Patrick Keary v The Property Registration Authority of Ireland

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Judge: Ms. Justice Butler
• Judgment Date: 24 January 2022
• Neutral Citation: [2022] IEHC 28
• Court: High Court
• Docket Number: [Record No. 2016/9512 P] [Record No. 2019/8124 P]

Between

Patrick Keary

Plaintiff

and

The Property Registration Authority of Ireland

Defendant

Between

Patrick Keary

Plaintiff

and

The Minister for Justice and Equality, Ireland and The Attorney General

Defendants

Between

Patrick Keary

Plaintiff

and

The Minister for Justice and Equality, The Garda Commissioner, The Courts Service, Ireland and The Attorney General

Defendants

[2022] IEHC 28

[Record No. 2016/9512 P]

[Record No. 2019/0578 P]

[Record No. 2019/8124 P]

THE HIGH COURT

Strike out – Reasonable cause of action – Bound to fail – Defendants seeking to have the plaintiff’s proceedings struck out – Whether the plaintiff’s proceedings were bound to fail

Facts: The plaintiff, Mr Keary, brought three different cases against various public sector entities including the State. The defendants, the Property Registration Authority of Ireland, the Minister for Justice and Equality, Ireland, the Attorney General, the Garda Commissioner and the Courts Service, applied to the High Court seeking to have the plaintiff’s proceedings struck out either under O.19, r.28 as failing to disclose a reasonable cause of action or pursuant to the court’s inherent jurisdiction on the basis that the proceedings were bound to fail. In addition, the defendants complained, centrally as regards one of the cases and peripherally in another, that the proceedings had been issued in breach of an Isaac Wunder Order made against the plaintiff by Stewart J on 18th October, 2016. That order restrained the plaintiff from instituting any further legal proceedings in respect of certain lands without prior leave of the High Court. The plaintiff did not seek nor obtain such leave before instituting the proceedings in question.

Held by Butler J that the plaintiff’s central and over-arching contention in each of the three cases was unstateable: the proposition that somehow the constitutional guarantee of equality means that the plaintiff (and indeed all citizens) are “immune” from court orders. She held that all proceedings based on that proposition could and should be struck out under O.19, r.28. She held that they could also be struck out under the court’s inherent jurisdiction as the plaintiff could not make out the evidential case necessary to support the proposition which he sought to advance. She held that the assertion that the Director of Public Prosecutions was in contempt of court was not supported by any evidence. She held that the proceedings against the Property Registration Authority of Ireland (2016/9512P) could also be struck out under both headings. The plaintiff’s claim was predicated on his being the beneficial owner of the lands comprised in folio 42156 of County Galway. She held that that claim was unstateable in circumstances where the High Court had previously made orders in favour of the plaintiff’s mortgagee for possession of those lands, which order was never appealed; further the proceedings were moot. She held that there was no stateable basis on which the plaintiff could have a beneficial interest in folio GY74S and, in any event, the folio had been closed as the charges registered in it had all been discharged. She held that the plaintiff had not advanced any legal basis upon which it could be plausibly suggested that the actions of the Authority could be legally capable of amounting to a slander of title. She held that she would strike out that element of his claim pursuant to the court’s inherent jurisdiction. She held that the issues raised in the plaintiff’s constitutional action (2019/0578P) were substantially disposed of by virtue of her decision as regards the plaintiff’s over-arching claim to be immune from court orders. Insofar as the claims made concerned decisions made by the District Court or warrants issued by that Court in proceedings taken by Corrib Oil or a decision of the Supreme Court in proceedings taken by the ACC Bank against the plaintiff, she held that the proceedings were manifestly an attempt to re-litigate issues which had already been determined against the plaintiff in earlier proceedings. She held that the proceedings were an abuse of the court’s processes, unstateable and bound to fail. She held that she would make orders dismissing them under both heads of jurisdiction available to the court. She held that the proceedings concerning the District Court proceedings (2019/8124P) suffered from many of the same infirmities as the constitutional action. She held that those proceedings were also both unstateable and bound to fail and she would strike them out accordingly.

Butler J held that she would strike out all of the proceedings.

Proceedings struck out.

JUDGMENT of Ms. Justice Butler delivered on the day 24th of January, 2022

Introduction

1 This judgment deals with applications made by the defendants in three different cases brought by the plaintiff against various public sector entities including the State. The defendants seek to have the plaintiff's proceedings struck out either under O.19, r.28 as failing to disclose a reasonable cause of action or pursuant to the court's inherent jurisdiction on the basis that the proceedings are bound to fail. In addition, the defendants complain, centrally as regards one of the cases and peripherally in another, that the proceedings have been issued in breach of an Isaac Wunder Order made against the plaintiff by Stewart J on 18th October, 2016. That order restrained the plaintiff from instituting any further legal proceedings in respect of certain lands without prior leave of the High Court. The plaintiff did not seek nor obtain such leave before instituting the proceedings in question.

2 The plaintiff is a litigant-in-person who is acting on his own behalf, although it appears from his submissions that some of the arguments he makes are also being made by litigants in other cases with whom the plaintiff may be in contact. In this regard the plaintiff referred to a meeting due to be held the week after the hearing in this case and the intention of these litigants (presumably including the plaintiff) to “ go to Europe” en bloc. The plaintiff also appears to be assisted by his daughter although she was not present in court.

Plaintiff's central argument

3 All of these cases arise against a background of previous litigation in which the plaintiff was involved, usually as a defendant, and in which orders were made against him in favour of various other parties. Although I will outline the circumstances of each case individually, the plaintiff's belief that he is “ immune” from court orders is central to his claims both in the substantive litigation and in his response to these applications. The court has had some difficulty in understanding the basis of this claim. It appears to derive from the plaintiff's interpretation of the significance of orders made in unrelated proceedings in which the plaintiff was not involved. These proceedings are cited in the plaintiff's pleadings by reference to their case numbers being High Court No. 2006/1114P and Supreme Court No. 334/2007 being an appeal in that High Court case. These numbers refer to proceedings entitled Eugene Cafferky v. Director of Public Prosecutions. In his pleadings the plaintiff claims that the Supreme Court decision in that case “validated” a contempt of court by the DPP in respect of an order made by the High Court earlier in the same case. Consequently, the plaintiff argues that as Article 40.1 of the Constitution contains a guarantee of equality, citizens, including himself, are also immune from court orders and that the “ victims” of such orders can sue the State for damages, as he purports to do in the proceedings he describes as his constitutional case. Needless to say, there have been a significant number of court orders made against the plaintiff prior to the institution of these proceedings. Insofar as it is possible to deduce from the pleadings in this case, those orders have for the most part arisen in debt collection proceedings against the plaintiff.

4 When asked by the court for some more information as to the nature of the Cafferky case and of the order of which the plaintiff alleges the DPP to have been in contempt, the plaintiff was unable to provide the court with any additional information. He does however complain that the Supreme Court decision in case 334/2007 is not on the Courts Service website as a result of which he has been unable to access it. This would seem to be because no written judgment was issued in the case, the Supreme Court having dismissed Mr. Cafferky's appeal on an ex tempore basis and without reserving judgment. In circumstances where the plaintiff was unable to provide the court with any assistance as regard the authority which is central to his contentions, I asked the solicitor acting on behalf of the defendants to see if she could procure copies of all relevant judgments and orders over the lunch break. On the resumption of the hearing at 2pm a bundle comprising copies of five orders was handed into court. The Supreme Court order made on 28th October, 2011 records the dismissal of Mr. Cafferky's appeal against an order of the High Court (Lavan J) dated 13th November, 2007 which in turn dismissed his claim on the grounds that it disclosed no reasonable cause of action. The High Court order of 13th November, 2007 simply records the dismissal of the claim on those grounds.

5 There are then three additional interlocutory orders made by the High Court. One of these was made by the Master of the High Court on 5th October, 2006 and refused Mr. Cafferky leave to join additional parties to his proceedings, leave to make a consequential amendment to his statement of claim and discovery. It seems that the plaintiff's arguments are based on one or both of the other two orders. The earlier of these (McKechnie J. 22nd May, 2006) gives the defendant, the DPP, an extension of two weeks to file an...