”
and further, he submits that the judge “continued” to interrupt him during his submissions, going beyond what was acceptable, such that he did not receive a fair trial (or hearing). The appellant claims that he was at a disadvantage by virtue of the fact that he was unrepresented and that had he had legal representation, he would not have had to answer to an inquiry as to whether or not he had actually borrowed the sum claimed. These are propositions which I reject: the extent of the interruptions of the learned President were minimal and it is perfectly plain that they were directed to clarifying what was in issue. Further, insofar as enquiries were made or questions asked of Mr. Wright, they were of the class of questions which are commonplace in cases of this kind; and could not have adversely interfered in any way with his presentation of the case. In particular, it was perfectly legitimate for the President to enquire of Mr Wright whether he had borrowed the sum in dispute,...
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