N. v The International Protection Appeals Tribunal

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Judge: Mr Justice Max Barrett
• Judgment Date: 29 July 2019
• Neutral Citation: [2019] IEHC 585
• Docket Number: 2019 26 JR
• Court: High Court
• Date: 29 July 2019

IN THE MATTER OF SECTION 5 OF THE ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS (TRAFFICKING) ACT 2000, AS AMENDED

Between:

N.

Applicant

– and –

THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION APPEALS TRIBUNAL

AND

THE MINISTER FOR JUSTICE AND EQUALITY

Respondents

[2019] IEHC 585

2019 26 JR

THE HIGH COURT

Judicial review – Subsidiary protection – Refugee – Applicant seeking judicial review – Whether the respondent’s reasons for discounting the probative weight of the Spirasi report were unreasonable and irrational

Facts: The applicant, a national of Malawi, applied for international protection in Ireland. The first respondent, the International Protection Appeals Tribunal (IPAT), in a decision of 21.05.2018, affirmed the recommendation of the International Protection Officer that the applicant should be given neither a refugee declaration nor a subsidiary protection declaration. The applicant had concerns relating to the Spirasi report, a medico-legal report prepared by the Spiritan Asylum Services Initiative and submitted as part of the applicant’s application. Three difficulties arose in the IPAT’s treatment of the Spirasi report in the impugned decision. Firstly, the Tribunal viewed “the qualified nature of the psychological assessments” (impugned decision, para.4.3.15), as touched upon by the author of the Spirasi report, as a factor which reduced the weight that should be assigned to those assessments. However, when the author of the report passed comment on the results of the psychological assessments, his commentary was intended as an observation in favour of the applicant. So, for example, when the author of the Spirasi report stated at p.7 of same that “I would have expected much higher negative scoring”, this was because the applicant’s discernible mood state suggested that the applicant was in truth in a worse condition than his scoring suggested. However, the IPAT clearly – and mistakenly – construed the author’s commentary as working to the detriment of the applicant. Secondly, under para.187 of the UNHCHR Manual on the Effective Investigation and Documentation of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (the Istanbul Protocol), a ‘consistent/highly consistent’ rating relates to physical symptoms only (“lesion[s] and…the overall pattern of lesions”). However, in the impugned decision the IPAT discounted the probative value of the Istanbul Protocol-related findings by reference to the qualified psychological assessment (para.4.3.15), a line of reasoning that was, at best, unreasonable. Thirdly, there is a long line of case-law which points to a medico-legal report such as the Spirasi report not being capable of proving the truth of an individual applicant’s account of events (RS (Ukraine) v IPAT (No.1) [2018] IEHC 512, RS (Ukraine) v IPAT (No.2) [2018] IEHC 743, AMN v RAT [2012] IEHC 393 and MZ (Pakistan) v IPAT (No.2) [2019] IEHC 315). Although the wording of the impugned decision was a little unclear in this regard, it did seem, from para.4.3.31 of the impugned decision, where criticism was levelled by the IPAT that the Spirasi report “is not definitive of the cause of the Appellant’s presentation”, that the IPAT anticipated a degree of determination by the Spirasi report that was not consistent with the case-law.

Held by the High Court (Barrett J) that the Spirasi report, a key document before the IPAT, was not properly considered by the IPAT in its decision; specifically, the IPAT’s reasons for discounting the probative weight of the Spirasi report were unreasonable and irrational.

Barrett J held that the deficiencies identified were of such significance as to require the court as a matter of law to grant the order of certiorari sought by the applicant and to remit the matter to the IPAT for fresh consideration.

Order...