Martin v DPP
| Jurisdiction | Ireland |
| Judge | Mr. Justice Meenan |
| Judgment Date | 10 July 2018 |
| Neutral Citation | [2018] IEHC 598 |
| Docket Number | [2016 No. 264 J.R.] |
| Court | High Court |
| Date | 10 July 2018 |
[2018] IEHC 598
[2016 No. 264 J.R.]
THE HIGH COURT
JUDICIAL REVIEW
Judicial review – Order of certiorari – No order charges – Applicant seeking judicial review – Whether the applicant was entitled to the reliefs sought
Facts: The High Court, on 25 April 2016, granted the applicant, Mr Martin, liberty to apply by way of an application for judicial review for: (i) an order of certiorari quashing the order made by the District Judge on 21 April 2016 remanding without prejudice the applicant to 15 June 2016 on no order charges; (ii) a declaration that the order "remand without prejudice" is not an order known in law; (iii) a declaration that the District Court does not have the power to make orders on charge sheets which are not formally before it; (iv) a declaration that any attempt to re-enter the no order charges must be on notice to the accused; (v) an order of certiorari quashing the purported re-entry of the no order charges on 15 April 2016. The applicant submitted that the no order charges were re-entered without warning or notice to the applicant. This, it was argued, lacked the requisite constitutional fairness. It was submitted that there is no provision in the District Court Rules setting out the procedure that should be followed when charges, such as those at issue before the Court, are being re-entered. The applicant argued that the District Judge should have adopted a procedure analogous to O. 22 of the District Court Rules, which governs the procedure to be followed where an accused fails to appear. The applicant maintained that the order to "remand without prejudice" has no basis and is unknown in law. In support of this, the applicant relied upon ss. 21 – 24 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1967; there is no reference in these provisions to a "remand without prejudice".
Held by the Court that what was at issue in this case was not the making of a final order but rather an administrative step so that a final order could be made at a future hearing which the applicant had notice of; at that hearing, the applicant would have the opportunity to exercise his constitutional rights. The Court held that the use of the term "without prejudice to the defendant" in remanding the applicant on continuing bail did not affect the validity of the order made but rather confirmed that before any final order was made the applicant would be afforded an opportunity to exercise his constitutional rights. The Court held that, in light of the judgment in Brady v Fulham [2010] IEHC 99, it could not see any objection to the District Judge remanding the applicant on bail until 15 June 2016.
The Court held that, by reason of the foregoing, the applicant was not entitled to the reliefs sought and it dismissed his application for judicial review.
Application refused.
The factual background to this application is that the applicant pleaded guilty to three charges and was due to be sentenced by the District Court in December 2015. Following a number of adjournments, the applicant was remanded on continuing bail until 8 February 2016. On that date, the applicant failed to attend at the District Court and, as there was no bail recognisance appended to the charge sheets on the court file, the District Judge made no order (hereinafter referred to as the 'no order charges').
On 4 March 2016, the applicant was before the District Court in respect of other matters. The gardaí sought to re-enter the no order charges. This, however, was objected to by the solicitor acting on behalf of the plaintiff. The District Judge reinstated the no order charges but stated that he would accept submissions on the matter and indicated that a case stated should be prepared as regards the proper procedure to be followed in re-entering the no order charges. The applicant was remanded on continuing bail to 15 April 2016.
On 15 April 2016, the matter came before a different District Judge. Following exchanges in relation to submissions in respect of the case stated, the District Judge remanded the applicant on continuing bail to 27 May 2016.
On 20 April 2016, the matter was mentioned before the District Judge who had been sitting on 4 March 2016 when the no order charges had been reinstated. The respondent informed the court that a case stated might not be necessary as most, if not all, of the issues in question had been addressed by the decision in DPP v. Scott Hallion (Unreported, High Court, Hanna J., 27 May 2011). In Hallion it was submitted, as in the instant case, that the applicant had pleaded guilty to no order charges and that consequently a recharge in respect of the said charges would be a 'double jeopardy'. After the respondent brought this judgment to the attention of the District Judge and submissions were made by both sides, the matter was adjourned to the following day.
On 21 April 2016, the matter was again considered by the District Judge. Once again, the applicant, through his solicitor, objected to the re-entry of the no order charges maintaining that the charges were not properly before the court. The District Judge, however, remanded the applicant on continuing bail, without prejudice to the defendant. The transcript of the hearing reads:-
'JUDGE: Because we're not going to deal with these matters until the 15th of June.
MR BRADBURY: Very good.
JUDGE: So, I am remanding on continuing bail without prejudice to the defendant, OK.
Mr. BRADBURY: OK.
JUDGE: OK. So, there is no prejudice to the defendant and then you can hold your powder dry until the next occasion. OK?'
On 25 April 2016, the High Court (Humphreys J.) granted the applicant liberty to apply by way of an application for judicial review for:-
(i) An order of certiorari quashing...
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