Michael Maher v Jabil Global Services Ltd

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Judge: Mr. Justice Clarke
• Judgment Date: 12 May 2005
• Neutral Citation: [2005] IEHC 130
• Docket Number: [2002 No. 14428 P]
• Court: High Court
• Date: 12 May 2005

[2005] IEHC 130

THE HIGH COURT

[No. 14428 P/2002]

MAHER v JABIL GLOBAL SERVICES LTD

BETWEEN

MICHAEL MAHER

PLAINTIFF

AND

JABIL GLOBAL SERVICES LIMITED

DEFENDANT

MCGRATH v TRINTECH TECHNOLOGIES 2005 ELR 49

HATTON v SUTHERLAND 12/2/2002 TLR

QUIGLEY v COMPLEX TOOLING & MOULDING UNREP HIGH 9.3.2005

NEGLIGENCE

Employer's liability

Duty of care - Causation - Foreseeability - Personal injuries - Occupational stress -McGrath v Trintech Technologies [2004] IEHC 342 (Unreported, High Court, Laffoy J, 19/10/2004) followed - Hatton v Sunderland [2002] 2 All ER 1 approved - Claim dismissed - (2002/14428P - Clarke J - 12/5/2005) - [2005] IEHC 130; Maher v Jabil Global Services Ltd - [2008] 1 IR 25; [2005] ELR 233

Facts: the plaintiff was employed by the defendant as a shift manager. He contended that the amount of work which he was required to do and the targets set by the defendant was unrealistic and caused him stress which led to his absence from work and his eventual resignation and that the defendant knew or ought to have known of it. Other employees gave opposite views as to whether they felt the targets were excessive or unreasonable. No expert evidence was called as to whether the targets of which the plaintiff complained were unreasonable in the circumstances.

Held by Mr Justice Clarke in dismissing the plaintiff's claim, 1, that there was no distinction to be made in the assessment of liability of an employer in cases where an employee claimed that as a result of negligence he suffered physical injury or mental injury. The starting point for a consideration of liability in assessing mental injury was to ask the following questions: (a) had the plaintiff suffered an injury to their health as opposed to ordinary occupational stress; (b) if so, was that injury attributable to the workplace and; (c) if so, was the harm suffered to the particular employee reasonably foreseeable in all the circumstances.

2. Injuries could be foreseeable in two circumstances, firstly, because having regard to the burden of work or other conditions in which the employee was required to work the risk of such injury ought to be anticipated generally by a prudent employer which would be applicable to all employees. Alternatively, injury could be foreseeable in respect of an individual employee having regard to any particular vulnerability to injury known to the employer in respect of that employee.

3. That an employer would not be in breach of its duty of care to its employees either individually or collectively by setting targets which were ambitious provided that such targets were not such as would make them unachievable having regard to all the conditions prevalent in the workplace on the occasion in question.

4. The fact that a small number of employees described the targets as unreasonable but that many others described them as challenging but fair demonstrated how difficult it would be for a court to reach a conclusion that the targets were so severe as to render the employer in breach of duty without the aid of expert evidence.

5. That the plaintiff did not make the level or extent of complaint about his job such as would have led his employer to have had reasonable grounds for believing that his continuance in that job would be likely to lead to psychological harm.

Obiter dictum: That the general proposition that an employer who offered appropriate counselling or treatment services to employees suffering from stress would be unlikely to be found in breach of duty was subject to a caveat that, if notwithstanding the provision of such a service, the truth was that an employer was intent on removing an employee, the availability of such a service could be regarded as being more a matter of form than substance.

Reporter: P.C.

1 JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Clarkedelivered 12th May, 2005.

2 In these proceedings the plaintiff claims damages for negligence and breach of duty giving rise to personal injuries. However the circumstances in which the claim arises are somewhat unusual. The plaintiff claims that as a result of certain treatment to which he was subjected in the course of his employment with the defendant company he has suffered significant psychological harm. The actions of which he complains may loosely be said to come within the rubric of "stress, harassment and bullying in the workplace". That such a cause of action may be maintained is clear from a number of judgments of this court to which I will return in due course. Many of the primary facts are not in dispute although in a number of key areas there are significant differences in the evidence tendered on the one hand by and on behalf of the plaintiff and on the other hand by and on behalf of the defendants. It is necessary to commence by reviewing the factual background to this dispute.

The Facts

3 The plaintiff was employed by the defendant as a supervisor in the early months of 2001. After an initial period the plaintiff was allocated to a part of the defendants activities which involved a production line which worked on IT equipment from DELL. He acted as a supervisor until the middle months of 2001. It is common case that the DELL programme grew very rapidly during the course of 2001. A chart was proved in evidence from which it is clear that the total numbers working in that area grew from 25 in January 2001 to 96 in December 2001. It is common case that the DELL programme was, in the words of a number of the witnesses on both sides, "ramping up" at all material times. This meant that a significantly greater volume of equipment was going through the process.

4 It is also common case that the DELL aspect of the defendant company's operation was at all material times conducted on the basis of two separate shifts. Each shift worked for a two week period Monday to Wednesday on a 12 hour day and then moved for a further two week period with a similar day worked Thursday to Saturday. Therefore once a month the employees would enjoy a natural break of seven consecutive days but would equally, on a once a month basis, have a period of seven days in which they worked six 12 hour shifts. In the DELL programme during the early and middle part of 2001 each shift had a supervisor both of whom reported to an overall manager. That manager worked a "normal" working day and was not, therefore, allocated to either shift. While there was some little difference between the parties on this issue I am also satisfied that at all material times there was a second supervisor on each shift termed as "a debug" supervisor whose duties involved overseeing the "debug" or problem solving part of the process. The events which give rise to these proceedings commence in July and August 2001 when the defendants put in place a new structure. The principal relevant change was that a shift manager was appointed to each shift. In July the plaintiff was appointed to one such role which amounted to a promotion. The appointment became effective in August. It should also be noted that the plaintiff was, at that stage, still in his initial probationary period which also expired in August. There was no separate probationary period in respect of his promoted position as shift manager. There remained in place in respect of each shift a supervisor together with the debug supervisor.

Matters in controversy

5 After this time there are issues of fact in controversy between the parties. What is not in controversy, however, is that having taken up the position of shift manager the plaintiff began to suffer from what has now been diagnosed as stress (although the initial diagnosis suggested the possibility of heart trouble). This led to the plaintiff being out sick from the 19th October until the end of the year. He then returned to work, in early January, having had consultations with representatives of the defendants and having undergone a medical assessment on behalf of the defendants. On his return the plaintiff was assigned to different work on what was known as the "Nortel Shelf". He continued on the Nortel Shelf until approximately the 12th of March (subject to a number of days absence during that period) when he went out on what might be termed relatively permanent sick leave. This lasted until he gave notice of the termination of his employment effective in mid October 2002. In simple terms the principal areas of controversy between the parties concern the circumstances which led to the plaintiff's initial stress in the period leading up to mid October 2001 and the further circumstances that led to him going out sick in March 2002 with particular reference to the way in which he was treated by management on and after his return in early January. While there obviously are some connections between the events in those two periods the claims made in respect of them and the key disputed facts material to a consideration of those claims are significantly different and it is, therefore, convenient to treat them largely separately. For convenience I will refer to the earlier period as the "DELL Manager" period and the latter period as the "Nortel Shelf" period.

The Plaintiff's claims

6 The plaintiff's contention in respect of the DELL manager period was that the amount of work which he was required to do and in particular the pressure under which he was placed by management to achieve targets which he described as unrealistic gave rise to his stress and occurred in circumstances where his employers knew or ought to have known that such harm was a likely consequence.

7 The claim made in respect of the Nortel shelf period is, to some extent, the direct opposite. It is contended that the defendant company in effect gave the plaintiff a "non job" which exposed him to humiliation amongst his fellow workers to whom it would be obvious, on his case, that he had...