McCarthy v McNulty & Mibi
| Jurisdiction | Ireland |
| Judge | Hon. Mrs. Justice Denham |
| Judgment Date | 22 October 1999 |
| Neutral Citation | [1999] IESC 70 |
| Docket Number | No. 225 of 1997 |
| Court | Supreme Court |
| Date | 22 October 1999 |
[1999] IESC 70
THE SUPREME COURT
Denham, J.
Murphy, J.
Lynch, J.
BETWEEN
AND
Citations:
MOTOR INSURERS BUREAU OF IRELAND (MIBI) AGREEMENT 1988 MEMORANDUM CLAUSE 2(2)
RSC O.19 r2
RSC O.21 r14
SOUTH AFRICAN REPUBLIC V LA COMPAGNIE FRANCO-BELGE DU CHEMIN DE FER DU NORD 1897 2 CH 487
QUINN V HESSION 1879–80 4 LRI 35
ARTHUR V ARTHUR 1879–80 3 LRI 1
Synopsis
Practice and Procedure
Practice and procedure; appeal against order of High Court granting leave to amend defence to include counterclaim against appellant; whether convenience of appellant would be seriously embarrassed by counterclaim; whether counterclaim would be unjust to appellant; O. 19, r. 12 and O. 21, r. 14, Rules of the Superior Courts.
Held: Appeal dismissed.
McCarthy v. McNulty - Supreme Court: Denham J., Murphy J., Lynch J. - 22/10/1999
The plaintiff appealed the decision of the High Court granting the second named defendant leave to amend its defence to include a counterclaim. In the interests of ensuring finality, avoiding a multiplicity of proceedings and unnecessary costs the Court could exercise its discretion to deal with all claims arising out of the same matter in one set of proceedings. The Supreme Court so held in dismissing the appeal.
This is an appeal by the Plaintiff/Appellant (hereinafter referred to as the Appellant) against an Order of the High Court, Mr. Justice Johnson, given on 16th June, 1997. By Notice of Motion dated 14th May, 1997 the Defendants moved to apply to the High Court for leave to amend the defence to include a counterclaim against the Appellant. The Affidavit which grounded the Motion was deposed by Paul Beegan who described that the proceedings arose out of an accident which happened on 11th July, 1992 when the Appellant was a back seat passenger in his own car driven by the first named Defendant. The Appellant's claim is for damages for injuries suffered when the car collided with two other vehicles as a result of the negligence of the first named Defendant. The first named Defendant was driving the car with the consent of the Appellant because the Appellant had consumed too much alcoholic drink. Three other actions have been brought arising out of this accident and the total cost of the claims to date is £168,438.00. The second named Defendant (herein referred to as the M.I.B.I.) was joined to the proceedings pursuant to Clause 2(2) of the Memorandum of Agreement made on 21st December, 1988 between the Minister for the Environment of the one part and the Motor Insurers” Bureau of Ireland. It is the case of the M.I.B.I that the expense incurred by it arose from the fact that the Appellant permitted an uninsured person, the first named Defendant, to drive the Appellant's car. It is the case of the M.I.B.I. that in the other actions arising from this accident the Appellant, as a Defendant, was vicariously liable for the negligent driving of the first named Defendant, that the monies paid by M.I.B.I. were monies paid for and on behalf of the Appellant and to the use of the Appellant and that the payment of these monies relieved him of a liability which would otherwise have attached to him. Further, it is the M.I.B.I.'s case that, it would be unjust to permit the Appellant having cost the M.I.B.I. a very large amount of monies by permitting an uninsured driver to drive his car, to now recover further compensation for his own injuries without having to reimburse the M.I.B.I. for the monies which it paid out on his behalf.
On the matter coming before the High Court on the 16th June, 1997, before Mr. Justice Johnson, it is clear, from Counsels” agreed note, that the application was opposed by Counsel on behalf of the Appellant who referred to Order 19 Rule 2 and Order 21 Rule 14 of the Rules of the Superior Courts. It was argued by Counsel for the Appellant that it would not be convenient for the Appellant for the claim and counterclaim to be disposed of together, that there was insufficient connection between them, that the only issue in common between the claim and the counterclaim was whether or not the Appellant knew or ought to have known that there was no insurance. It was pointed out to Mr. Justice Johnson that the Appellant had suffered very substantial injuries and that there would be a considerable amount of evidence in relation to same. In addition, it was further stated to Mr. Justice Johnson that, there was a plea of contributory negligence including allegations that the Appellant allowed himself travel as a passenger in the car when it was defective, when the driver of same was drunk and without wearing a seat belt. Also, it was argued before Mr. Justice Johnson that, insofar as the counterclaim was concerned there would be an issue as to whether or not the amount of the three settlements (£168,000) was reasonable and that there would be considerable amount of dispute as to whether or not the M.I.B.I. were entitled in law to recover from the Appellant. Mr. Justice Johnson...
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