M.I. (Pakistan) v The International Protection Appeals Tribunal
| Jurisdiction | Ireland |
| Judge | Mr. Justice Richard Humphreys |
| Judgment Date | 25 June 2019 |
| Neutral Citation | [2019] IEHC 539 |
| Court | High Court |
| Docket Number | [2018 No. 869 J.R.] |
| Date | 25 June 2019 |
[2019] IEHC 539
THE HIGH COURT
JUDICIAL REVIEW
Humphreys J.
[2018 No. 869 J.R.]
AND
Judicial review – Asylum – International protection – Applicant seeking judicial review – Whether the respondent failed to assess documentary evidence
Facts: The applicant, a national of Pakistan, arrived in Ireland on 11th September, 2015 and applied for asylum. On 25th November, 2016 he was notified that the asylum claim had been refused. He appealed that to the Refugee Appeals Tribunal on 15th December, 2016. On 31st December, 2016, on the commencement of the International Protection Act 2015, the applicant was deemed to have made an application for international protection, and thereafter submitted a questionnaire seeking subsidiary protection. On 22nd March, 2018 he was informed by the International Protection Office that the subsidiary protection claim was refused. On 9th April, 2018, he submitted a notice of appeal to the first respondent, the International Protection Appeals Tribunal. An oral hearing took place on 19th July, 2018. On 13th September, 2018, the tribunal rejected the appeal and the applicant was so notified by letter dated 17th September, 2018, received on 20th September, 2018. Proceedings were filed on 22nd October, 2018. The High Court (Humphreys J) granted leave on 5th November, 2018, the primary relief sought in the proceedings being certiorari of the decision of the tribunal. The substantive notice of motion was returnable for 19th November, 2018 and a statement of opposition was filed on 14th March, 2019. Ground 1 alleged failure to assess documentary evidence. Ground 2 alleged failure to have regard to country information. Ground 3 alleged complete reliance on inconsistencies and failure to have regard to the applicant’s explanations. Ground 4 alleged rolling together of a series of events. Ground 5 alleged non-compliance with the procedures directive and subsidiary protection regulation. Ground 6 alleged failure to consider possible exposure of the applicant to persecution or serious harm. Ground 7 alleged failure to make clear findings.
Held by Humphreys J that the applicant had not established that the tribunal failed to make a reasonable assessment of the documentary evidence. He held that the tribunal member said that all documents submitted were considered (para. 2.2) and that this had not been displaced, in accordance with G.K. v. Minister for Justice Equality and Law Reform [2002] 2 I.R. 418. He held that failure to discuss something is not to be equated with failure to consider it or to have regard to it. He held that a decision-maker is not generally obliged to provide a narrative discussion. He held that Ground 5 was not a valid complaint in the light of the wording of the decision. He held that the very terms of the decision consider and reject the risk of persecution or serious harm. He held that the tribunal member rejected all of the applicant’s claims (paras. 4.6 and 4.8) apart from his being from Pakistan (para. 4.10); therefore there were clear findings.
Humphreys J held that the application would be dismissed.
Application dismissed.
The applicant is a national of Pakistan, born in 1974. He arrived in Ireland on 11th September, 2015 and applied for asylum. His claim indicated that he travelled via Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, Greece, other unspecified countries and the UK before coming to Ireland.
On 25th November, 2016 he was notified that the asylum claim had been refused. He appealed that to the Refugee Appeals Tribunal on 15th December, 2016. The grounds of appeal in that notice of appeal are summary handwritten grounds which provide no information whatsoever and simply contend that the Commissioner erred in fact and in law as the applicant had established a case to qualify for refugee status. That of course is utterly meaningless.
Country reports were also submitted and on 31st December, 2016, on the commencement of the International Protection Act 2015, the applicant was deemed to have made an application for international protection, and thereafter submitted a questionnaire seeking subsidiary protection.
On 22nd March, 2018 he was informed by the International Protection Office that the subsidiary protection claim was refused.
On 9th April, 2018, he submitted a notice of appeal to the International Protection Appeals Tribunal. The grounds of appeal are relatively opaque, certainly when compared with the submissions made in the present judicial review, and don't really address the various inconsistencies in the applicant's evidence in much detail. The grounds of appeal claim a ‘ mistake’ in the applicant's original evidence but don't put that down to medical reasons. By way of another example, they don't make any case about indiscriminate violence in the country of origin, which is part of the grounds as pleaded in the present judicial review. Again one has to make the basic point that it is not open to an applicant to make a point at the judicial review stage that he or she hasn't contested in the tribunal hearing.
An oral hearing took place on 19th July, 2018 when Ms. Lisa McKeogh B.L. appeared for the applicant.
On 13th September, 2018, the tribunal rejected the appeal and the applicant was so notified by letter dated 17th September, 2018, received on 20th September, 2018.
The present proceedings were filed on 22nd October, 2018, possibly slightly out of time, although sensibly the respondents have not raised any issue about that.
I granted leave on 5th November, 2018, the primary relief sought in the proceedings being certiorari of the decision of the tribunal.
The substantive notice of motion was returnable for 19th November, 2018 and a statement of opposition was filed on 14th March, 2019. I have now received helpful submission from Mr. Garry O'Halloran B.L. for the applicant and from Ms. Sarah K.M. Cooney B.L. for the respondents.
Ground 1 contends ‘ The IPAT erred in law in rejecting the credibility of the Applicant without making any reasonable assessment of the documentary evidence submitted and which prima facie established the identity of the Applicant and provided objective support to the narrative related by the Applicant.’
The applicant hasn't established that the tribunal failed to make a reasonable assessment of the documentary evidence. The tribunal member says at para. 2.2 of the decision that he had regard to all documents submitted and the applicant hasn't displaced that: see per Hardiman J. in G.K. v. Minister for Justice Equality and Law Reform [2002] 2 I.R. 418 [2002] 1 I.L.R.M. 401. The fact that the applicant established that he was from Pakistan doesn't take him meaningfully very far along the road to proving his account of the alleged persecution or serious harm.
Ground 2 contends that: ‘ The IPAT failed to assess the plausibility of the Applicant's claim in light of the country of origin information before it’.
That has not been demonstrated. Again the tribunal member said that all documents submitted were considered (para. 2.2) and that hasn't been displaced, in accordance with G.K. v. Minister for Justice Equality and Law Reform [2002] 2 I.R. 418 [2002] 1 I.L.R.M. 401.
The applicant can't challenge the decision by reference to something he didn't submit. That would be a gas-lighting of the decision-maker of a high order. Indeed, it is not clear that the applicant relied on any country information at the hearing. He doesn't aver that he did so. There is no mention of country information in the tribunal member's synopsis of the applicant's evidence and no specific challenge has been launched in the proceedings as to the accuracy of that synopsis.
Ground 4 contends that: ‘ The IPAT erred in law and in fact in rolling a series of events into singular events, most notably when dealing with the evidence of violent encounters in 2008, 2009, 2011 and 2015 and when dealing with the evidence of ongoing illness experienced by the father of the Applicant prior to his ultimate demise, and in then making adverse credibility findings based on the erroneous recollection of the evidence.’
A decision-maker is not generally obliged to provide a narrative discussion. That is to be distinguished from the obligation to give reasons. A decision-maker is therefore not precluded from rolling together related issues as long as the reasons for the conclusions are apparent. Indeed, the High Court does this on occasion where it considers that kind of approach to be convenient, and it would be hypocritical to criticise an administrative decision-maker for doing so.
The applicant very modestly characterises the difficulties with his evidence in this ground as ‘ erroneous recollection’, but the tribunal member saw and heard the applicant and is far better placed than the court to decide on the applicant's credibility. The fact that he did so...
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