R.C. v K.E.

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Judge: Mr. Justice Noonan
• Judgment Date: 28 June 2018
• Neutral Citation: [2018] IEHC 548
• Docket Number: [2017 No. 240 C.A.]
• Court: High Court
• Date: 28 June 2018

[2018] IEHC 548

THE HIGH COURT

Noonan J.

[2017 No. 240 C.A.]

BETWEEN

R. C.

PLAINTIFF

AND

K. E.

DEFENDANT

Defamation – Absolute privilege – Abuse of process – Plaintiff seeking damages for defamation – Whether the proceedings were an abuse of process

Facts: The plaintiff instituted proceedings in the Circuit Court seeking damages for defamation against the defendant. Arising out of those defamation proceedings the defendant brought a motion before the Circuit Court seeking the following reliefs: 1) an order dismissing or striking out the proceedings for failing to disclose any reasonable cause of action as against the defendant; 2) an order dismissing or striking out the proceedings on the basis that they are frivolous, vexatious and are bound to fail; 3) in the alternative an order dismissing or striking out the proceedings on the basis that same constitute an abuse of process. The Circuit Court dismissed the claim and the plaintiff appealed to the High Court against that order.

Held by Noonan J that the bringing of these proceedings constituted a clear breach of the in camera rule and could only be viewed as an abuse of process. He held that the alleged statements that were made in this case were covered by absolute privilege.

Noonan J held that the Circuit judge came to the correct conclusion and he accordingly affirmed her order and dismissed this appeal.

Appeal dismissed.

EX TEMPORE JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Noonan delivered on the 28th June, 2018

1 This is a Circuit Court appeal brought by the plaintiff against the Circuit Court's order dismissing the claim in the circumstances hereafter appearing. The background is that the plaintiff was in a relationship with a lady who I will refer to as K.B. and he had a child as a result of that relationship with K.B. and the child has been referred to in these proceedings as A.B. After that relationship ended K.B. formed a new relationship with the defendant in these proceedings.

2 Arising out of the breakup of the relationship between the plaintiff and K.B. family law proceedings were commenced in the District Court which considered matters relating inter alia to custody and access to A.B. In the course of those proceedings the District Court made an order pursuant to s. 20 of the Childcare Act of 1991 and that section insofar as is relevant to these proceedings provides that where it appears to the court that it may be appropriate for a care order or supervision order to be made with respect to the child concerned in the proceedings the court may of its own motion or on the application of any person adjourn the proceedings and direct the health board for the area in which the child resides or is for the time being to undertake an investigation of the child's circumstances and the functions of the health board under this section have now been taken over by the Child and Family Agency otherwise known as TUSLA. Subs. 3 of s. 20 provides that where the court gives a direction under subs. 1 the health board concerned shall undertake an investigation of the child's circumstances and shall consider a number of factors that are set out in the subsection.

3 Now as I have said the District Court made an order under s. 20 of the Childcare Act, 1991 and in compliance with that order the Child and Family Agency/TUSLA appointed a social worker to carry out the investigation that is identified in the section and in the course of that investigation the social worker conducted interviews with the relevant parties which of course included the plaintiff and the defendant in these proceedings. In the course of interviewing the defendant the plaintiff alleges that the social worker was told by the defendant that the plaintiff had previously been guilty of abducting a woman and detaining her without her consent for a number of days. In a subsequent interview with the plaintiff, the plaintiff again alleges in his civil bill in these proceedings that this information was disclosed to him by the social worker and arising out of that the plaintiff instituted proceedings in the Circuit Court seeking damages for defamation against the defendant.

4 Arising out of those defamation proceedings the defendant brought a motion before the Circuit Court and in that motion the defendant seeks the following reliefs:

1. First, an order dismissing or striking out the proceedings for failing to disclose any reasonable cause of action as against the defendant.

2. Secondly, an order dismissing or striking out the proceedings on the basis that they are frivolous, vexatious and are bound to fail.

3. Thirdly in the alternative an order dismissing or striking out the proceedings on the basis that same constitute an abuse of process.

Those are the grounds upon which the defendant seeks to have the proceedings struck out and the defendant's motion is essentially based on two matters: First, that the proceedings constitute a breach of the in camera rule and are accordingly an abuse of process and should be struck out on that ground alone; secondly, that the alleged statement of the defendant which is the subject matter of the complaint in the defamation proceedings is subject to absolute privilege in law.

5 So, dealing with each of those propositions in turn first the alleged breach of the in camera rule. To my mind there is no doubt that this claim made by the plaintiff arises solely and directly from the in camera proceedings that are or have been before the District Court. In that regard it seems relevant to refer to the decision of Laffoy J., then a judge of the High Court, in M.P. v A.P. [1996] 1 IR...