M.E. (Libya) v The Refugee Appeals Tribunal No. 2
Jurisdiction | Ireland |
Judge | Mr. Justice Richard Humphreys |
Judgment Date | 14 May 2018 |
Neutral Citation | [2018] IEHC 300 |
Docket Number | [2016 No. 725 J.R.] |
Court | High Court |
Date | 14 May 2018 |
AND
(No. 2)
[2018] IEHC 300
[2016 No. 725 J.R.]
THE HIGH COURT
JUDICIAL REVIEW
Costs – Asylum application – Dublin III regulation art. 17 – Applicant seeking costs – Whether costs favoured the applicant
Facts: The applicant, born in Libya, applied for asylum in the UK on 21st October, 2012 and was refused. On 12th October, 2015, he reapplied and was again refused. On 16th December, 2015, he applied for asylum in Ireland. On 11th March, 2016, the Refugee Applications Commissioner decided to transfer that application to the UK under the Dublin III regulation. He appealed that decision to the first respondent, the Refugee Appeals Tribunal, which affirmed the decision on 17th August, 2016. On 26th August, 2016, the applicant sought the exercise of discretion under art. 17 of the Dublin III regulation in order to allow the applicant to remain in the State. On 21st October, 2016, the High Court (Humphreys J) granted leave in the proceedings. On 17th July, 2017, O’Regan J gave judgment allowing the applicant to amend the proceedings in order to challenge the failure to consider the art. 17 discretion issue. On 24th July, 2017, the CSSO wrote stating that “the respondent” (unspecified, but apparently referring to the second respondent, the Minister for Justice and Equality) “now proposes to consider your client’s request for the exercise of discretion under art. 17(1)”. On 27th August, 2017, the applicant resubmitted an application for art. 17 relief to the Minister. The Minister failed to make a decision on that application and on 29th January, 2018, the applicant brought a second set of judicial review proceedings seeking mandamus to require the Minister to determine the art. 17 claim. Those proceedings were in the asylum holding listing awaiting the outcome of the reference to the CJEU in M.A. v Minister for Justice and Equality [2017] IEHC 677. The issue in these proceedings was one of costs only.
Held by Humphreys J that the thrust of the amended statement of grounds was that there should be some mechanism for the determination of the art. 17 application by somebody. Humphreys J noted that the Minister, following that amendment, agreed to decide that application; that rendered the proceedings moot. Humphreys J held that the Minister’s agreement was, therefore, the event and it was clearly one related to the proceedings, thus costs favoured the applicant.
Humphreys J held that he would order the proceedings struck out with costs to the applicant including reserved costs to be taxed in default of agreement.
Proceedings struck out.
The applicant was born in Libya in 1987. He left his own country in August, 2010, and went to the UK for a five-year period. On 21st October, 2012, he applied for asylum in the UK. That was refused. On 12th October, 2015, he reapplied in the UK. That was also refused.
On 16th December, 2015, he arrived in Ireland and applied for asylum. On 11th March, 2016, the Refugee Applications Commissioner decided to transfer that application to the UK under the Dublin III regulation. He appealed that decision to the Refugee Appeals Tribunal which affirmed the decision on 17th August, 2016.
On 26th August, 2016, the applicant's solicitor wrote setting out that the...
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FA v The International Protection Appeals Tribunal, The Minister for Justice, Ireland and The Attorney General
...to exercise the Article 17 discretion was further complicated by rulings of the High Court which are referred to in ME (Libya) v. RAT [2018] IEHC 300. As set out at paragraph 10 of the judgment:- “10. A significant complication exists here in the sense that while the Minister has agreed to ......