Pysz v Ireland

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Judge: Ms. Justice Bolger
• Judgment Date: 05 July 2022
• Neutral Citation: [2022] IEHC 412
• Court: High Court
• Docket Number: [Record No. 2019/1444 P]

Between

Tomasz Pysz

Plaintiff

and

Ireland, Department of Foreign Affairs, Department of Labour

Defendants

[2022] IEHC 412

[Record No. 2019/1444 P]

THE HIGH COURT

Frivolous and vexatious claim – Bound to fail – Reasonable cause of action – Defendants seeking to strike out the plaintiff’s claim – Whether the plaintiff’s claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action

Facts: The plaintiff, Mr Pysz, on 20 February 2019, issued a plenary summons in which he identified his claim as “negligence, failure of duty of care, violations of civil liberties, Freedom of Information Act, prohibition of Incitement to Hatred Act, the Lisbon Treaty, the Amsterdam Treaty and the European Constitution. Accomplice to modern day slavery and human exploitation”. The defendants, Ireland, the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Department of Labour, applied to the High Court pursuant to O. 19, r. 28 of the Rules of the Superior Courts to strike out the plaintiff’s claim on the basis that it disclosed no reasonable cause of action and/or that it was frivolous and vexatious and/or bound to fail. The defendants also sought such further or other reliefs as the court may deem appropriate and claimed that this entitled the court to rely on its inherent jurisdiction to strike out the proceedings should that be considered appropriate.

Held by Bolger J that the plaintiff sought to assert a vague claim against the State for having failed to discharge what he claimed was the State’s duty of care to protect him as an EU citizen. Insofar as any such duty was owed, Bolger J held that it was discharged by the State’s implementation of a vast range of protective employment law statutes, which can be invoked by the employee within a legal framework that allows for some legitimate restrictions including the doctrine of state immunity. Bolger J was satisfied that the plaintiff’s claims of negligence and a breach of duty, as set out in his plenary summons arising from what he said was the State’s failure to respond to his allegation of mistreatment by his employer, did not give rise to a cause of action whether at common law or pursuant to the unidentified international laws and treaties referred to in the plaintiff’s statement of claim or the “European Constitution” or the Treaties of Lisbon or Amsterdam referred to in his affidavit and the plenary summons. In those circumstances and accepting that the court’s jurisdiction should be exercised sparingly and only in clear cases (Barry v Buckley [1981] IR 306), Bolger J held that the case came within the type of case that Whelan J in the Court of Appeal found in Maurice v Marine Hotel (Sutton) Ltd & ors [2019] IECA 85 merited the exercise of the court jurisdiction. Bolger J held that the plaintiff sought to avail of the scarce resources of the courts to hear a case which had no prospect of success, which was a significant factor in the decision of Irvine J in the Court of Appeal in Fox v McDonald & ors [2017] IECA 189 to dismiss the plaintiff’s appeal against the order of the High Court striking out his proceedings pursuant to O. 19, r. 28. If Bolger J was wrong in her application of O. 19, r. 28, then she considered that the wider jurisdiction of the courts to strike out proceedings pursuant to its inherent jurisdiction would require the proceedings to be struck out having regard to the fact that the plaintiff’s employment was found by the WRC to come within the doctrine of state immunity. Bolger J did not consider that there was any credible basis for the plaintiff to assert that the State defendants had breached a duty of care to the plaintiff, that it facilitated slavery or profited from it or that it, through various Government bodies, threatened or intimidated the plaintiff and violated his civil liberties. Bolger J struck out the plaintiff’s proceedings pursuant to the inherent jurisdiction of the court in the event that it was not open to her to strike them out pursuant to O. 19, r. 28.

Bolger J held that as the defendants had succeeded in their motion, in accordance with the provisions of s. 169 of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015, the defendants were entitled to the costs of the motion and the entire proceedings against the plaintiff.

Application granted.

DECISION of Ms. Justice Bolger delivered on the 5th day of July, 2022

1 This is the defendants' application pursuant to O. 19, r. 28 of the Rules of the Superior Courts to strike out the plaintiff's claim on the basis that it discloses no reasonable cause of action and/or that it is frivolous and vexatious and/or bound to fail. The defendants also seek such further or other reliefs as this Court may deem appropriate and claims that this entitles the court to rely on its inherent jurisdiction to strike out the proceedings should that be considered appropriate. For the reasons set out below I am allowing this application to strike out the plaintiff's proceedings.

Background

2 The plaintiff is a lay litigant. On 20 February 2019, he issued a plenary summons in which he identified his claim as “negligence, failure of duty of care, violations of civil liberties, Freedom of Information Act, prohibition of Incitement to Hatred Act, the Lisbon Treaty, the Amsterdam Treaty and the European Constitution. Accomplice to modern day slavery and human exploitation”. On 12 March 2019, he filed an affidavit averring to certain matters but eventually, having been advised by the defendants of the need to do so, he filed a statement of claim in which he set out his case in somewhat narrative form.

3 The defendants' application to this court pursuant to O. 19, r. 28 requires the court to consider the case solely on the plaintiff's pleadings. I have therefore had careful regard to what the plaintiff states in his plenary summons and statement of claim. Given the plaintiff's status as a lay litigant and in order to ensure that he does not lose out on identifying anything which might assist him in making his case, I have also had regard to the entire contents of his affidavit.

4 The plaintiff brought a claim to the WRC pursuant the Unfair Dismissals Act against the US Embassy arising from his alleged dismissal by the US Embassy on 7 July 2016. He also brought a claim pursuant to the Payment of Wages Act for unpaid wages during a period of sick leave from February to July 2016. The Workplace Adjudication Officer issued a decision of 24 January 2018 that she did not have jurisdiction to hear the complaint as she found the respondent embassy was covered by ‘the doctrine of restrictive state immunity’. The plaintiff advised this Court that he sought to appeal that decision outside of the statutory time limit for doing so, and the Labour Court refused to allow his appeal. He advised the court that he has appealed that determination of the Labour Court to the High Court and is currently awaiting a hearing date.

5 The plaintiff sought leave to furnish additional evidence to the court during the hearing of the...