N. S. v DPP
Jurisdiction | Ireland |
Judge | Clarke C.J.,Irvine J.,Baker J. |
Judgment Date | 28 January 2020 |
Neutral Citation | [2020] IESCDET 7 |
Court | Supreme Court |
Docket Number | S:AP:IE:2019:000206 |
[2020] IESCDET 7
Clarke C.J.
Irvine J.
Baker J.
S:AP:IE:2019:000206
2018 No. 291 JR
THE SUPREME COURT
DETERMINATION
RESULT: The Court does not grant leave to the Applicant to appeal to this Court directly from the High Court.
REASONS GIVEN:
ORDER SOUGHT TO BE APPEALED
COURT: High Court |
DATE OF JUDGMENT OR RULING: 16th October, 2019 |
DATE OF ORDER: 23rd October, 2019 |
DATE OF PERFECTION OF ORDER: 1st November, 2019 |
THE APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL WAS MADE ON 21st November, 2019 AND WAS IN TIME. |
The general principles applied by this Court in determining whether to grant or refuse leave to appeal having regard to the criteria incorporated into the Constitution as a result of the Thirty-third Amendment have now been considered in a large number of determinations and are fully addressed in both a determination issued by a panel consisting of all of the members of this Court in B.S. v Director of Public Prosecutions [2017] IESCDET 134 and in a unanimous judgment of a full Court delivered by O'Donnell J. in Quinn Insurance Ltd. v PricewaterhouseCoopers [2017] IESC 73, [2017] 3 I.R. 812. The additional criteria required to be met in order that a so-called ‘leapfrog appeal' direct from the High Court to this Court can be permitted were addressed by a full panel of the Court in Wansboro v Director of Public Prosecutions [2017] IESCDET 115. It follows that it is unnecessary to revisit the new constitutional architecture for the purposes of this determination.
Furthermore, the application for leave filed and the respondent's notice are published along with this determination (subject only to any redaction required by law) and it is therefore unnecessary to set out the position of the parties.
In that context, it should be noted that the respondent does oppose the grant of leave. The respondent's notice was out of time by ten days. However, the Court considers that in all the circumstances an extension of time should be granted.
As appears from the notices filed, the central issued raised by the applicant (“N.S.”) in seeking to prohibit a criminal trial for historical sexual abuse centred around what was said to be the exceptional delay involved in the underlying criminal...
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