R (Peel) v Armagh Urban District Council

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Judgment Date: 01 May 1900
• Date: 01 May 1900
• Court: Queen's Bench Division (Ireland)

Reg. (Peel)

and

Armagh Urban District Council (1).

Q. B. Div.

CASES

DETERMINED BY

THE QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION

OF

THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE IN IRELAND,

AND ON APPEAL THEREFROM IN

THE COURT OF APPEAL,

AND BY

THE COURT FOR CROWN CASES RESERVED.

1901.

Local Government (Ireland) Act, 1898 (61 & 62 Vict. c, 37), sects. 109, 115, 119 — Office” — “Existing officer” — Solicitor to former Township Commissioners.

A practising solicitor, who, prior to 1898, had, as occasion arose, transacted legal business for the commissioners of a township, but had not been appointed by any resolution of that body, nor had been in receipt of any fixed salary, is not an existing “officer” within the meaning of the Local Government (Ireland) Act, 1898, nor entitled to compensation for loss of “office” upon his services being discontinued by the Urban District Council created under that Act.

Mandamus.

For the purposes of this report the facts of the case may he taken to be these. The prosecutor, Mr. J. E. Peel, a practising solicitor in Armagh, had, for some twenty years prior to the passing of the Local Groverment (Ireland) Act, 1898, acted as solicitor for the then township commissioners, but had not been at any time formally appointed as their solicitor by any resolution of that body, nor had their legal business been exclusively performed

by him. In 1899 the new Urban District Council appointed Mr. Lavery, solicitor, of Armagh, to carry on certain legal business, upon which Mr. Peel had been previously engaged by a committee of the former Commissioners. Mr. Peel objected, and, his remonstrances being neglected, sent in a formal claim for compensation for loss of office. The Council declined to entertain the claim, and Mr. Peel applied for and obtained a conditional order for a writ of mandamus to compel the Council to take his claim into consideration, and to consider and assess the amount of compensation payable to him.

The Council having shown cause:—

Campbell, Q.C., and C. Murphy (with them Ronan, Q.C.) now moved that the conditional order be made absolute. They referred to sects. 109, 115, 119, 120, of the Local Government Act. The case (they contended) was governed by Reg. (Brown) v. Wicklow County Council (1). If a solicitor for a Grand Jury be entitled as a county “officer” to compensation, how can it have been the intention of the Legislature to exclude from compensation the corresponding official of other bodies whose duties were likewise transferred to the new Councils? The absence of a resolution, appointing the applicant to be solicitor to the Commissioners, afforded no distinction, seeing that his employment had been practically continuous: Reg. v. Justices of Carmarthen (2); Reg. v. Justices of Bridgewater (3); Reg. v. Poor Law Board (4); Reg. v. Mayor of Norwich (5); Reg. v. Local Government Board (6). A liberal interpretation was always given of the class entitled to compensation. If satisfied that the applicant was de facto permanently employed, it became immaterial whether the payment was by fees for work, as it was done, or by salary. The references in the Local Government Act, 1898 (and see Schedule VII., Part 2) to fees as well as salary, and the system of averages adopted for the assessment of compensation, showed that a fixed salary was not one of the essentials of such offices as the Legislature had in view when providing for compensation for loss of office: Drew v. Metropolitan Board of Works

(1). Reg. (Holmes) v. Corporation of Drogheda (2) was inconsistent with Reg. v. Justices of Carmarthen (3) and Reg. v. Local Government Board (4).

Hume Q.C., and Healy, Q.C. (Drumgoole with them) for the Urban District Council:—

The applicant was merely casually employed by the Commissioners; there was no formal appointment whatever; there was no exclusive employment; and the Commissioners could have at any time employed another solicitor to act for them. Some degree of permanency of tenure was necessary to the idea of “office”: Reg. (Holmes) v. Corporation of Drogheda (2); and, if not an “officer,” the applicant could not be held to be an “existing officer.” Save for the express wording of the 115th section, the “solicitor to a grand jury” would never have been held to be an “officer”; he was to be so “deemed,” because otherwise he would not have come within the definition. Brown'sCase (5), therefore, is clearly distinguishable. [They also referred to the Armagh Local Act, 1896 (59 & 60 Vict. c. ccv, sects. 2, 53).]

Cur adv. vult.

Sir P. O'Brien, L.C.J.:—

The question in this case is whether Mr. Peel the applicant is entitled to compensation under the provisions of the Local Government Act on his dismissal from the post of solicitor to the Armagh Urban District Council. He has been dismissed from that post, or perhaps I should say, the Council has refused to continue to employ him as their solicitor, and he seeks by writ of mandamus to compel the Council to award him compensation. Mr. Peel alleges that he was solicitor to the Town Commissioners of Armagh, and that being solicitor he was an officer of that body, and that, when that body became merged in or transmuted into the Armagh Urban District Council, he became an officer of that body. Indeed he alleges he did some business as solicitor for

them, and that now, when, apart from incapacity or misconduct on his part, the Council have appointed Mr. Lavery to do some legal work for them, he is entitled to compensation. The question depends upon the true construction of the 119th section of the Local Government Act. Was Mr. Peel an “existing officer” within the meaning of that section? If he was, he is entitled to compensation. I eliminate from the discussion the word “existing,” and I apply myself to the word “officer.” Was Mr. Peel an “officer”? In my judgment he was not within the meaning of that section an officer either of the Armagh Town Commissioners or of the Armagh Urban District Council.

It is stated, and it would appear, that he did not do all the work, and, in particular, the Court work of the Armagh Town Commissioners; but independently of this matter, he was not appointed by resolution to act as the solicitor of either body, nor did he receive a salary. He merely did the business of the Town Commissioners of Armagh as it arose from time to time. In the words of the Town Clerk, “from time to time, as occasions arose, Mr. Peel was instructed to transact legal matters for the Board of Town Commissioners of Armagh; but there is no resolution appointing him as solicitor to the Board, and he merely furnished his costs for the work he was instructed to do in the usual way.” This was the position of Mr...