Murphy v C(M)

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Judge: Keane C.J.
• Judgment Date: 08 March 2004
• Neutral Citation: 2004 WJSC-SC 7509
• Court: Supreme Court
• Date: 08 March 2004

2004 WJSC-SC 7509

THE SUPREME COURT

Keane C.J.

Murray J.

Hardiman J.

Geoghegan J.

Fennelly J.

90/01 & 146/03

MURPHY v. C (M) & ORS

BETWEEN

MICHAEL F. MURPHY

APPLICANT

AND

M.C., J.W., P.C. AND J.C.

DEFENDANTS

Citations:

PROCEEDS OF CRIME ACT 1996 S3

PROCEEDS OF CRIME ACT 1996 S4

PROCEEDS OF CRIME ACT 1996 S8

MCK (F) V F (A) 2002 1 IR 242 2002 2 ILRM 303

PROCEEDS OF CRIME ACT 1996 S1

PROCEEDS OF CRIME ACT 1996 S4(1)

MCK V C 2001 4 IR 1

AG V RYANS CAR HIRE LTD 1965 IR 642

EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS & FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS

Synopsis:

CRIMINAL LAW

Proceeds of crime

Appeal - Whether section 3 proceedings interlocutory or final - Proceeds of Crime Act 1996, section 3 (90/2001 & 146/2003 - Supreme Court - 8/3/2004)

Murphy v C(M)

Facts: The applicant appealed against the refusal by the High Court to discharge a previous order freezing property on the grounds that it constituted the proceeds of crime. The basis of the appeal was that since the order freezing the property was made the Supreme Court had decided that although described as an interlocutory order, the order was in effect a final order, and therefore the proceedings had been treated as interlocutory in character when they should have been treated as the final trial. The applicant contended that the court should conclude that that case was erroneously decided and to allow matters to proceed in the High Court on the basis that the applicant was entitled to have his application under s. 3 treated as an interlocutory application.

Held by the Supreme Court (Keane CJ, Murray, Hardiman, Geoghegan and Fennelly JJ) in dismissing the appeal and affirming the order of the High Court that the decision was entirely correct in law. The applicant had not suffered any disadvantage or injustice as the High Court decision was not particularly affected by the fact that the judge was dealing with interlocutory proceedings. The onus was on the applicant to satisfy the court that the property was not the proceeds of crime and it was still open to him to do that.

Reporter: R.W.

1 8th day of March 2004 , by Keane C.J.

Keane C.J.

2 This is an appeal from the order of the President of the High Court in which he refused an application to discharge a previous order made by Mr. Justice O'Sullivan pursuant to s. 3 of the Proceeds of Crime Act, 1996. That is an order under the section effectively freezing any dealings in a particular property on the grounds that the property constituted the proceeds of crime and that its value was not less than IR£10,000.00.

3 The basis of the appeal as argued by Dr. Forde before the court today is that the application before Mr. Justice O'Sullivan proceeded on the basis that the order being made by the court under the 1996 Act s. 3 thereof, was as described in the Act, an interlocutory order and that was the basis on which it was approached but that since that case was heard in the High Court, this court has decided in a case, which I shall refer in more detail in a moment, that an order made pursuant to s. 3, although described in the Act as an interlocutory order, is not an interlocutory order in the sense in which that term is normally used. In effect it is a final order since it restrains any person having any interest in the property from dealing with it or disposing of it in any way for a period of seven years.

4 The order made ultimately under the Act if it is made under s. 4 of the Act, while also a final order, is not the final order as that expression would normally be understood so far as s. 3 is concerned. A s. 3 order is in its nature final and is distinguishable on a number of important respects in the form of interlocutory orders with which courts are familiar in ordinary inter partes civil proceedings.

5 The basis of today's appeal is that decision of this court was erroneous in point of law and should now be overruled. It is argued on behalf of the applicant that it being erroneous in point of law it would be unjust that it should be allowed to remain in being as a correct statement of the law because the proceedings before Mr. Justice O'Sullivan were treated as interlocutory in character and if the law, is as stated by this court in its later decision, it would mean that the applicant was, in effect, deprived of the final trial which, on the defendants' argument, he should have had before Mr. Justice O'Sullivan because Mr. Justice O'Sullivan was treating it as an interlocutory application.

6 As the argument is put, it is said that the erroneous decision of this court, as it is claimed to be, has resulted in a situation where the applicant has effectively been deprived of the trial that he was entitled to because unless this court now concludes that that case was erroneously decided as we are invited to do, the applicant will effectively never have at any stage a final trial of the matter. It is on that basis that it is urged that this court should now come to the conclusion that its earlier decision was erroneous and allow matters to proceed in the High Court on the basis that the applicant is and was at all times entitled to have this application under s. 3 treated as an interlocutory application and not as the final disposition of the issues arising under s. 3.

7 I would have to say at the outset that while I will approach the case on the basis that Dr. Forde is correct in saying that the case was treated by Mr. Justice O'Sullivan in accordance with the then President of the High Court as being one which was interlocutory in its nature, it does not appear to me from reading Mr. Justice O'Sullivan's judgment that that played any essential part in his determination of the matter which was then before him because he expressly rejected any attempt to rely on hearsay evidence in relation to the value of the property which is, of course, one of the hallmarks of the traditional interlocutory procedure.

8 While it is true that he certainly accepted and relied on, in coming to a conclusion, that the order should be made on evidence of belief of Chief Superintendent McKenna, that of course was in accordance not with any principle, specifically applicable to interlocutory proceedings as such, but because of the provisions of s. 8 of the 1996 Act itself which enables the court to act on the statement of an authorised officer of the Criminal Assets Bureau that he or she believes that the respondent is in possession or control of...