Moore v The Governor of Limerick Prison and Others

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Court: High Court
• Judge: Ms. Justice Siobhán Phelan
• Judgment Date: 01 May 2024
• Neutral Citation: [2024] IEHC 254
• Docket Number: [Record No.: 2017/9158P]

Between:

June Moore

Plaintiff

and

The Governor of Limerick Prison, The Irish Prison Service, The Minister for Justice and Equality, Ireland and The Attorney General

Defendants

[2024] IEHC 254

[Record No.: 2017/9158P]

THE HIGH COURT

RULING of Ms. Justice Siobhán Phelan, delivered on the 1st day of May, 2024.

INTRODUCTION

1 . In these proceedings, the Plaintiff claims damages and declaratory relief in relation to an alleged breach of her rights under Article 40.3 of the Constitution and/or Articles 3 and/or 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights because of the practice of “ slopping out” in Limerick Prison during her period of incarceration there between 2002 and 2004. It is common case that the proceedings issued 13 years after the Plaintiff was released from prison and the accrual of the alleged wrongs.

2 . On this application, I am required to determine both whether it is appropriate to direct trial of objection raised by the Defendants in reliance on the Statute of Limitations, 1957 and/or delay under Order 25, rule 1 of the Rules of the Superior Courts, 1986 (as amended) as a preliminary issue and, if so, whether the Plaintiff's claim as against the Defendants for damages for breach of her rights (be they under the Constitution or the European Convention on Human Rights) is statute barred in accordance with the provisions of s. 11(2) of the Statute of Limitations, 1957 (hereinafter “the 1957 Act”) and/or by virtue of s. 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights Act, 2003 (hereinafter “the 2003 Act”).

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

3 . The factual background to these proceedings is set out in the pleadings and summarised at paragraphs 1–6 of the Defendants' written submissions and will not be repeated, save to note that the proceedings arise out of the Plaintiff's detention and imprisonment in Limerick Prison between February, 2003 and March 2004. A time-line is given in the Plaintiff's written submissions, which I adopt, as follows:

DATE	EVENTS
20th of February, 2003	The Plaintiff was incarcerated in Limerick Prison
25th of March, 2004	The Plaintiff was released from prison
13th of September, 2017	Gary Simpson judgment (High Court) Gary Simpson v The Governor of Mountjoy Prison and Others [2017] IEHC 561
12th of October, 2017	Plenary Summons issued.
17th of October, 2017	Statement of Claim issued.
5th of April, 2018	The Defendant entered an Appearance
14th of November, 2019	Gary Simpson judgment (Supreme Court) Gary Simpson v The Governor of Mountjoy Prison and Others [2020] IESC 52
February, 2020	The State opened a settlement scheme
26th of February, 2021	The Defendants delivered a Defence
6th of April, 2022	Christopher McGee Judgment High Court Christopher McGee v The Governor of Portlaoise Prison and Others [2022] IEHC 210
25th of May, 2023	Christopher McGee Judgment Supreme Court Christopher McGee v The Governor of Portlaoise Prison and Others [2023] IESC 14
1st of February, 2024	John O'Brien Judgment High Court

4 . This timeline discloses that between March 2004 (when the Plaintiff was released from prison) and October, 2017 (when these proceedings were issued by plenary summons), no steps were taken to advance a claim arising out of the Plaintiff's conditions of detention, specifically being subjected to a practice of slopping out during the term of her detention. Indeed, it is readily to be inferred from the timing that the issue of proceedings in October, 2017 followed on the delivery of judgment of the High Court in Simpson v. Governor of Mountjoy Prison [2017] IEHC 561 in September, 2017.

PROCEEDINGS

5 . Proceedings issued by Plenary Summons dated the 12 ^th of October, 2017. Although a Statement of Claim purports on its face to have been delivered on the 17 ^th of October, 2017 there is some question (which does not immediately concern me) as to whether it was served at time. An Appearance to the proceedings was entered on the 5 ^th of April, 2018. In turn, the Plaintiff served a Notice of Intention to Proceed on the 8 ^th of January, 2020.

6 . By Notice of Motion dated the 25 ^th of August, 2020, an application was made on behalf of the Plaintiff for judgment in default of defence. An Order was made extending time for delivery of the Defence in consequence of which motion a Defence was delivered on the 26 ^th of February, 2021.

7 . In the Defence delivered a series of preliminary objections were pleaded as follows:

• (1) “The Plaintiff's claim for damages for breach of constitutional rights is barred by virtue of Section 11(2) of the Statute of Limitations Ac, 1957 having been issued more than 6 years from the date on which the cause of action accrued.

• (2) The Plaintiff's claim for damages pursuant to Section 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights Act, 2003, is barred by virtue of Section 3(5)(a) of the said 2003 Act having been brought in respect of the alleged contravention which arose more than one year before the commencement of the proceedings.

• (3) The Statement of Claim fails to disclose any facts of circumstances which will permit this Honourable Court to extend the time for the bringing of the Plaintiff's claim for damages pursuant to Section 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights Act, 2003, pursuant to Sections 3(5) of the said 2003 Act. It is denied that it would be in the inherent interests of justice to extend the time and the Plaintiff is not entitled to any extension.

• (4) By way of further preliminary objection to the substance of these proceedings the Plaintiff's claim as against the Defendants should be dismissed pursuant to the inherent jurisdiction of this Honourable Court by reason of the Plaintiff's inordinate and inexcusable delay in the institution and prosecution of these proceedings.

• (5) Further and in the alternative, the Plaintiffs is guilty of inordinate and inexcusable delay and/or lashes such that the Plaintiff is not entitled to maintain the proceedings herein as against the Defendants and the balance of justice requires these proceedings to be dismissed for want of prosecution.

• (6) The Plaintiffs' claim is statute barred and such should be dismissed in its entirety.”

8 . No Reply has been delivered to this Defence.

9 . By Notice of Motion issuing on the 30 ^th of March, 2021 and returnable to the 5th of July, 2021, the Defendants sought, in essence:

• I. An Order pursuant to Order 25, Rule 1 of the Rules of the Superior Courts, 1986 that the preliminary objections raised by the Defendants at 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the Defence be set down for hearing and disposed of by way of a trial on a point of law;

• II. Further and/or in the alternative, Orders dismissing the claim pursuant to the inherent jurisdiction of the Court on delay grounds and/or for being statute barred pursuant to the State of Limitations 1957 (as amended) and/or s. 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights Act, 2003.

10 . The Defendants' application is grounded on the Affidavit of Ms. Louise Boughton sworn on the 30 ^th of March, 2021 to which no replying affidavit has been sworn on behalf of the Plaintiff. The motion was adjourned for lengthy periods of time pending the decision of the Supreme Court on the applicability of s. 11(2) of the 1957 Act (as amended) to claims of this nature in McGee v. Governor of Portlaoise Prison & Ors. [2023] IESC 14.

11 . The hearing of this application was fixed for the 30 ^th of April, 2024 by Hyland J. in early November, 2023. In fixing the hearing date, I am advised that the Court was advised, without demur of behalf of the Plaintiff, of the Defendants' intention to move the application for trial of the preliminary issue and, if ordered, to seek to have the preliminary issue determined together.

12 . The Defendants' outline submissions in support of the application were filed on the 13 ^th of December, 2023 and the Plaintiff's submissions in response were filed on the 11 ^th of February, 2024. These submissions were directed to the substantive issue in relation to the 1957 Act rather than the question of whether the issue should properly be determined on a preliminary basis, seemingly reflecting a common understanding that the preliminary issue would be before me for determination if I made an order so directing.

13 . By letter dated the 30 ^th of April, 2024 delivered immediately before I sat to hear the Defendants' application, solicitors on behalf of the Plaintiff wrote with reference to the case before the Court “ this morning” seeking consent to have the proceedings amended to seek additional reliefs as follows:

• I. A declaration that before the decision of the Supreme Court in Simpson v. Governor of Mountjoy Prison & Ors [2019] IESC 81 (15 ^th of November, 2019), there was no effective remedy under Irish law for breach of the Plaintiff's rights occasioned by the lack of in-cell sanitation and the practice of “ slopping out” in the prison where she was detained.

• II. A declaration that any application of a statute bar for the purpose of defeating the Plaintiff's claim or of a measure having the same effect, whether under the Statute of Limitations or the European Convention on Human Rights Act or pursuant to the inherent jurisdiction of this Honourable Court, or otherwise, would be unconstitutional or incompatible with the State's obligations and the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights, particularly Articles 3, 6, 8 and 13 thereof.

14 . The letter of the 30 ^th of April, 2024 was brought to my attention upon sitting and it was indicated that if consent to the mooted application to amend was not forthcoming, an application for an adjournment would be made.

15 . In response, not surprisingly, it was confirmed through Counsel for...