Mungovan v Clare County Council
| Jurisdiction | Ireland |
| Judge | Mr Justice Peter Charleton |
| Judgment Date | 24 July 2020 |
| Neutral Citation | [2020] IESC 47 |
| Date | 24 July 2020 |
| Court | Supreme Court |
| Docket Number | Supreme Court appeal number: S:AP:IE:2019:000075 Court of Appeal record number 2016/233 [2017] IECA 321 High Court record number 2011/9930P [2015] IEHC 561; [2018] IEHC 267 |
[2020] IESC 47
Clarke C.J.
MacMenamin J.
Dunne J.
Charleton J.
O'Malley J.
Supreme Court appeal number: S:AP:IE:2019:000075
[2020] IESC 47
Court of Appeal record number 2016/233
High Court record number 2011/9930P
AN CHÚIRT UACHTARACH
THE SUPREME COURT
Costs – Unitary trial – Remittal – Appellant seeking costs – Whether there was an entitlement to all costs
Facts: Leave to appear before the Supreme Court was given on 6 September 2019 to determine questions relating to the validity of several refusals of the respondent, Clare County Council, to accept the appellant, Mr Mungovan as a qualified water treatment engineer for planning purposes by entering his name on a list of such experts who would be acceptable to the local authority. The following question arose for decision on a direct appeal from the judgment of Costello J in the High Court: where an administrative body decides and implements a fixed policy directly affecting those interacting with it, is a person on receipt of an adverse decision founded on that policy required, by statute or the Rules of the Superior Courts, to bring a challenge within the time limits fixed for judicial review or, instead, is that person entitled to seek judicial condemnation of the policy at any time while it is in force and hence liable to affect them afresh? On 24th April 2020, Charleton J held that the plaintiff must succeed on the time point and that the matter would be remitted to the High Court for a unitary trial to decide: the validity of the policy of Clare County Council in the context in which it was taken; whether the plaintiff was validly excluded by that policy; what steps he took to assert his rights; whether laches or acquiescence or any other principle of equity should bar the plenary action; if there is invalidity in the policy, was there malice by the county council such as to ground a tort action for misfeasance in public office; and whether any aspect of defamation can validly be asserted. Submissions were invited from the parties. For the sake of clarity, it was proposed to set out the ruling of the Court on costs, covering multiple motions and appeals. The submissions on behalf of Mr Mungovan detailed all, or at least the most substantive, of the orders on costs made to date and simply suggested that there was an entitlement to all such costs. Clare County Council proposed that a range of factors be taken into consideration in order to fairly dispose of the costs. Central to the argument was a proposal that the appeal was not run as it should have been and that a wasted costs order was “inescapable” because of an earlier hearing.
Held by Charleton J that as the matter was returning to the High Court for a unitary trial, and as there had been no ruling on whether a local authority may maintain such a register as was done in this case, the Supreme Court specifically making no ruling on this matter, or exclude someone in Mr Mungovan’s position, and as many aspects of the claim had been abandoned, the slate on costs should be wiped clean and clarity brought to where the parties stood.
Charleton J held that 40% of the costs in all of the courts and on all of the motions and steps should be awarded to Mr Mungovan.
Costs awarded.
Following on the delivery of the judgment of this Court on Friday, April 24th 2020, submissions were invited from the parties. These have become somewhat complex and for the sake of clarity, it is proposed to set out the ruling of the Court on costs, covering as these do multiple motions and appeals.
The submissions on behalf of Mr Mungovan bear the advantage of detailing all, or at least the most substantive, of the orders on costs made to date and simply suggest that there is an entitlement to all such costs. These submissions read:
The costs order required should simply precisely reverse all the previous Orders sought by — and awarded to — Clare Co Council, and which should now be awarded instead to the Plaintiff, viz:
A. 30 May 2014, High Court, Gilligan J, Defendant's motion 14 January 2014 seeking preliminary modular trial costs in the cause; Plaintiff's motion 10 January 2014 striking out 28 - 35 be reserved to “trial of modular issue.”
B. 14 October and 2015, High Court, Keane J, reserve costs motion 14 January 2014 to trial of action; dismiss Plaintiff's motion with costs (to include reserved costs and written submissions) 10 January 2014. Stay on costs order pending determination of proceedings.
C. 9 February 2018, Court of Appeal, separate costs hearing, Plaintiff to pay costs of appeal to be taxed in default of agreement (perfected on 4 May 2018).
D. 11 May 2018, High Court, Costello J, Plaintiff's claims by paragraphs 17 (a) - (e) stand dismissed; Plaintiff's claims 18 (a) - (c) be struck out; Defendant recover costs of this motion (16 November 2016) and Order to be taxed in default of agreement; Plaintiff to pay costs of both motions, viz Defendant's motion 14 January 2014 and Plaintiff's motion 10 January 2014. Vacate order for stay...
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...to interfere with the exercise of a trial judge's discretion in awarding costs”. 76 . Charleton J. in Mungovan v. Clare County Council [2020] IESC 47 articulated that discretion thus:- “Costs are at the discretion of a court under s. 169…The exercise of this discretion as to the award of co......