O'Mahoney v Judge Hughes
| Jurisdiction | Ireland |
| Judge | Clarke C.J.,Dunne J.,O'Malley J. |
| Judgment Date | 25 March 2019 |
| Neutral Citation | [2019] IESCDET 68 |
| Court | Supreme Court |
| Date | 25 March 2019 |
[2019] IESCDET 68
THE SUPREME COURT
DETERMINATION
Clarke C.J.
Dunne J.
O'Malley J.
AND
| ORDER SOUGHT TO BE APPEALED |
| COURT: Court of Appeal |
| DATE OF ORDER: 5th October, 2018 |
| DATE OF PERFECTION OF ORDER: 5th November, 2018 |
| THE APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL WAS MADE ON 28th November, 2018 AND WAS IN TIME. |
The general principles applied by this Court in determining whether to grant or refuse leave to appeal having regard to the criteria incorporated into the Constitution as a result of the 33rd Amendment have now been considered in a large number of determinations and are fully addressed in both a determination issued by a panel consisting of all of the members of this Court in B.S. v Director of Public Prosecutions [2017] IESCDET 134 and in a unanimous judgment of a full Court delivered by O'Donnell J. in Price Waterhouse Coopers (A Firm) v Quinn Insurance Ltd. (Under Administration) [2017] IESC 73. The additional criteria required to be met in order that a so-called “leapfrog appeal” direct from the High Court to this Court can be permitted were addressed by a full panel of the Court in Wansboro v Director of Public Prosecutions (2017) IESCDET 115. Accordingly it is unnecessary to revisit the new constitutional architecture for the purpose of this determination.
The application for leave filed, and the respondent's notice thereto, are published along with this determination (subject only to any redaction required by law) and it is therefore unnecessary to set out the position of the parties in detail.
This is an application for leave to appeal against the decision of the Court of Appeal (see O'Mahoney v District Judge Hughes [2018] IECA 264) upholding the decision of the High Court (McDermott J. – see O'Mahoney v District Judge Hughes [2016] IEHC 606).
The applicant sought an order of certiorari in respect of her conviction for driving while the concentration of alcohol in her breath exceeded the permissible limit. The basis for the judicial review application was the conduct of the trial by the respondent District Judge. In particular, it was complained that the respondent breached fair procedures by enquiring into the nature of the defence to be offered and whether counsel was on a ‘fishing expedition’ in relation to the evidence. It was further contended that the respondent had made comments that would lead an objective person to believe that he was biased, or had come to a view of the case prior to the conclusion of the evidence, or was going to or was likely to reject any submissions made by defence counsel because the latter had not indicated the specific nature of the defence. It was also complained that the respondent had interrupted counsel excessively while he was cross-examining the investigating garda.
A transcript of the District Court hearing was made available to the High Court and the Court of Appeal, and the specific exchanges complained of are set out in detail in the judgments. It is only fair to note that at least part of the reason for the interventions by the respondent related to what seems to have been a misunderstanding between counsel and the respondent as to the extent of a concession made by counsel.
McDermott J. stated that he was reluctant to engage...
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