M.R (Bangladesh) v The International Protection Appeals Tribunal

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Judge: Mr. Justice Richard Humphreys
• Judgment Date: 29 January 2020
• Neutral Citation: [2020] IEHC 41
• Docket Number: [2019 No. 306 J.R.]
• Court: High Court
• Date: 29 January 2020

BETWEEN

M.R. (BANGLADESH)

APPLICANT

AND

THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION APPEALS TRIBUNAL AND THE MINISTER FOR JUSTICE AND EQUALITY

RESPONDENTS

[2020] IEHC 41

Richard Humphreys J.

[2019 No. 306 J.R.]

THE HIGH COURT

JUDICIAL REVIEW

Immigration and asylum – Credibility – Persecution – Applicant seeking asylum – Whether the respondent erred in law in its consideration of the benefit of the doubt principle

Facts: The applicant lived for years in the UK and never claimed asylum there. When unable to get a renewal of his student permission, he came to Ireland and immediately on arrival alleged persecution for the first time. The member of the first respondent, the International Protection Appeals Tribunal, who saw and heard him found his evidence confusing, inconsistent and vague, and rejected the credibility of his core account. He came to the High Court raising the following legalistic points about that process: (i) the first respondent erred in law in its consideration of the benefit of the doubt principle and its application to the facts of the case; (ii) the decision of the first respondent was ultra vires, unreasonable or irrational in failing to consider properly, or at all, the document submitted by the applicant confirming that a local chairman found the applicant’s uncle guilty of an assault on the applicant and which was corroborative of his claim; (iii) the first respondent’s finding that the applicant gave an inconsistent and confusing narrative, and one which lacked cogency, around the manner in which the applicant’s uncle interacted with the chairman was unreasonable and irrational; (iv) the first respondent acted unlawfully, unreasonably or irrationally in its treatment of the medical report dated 15th February, 2017 and in finding that the applicant was not generally credible as he provided an unreliable medical report in support of his claim; (v) the first respondent acted unreasonably and irrationally in failing to extend the benefit of the doubt to the applicant’s claim; (vi) the first named respondent acted ultra vires in failing to consider properly, or at all, (a) the medical report dated 14th March, 2017 by Dr. Zacharia or (b) the record of health screening for asylum seekers in Dublin centres dated 18th May, 2016 or (c) both; (vii) if the first respondent did in fact have regard to the medical report dated 14th March, 2017 of Dr Zacharia, the decision maker acted ultra vires, irrationally and in breach of the duty to furnish reasons in failing to state which medical report was deemed to be ‘unreliable’ when the applicant’s general credibility was condemned; (viii) the first respondent acted unreasonably or otherwise unlawfully in failing to advert to relevant country of origin information submitted concerning land disputes in Bangladesh or failing to consider the applicant’s accounts in light of that country of origin information and the first respondent’s conclusion that the applicant’s case was not strengthened by COI was irrational and unsupported by reason.

Held by Humphreys J that: (i) the benefit of the doubt only applies if the applicant’s general credibility is established; (ii) it was clear from the terms of the decision that the document was considered; (iii) the tribunal member saw and heard the applicant and was best placed to decide on his credibility; (iv) dictating an incorrect medical directly or indirectly to a doctor, producing it and then only accounting for it when cross-examined does undermine credibility, as does producing any document found not to be reliable; (v) the applicant’s credibility was not generally accepted; (vi) the tribunal did not err in law or in fact in calling the medical documentation not material; (vii) it was clear that it was the February 2017 document that was unreliable; (viii) the applicant confused a lack of narrative consideration with a lack of lawful consideration.

Humphreys J held that the application would be dismissed.

Application dismissed.

JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Richard Humphreys delivered on the 29th day of January, 2020

1 The applicant lived for years in the UK and never claimed asylum there. When unable to get a renewal of his student permission, he suddenly realised that he was in need of international protection, came to Ireland and immediately on arrival alleged persecution for the first time. He produced, among other things, an incorrect and unreliable medical report. The tribunal records that, by his own admission, the applicant told his mother to tell the doctor what to put in it. He is not now seeking to stand over this document. The tribunal member who saw and heard him found his evidence confusing, inconsistent and vague and, unsurprisingly, rejected the credibility of his core account. He now comes to court raising a snowstorm of legalistic points about that process. That attempt fails. Facts

2 The applicant claims to have been born in Bangladesh in 1982. He applied for a UK visa on 29th November, 2010 and was granted a student permission valid from 1st December, 2010 to 30th April, 2014. He left Bangladesh on 3rd January, 2011 for the UK. On the expiry of his student permission, he sought a renewal, but that was refused.

3 He appears to have remained in the UK illegally for a period, then left that country and came to the State on 15th May, 2016. He applied for asylum the following day. The basis for that claim was an alleged dispute with an uncle over land. The applicant claimed that he was subject to threats and violence in that regard.

4 Following the commencement of the International Protection Act, 2015, he formally applied for international protection on 18th July, 2017. The International Protection Office rejected that application on 6th November, 2018. On 15th November, 2018 he submitted a notice of appeal and on 25th April, 2019 the tribunal rejected the appeal and the credibility of core elements of the applicant's account.

5 The present statement of grounds was filed on 20th May, 2019, the primary relief sought being certiorari of the IPAT decision. I granted leave on 27th May, 2019, and on 18th November, 2019 allowed an amendment of the statement of grounds to extend the grounds being advanced on behalf of the applicant. I have now received helpful submissions from Mr. Michael Lynn S.C. (with Mr. James Kane B.L.) for the applicant and from Ms. Emily Farrell B.L. for the respondents.

The inappropriateness of legalistic over-analysis of decisions

6 The proceedings demonstrate a familiar pattern of legalistic micro-analysis of decisions, frequently based on semantic querulousness. One has to view an administrative decision in the round, and not place undue weight on semantic quibbles in respect of micro-sub-elements of it: see J.B.R. v. Refugee Appeals Tribunal & ors. [2007] IEHC 288; O.A.A. v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform & anor. [2007] IEHC 169. Particularly in the credibility context, Cooke J. said in I.R. v. Minister for Justice [2009] IEHC 510, [2015] 4 I.R. 144 at p. 152: “… when subjected to judicial review, a decision on credibility must be read as a whole and the court should be wary of attempts to deconstruct an overall conclusion by subjecting its individual parts to isolated examination in disregard of the cumulative impression made upon the decision maker especially where the conclusion takes particular account of the demeanour and reaction of an applicant when testifying in person”.

7 More fundamentally still, any administrative decision enjoys a presumption of validity and should be read in a manner that renders it valid rather than invalid, and that makes sense rather than nonsense: see, for example, Mark de Blacam, Judicial Review, 3rd ed., (Dublin, 2017) at p. 113: “[T]he presumption of validity which attaches to public acts generally … is necessary in the interests of good order and administration”, Re Comhaltas Ceoltóirí Éireann (unreported, High Court, Finlay P., 14th December, 1977); Campus Oil v. Minister for Industry (No. 2) [1983] I.R. 88; The State (Divito) v. Arklow Urban District Council [1986] I.L.R.M. 123. Listening to some applicants you would be forgiven for thinking that decisions must be read in the most erroneous way possible so that they can get their order of certiorari.

The medical reports

8 To explain the applicant's numerous complaints, there are three different medical reports with which we are concerned here:

(i) A “report” of 18th May, 2016, which is not really a report but rather a summary document regarding health screening for asylum seekers. It is not altogether clear who produced it but it seems to be the medical officer of Balseskin Health Centre. It refers to “PHx [which seems to mean past medical history] knife wound to back of head and left arm” and says this happened in Bangladesh.

(ii) A mangled report dated 15th February, 2017 is produced from Delta Medical College and Hospital. This is the unreliable report referred to above, and refers to a head injury and a broken hand rather than a cut hand. It also gets the applicant's date of birth wrong. The tribunal says that the applicant himself admitted that he told his mother what to put in it. That specific finding is not challenged in the pleadings, although the applicant seems to have a slightly...