Noel Recruitment (Ireland) Ltd v Personal Injuries Assessment Board and Others

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Judge: Kearns P.
• Judgment Date: 23 January 2015
• Neutral Citation: [2015] IEHC 20
• Docket Number: [No. 762JR/2013]
• Court: High Court
• Date: 23 January 2015

[2015] IEHC 20

THE HIGH COURT

[No. 762JR/2013]

Noel Recruitment (Ireland) Ltd v Personal Injuries Assessment Board

JUDICIAL REVIEW

BETWEEN

NOEL RECRUITMENT (IRELAND) LIMITED

APPLICANT

AND

THE PERSONAL INJURIES ASSESSMENT BOARD

RESPONDENT

AND

MORO ISSAK, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS MICHAEL CHAPWANYA

NOTICE PARTY

Practice and Procedure – Second Authorisation - Personal Injuries Assessment Board Act 2003 – Statutory Time Limits

Facts: The applicant in this case sought an order of certiorari to quash the authorisation granted by the respondent to the notice party. This authorised the notice party to bring proceedings against the applicant in relation to an accident at work. The application was brought against the respondent who had previously granted authorisation to the same notice party in respect of the same accident. The court had to determine whether the respondent was entitled to issue a second authorisation in such circumstances. The notice party contended that because the Personal Injuries Assessment Board Act 2003 did not expressly prohibit the Board from issuing a second authorisation it should be permitted to do so in appropriate circumstances. The applicant submitted that in the absence of an express power to issue a second authorisation the statutory tribunal should not have the power to revisit its own decisions. The applicant argued that to do so would effectively be giving the respondent Board the power to extend the limitation period to bring personal injury claims.

Held by Kearns P: The court determined there had been no restriction of a constitutional right of access to the courts. The first authorisation granted to the notice party permitted the bringing of a personal injury claim before the courts. However, that right was subject to the Statute of Limitations. The court concluded that the terms of the 2003 Act could not be interpreted in a way that would extend the fixed periods set by Statute for bringing claims. To defer statutory time limits with repeated applications to the respondent Board would prevent speedy resolutions to claims. This would go against the purpose for which the respondent Board was set up for.

Kearns P.

1 In these proceedings the applicant seeks an order ofcertiorari quashing the authorisation granted by the respondent to the notice party on the 25^th July, 2013 which purported to authorise the notice party to bring proceedings against the applicant in respect of a work place accident which occurred on the 23^rd October, 2009. The application has been brought in circumstances where the respondent had previously granted an authorisation to the same notice party in respect of the same accident in 2011. The issue, therefore, is whether or not the respondent is entitled to issue a second authorisation in such circumstances. Other parties named as potential defendants in both applications to the respondent have not sought to raise a similar point and the position of the respondent in relation to the present application is a neutral one, it neither objects nor consents, but specifically does not oppose the making of an order consisting of a declaration that the authorisation dated the 25^th July, 2013 is invalid insofar as it authorises the notice party to bring proceedings in respect of the relevant claim against the applicant (as distinct from the other named parties).

2 The position of the third party is a simple one: as there is no express prohibition in the legislation which precludes a second authorisation, it must be permissible for the respondent Board to so act, as otherwise the constitutional right of access to the court of the notice party would be curtailed.

3 The notice party claims to have been injured whilst lifting bags of potatoes in a warehouse on the 23^rd October, 2009. The accident is stated to have occurred at Keelings warehouse in Ballymun in Dublin where the notice party worked since December 2007. Both the applicant herein and Tesco Ireland Ltd. are stated at different points in the notice party's application to have been his employer on the date in question.

4 Using the name Michael Chapwanya, the notice party made an application dated the 30^th August, 2010 for an assessment of damages under s. 11 of the Personal Injuries Assessment Board Acts 2003 - 2007 (hereinafter "the Act") in respect of this alleged work place accident. The applicant was named as a respondent "employer" to the first application, as were Keelings Ltd. The applicant was notified of the first application pursuant to s. 13 of the Act by notice of the respondent dated the 1^st October, 2010.

5 The applicant did not respond to the said notice and was deemed to have consented to an assessment under s. 14 of the Act. By letter dated the 16^th March, 2011 the respondent notified the applicant of the decision to authorise proceedings against the applicant and stated in its letter:-

"As this concludes our involvement in the matter, we have closed our file."

6 This authorisation bore a reference number EL0906201040898. However, no proceedings were issued on behalf of the notice party on foot of this authorisation and any potential proceedings on foot thereof are now statute-barred pursuant to the provisions of the Statute of Limitations Act1957, as amended and s.50 of the Act.

7 The notice party, using the name Moro Issak (aka Michael Chapwanya) made a second application dated the 5^th March, 2011 which was received by the respondent on the 5^th October, 2011 for an assessment of damages under s.11 of the Act in respect of the same work place accident of 23^rd October, 2009 which was the subject matter of the first application. The applicant was named as a respondent in the second application, as was Keelings Ltd. Additionally, however, Tesco Ireland Ltd. were also named as a respondent in this second application.

8 The applicant was notified of the second application pursuant to s.13 of the Act by notice from the respondent dated the 30^th August, 2012. By email dated the 1^st October, 2012 a representative of the applicant replied to the correspondence indicating that the applicant did not consent to the respondent assessing the matter. Thereafter by letter dated 25^th July, 2011 the applicant was notified of the decision to authorise proceedings by the notice party against the applicant, notwithstanding that the purported authorisation was in respect of the same accident which was the subject matter of the first authorisation. Both authorisations now carry the same reference number.

9 It is beyond dispute therefore that the respondent entertained two successive applications for the assessment of damages brought by the same person in respect of the same accident, and in respect of which the respondent has issued two successive authorisations dated respectively the 16^th March, 2011 and the 25^th July, 2013.

10 The applicant has now been served with a personal injury summons dated the 30^th July, 2013 in respect of a personal injuries claim brought by the notice party as plaintiff and purported to be permissible on foot of the second authorisation issued by the respondent on the 25^th July, 2013.

11 On taking the matter up with the respondents, the applicant through their solicitor were advised that the Board was of the view that the second authorisation would not be invalid and that proceedings would be strenuously defended. However, the respondents have come into court with a modified position to the effect that any invalidity extends only to so much of the second authorisation as permitted the notice party herein to bring proceedings against the applicant.

12 The Personal Injuries Assessment Board Act2003 states in its preamble that it is:-

"An Act to enable, in certain situations, the making of assessments, without the need for legal proceedings to be brought in that behalf, of compensation...