Rajah v Royal College of Surgeons

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Judgment Date: 01 January 1994
• Date: 01 January 1994
• Docket Number: [1992 No. 339 J.R.]
• Court: High Court

High Court

High Court

[1992 No. 339 J.R.]

Rajah v. The College of Surgeons

Kavitha Rajah

Applicant

and

The Royal College of Surgeons in Ireland, the Members for the time being of the Council of The Royal College of Surgeons in Ireland and The Members for the time being of the Academic Appeals Board of The Royal College of Surgeons in Ireland

Respondents

Cases referred to in this report:—

Beirne v. The Commissioner of An Garda Síochána [1993] I.L.R.M. 1.

International Fishing Vessels Ltd. v. The Minister for the Marine[1989] I.R. 149.

Murphy v. The Turf Club [1989] I.R. 171.

R. v. National Joint Council for the Craft of Dental Technicians, ex parte Neate [1953] 1 Q.B. 704; [1953] 2 W.L.R. 342; [1953] 1 A.E.R. 321.

The State (Colquhoun) v. D'Arcy [1936] I.R. 641.

The State (Creedon) v. The Criminal Injuries Compensation Tribunal[1988] I.R. 51; [1989] I.L.R.M. 104.

Judicial review - Remedy - Availability - Educational institution established by Royal Charter - Academic appeals procedure established by regulations of institution - Students agreeing to be bound by procedure - Whether relationship between parties exclusively contractual - Whether decisions relating to academic standing amenable to judicial review - Whether establishment of institution by Royal Charter sufficient to bring such decisions within ambit of judicial review.

Judicial review - Fair procedures - Obligation to give reasons - Educational institution - Academic appeals procedure - Decision - Whether obligation to give reasons for decision.

Practice - Judicial review - Leave to apply for judicial review granted - Applicant seeking leave to extend grounds on which to apply for judicial review - Whether leave should be granted.

Judicial Review

The facts are summarised in the headnote and fully set out in the judgments of O'Hanlon J. and Keane J., infra.

On the 7th December, 1992, the applicant was given leave by the High Court (O'Hanlon J.) to apply for judicial review. The application to extend the grounds on which the application for judicial review was based was heard by the High Court (O'Hanlon J.) on the 8th February, 1993.

The substantive application for judicial review was heard by the High Court (Keane J.) on the 21st and 22nd April, 1993.

The first respondent was an educational institution established by Royal Charter in 1784, subsequently amended. The applicant was a student of the first respondent, who had failed an examination at the first sitting and at the repeat sitting.

The regulations of the first respondent, which applied to all students admitted to the college, provided that students who failed an examination had no automatic right to repeat the year. The regulations provided a procedure whereby a body known as the Student Progress Committee would consider the student's academic record and any mitigating factors. A decision of that committee could be appealed to a committee appointed by the Academic Board and any recommendation by the second committee that a student be refused re-admission had to be ratified by the Academic Board and the Council of the first respondent. The regulations provided that the student be informed in writing of the decisions of those bodies, but did not impose any obligation to give reasons for the decisions.

The Academic Board ratified a recommendation to refuse re-admission to the applicant. The applicant was granted leave by the High Court to apply by way of judicial review to quash that decision on the grounds that it was ultra vires the respondents to limit the number of students or to exclude a student who had achieved a higher standard in the examination than students whose appeal had been allowed. The applicant subsequently sought the leave of the High Court to adduce further grounds in support of her application for judicial review, relating to alleged breaches of natural justice in the manner in which the Appeals Board had dealt with her appeal, and the failure of the Board to state reasons for its decision. No effort had been made by the applicant to ascertain the reasons for the decision prior to the original application to the High Court.

Held by O'Hanlon J., in granting leave to expand the grounds on which the application for judicial review could be brought, that since the applicant had already been given leave to apply for judicial review, the application to extend the grounds would be granted with some reluctance.

Per curiam: That is was important that the High Court should not be turned into a court of appeal from the decisions of administrative tribunals generally, and that the tendency to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court by way of judicial review proceedings in every case where a party was dissatisfied with the decision of such tribunal was one that must be resisted.

On the hearing of the substantive application, the applicant contended that the attitude of one of the members of the committee appointed by the Appeals Board had belittled and intimidated her in her presentation of mitigating factors, such as her own ill-health and that of her mother. It was also contended that the appeals procedure itself was unfair in that the committee appointed by the Appeals Board restricted itself to a consideration of whether the Student Progress Committee had acted correctly. The applicant further submitted that she was entitled to be given reasons for the decision of the Appeals Board, so that she could challenge that decision.

The respondents, while denying any breach of fair procedures, submitted that since the relationship between the parties was contractual, the respondents were not amenable to judicial review as there was no public law issue. The applicant relied on the fact that the first respondent had been established by Royal Charter to refute that argument.

Held by Keane J., in refusing the relief sought, 1, that since the jurisdiction of the respondents was derived from the contract which came into being when the applicant became a student of the college and her agreement, express or implied, to be bound by the regulations, including the appeals procedure, the court had no jurisdiction to grant relief by way of judicial review.

Murphy v. The Turf Club [1989] I.R. 171 applied; Beirne v. The Commissioner of An Garda Síochána [1993] I.L.R.M. 1 distinguished.

2. That the fact the first respondent derived its existence in law from a Royal Charter was not a sufficient ground for bringing matters relating to the conduct and academic standing of its students within the ambit of judicial review, and that the same would apply in the case of an educational institution established by Act of parliament.

Semble: That in any event, the applicant had not established any breach of the requirements of natural or constitutional justice, and that the fact that one member of a particular tribunal might appear to be...