Rooney v Minister for Agriculture

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Judge: O'Donnell J.
• Judgment Date: 28 January 2016
• Neutral Citation: [2016] IESC 1
• Date: 28 January 2016
• Court: Supreme Court
• Docket Number: Appeal No.: 111/1990 Appeal No.: 430/2010

[2016] IESC 1

THE SUPREME COURT

O'Donnell J.

Appeal No.: 111/1990

Appeal No.: 430/2010

O'Donnell J.

Clarke J.

Dunne J.

Between

JOHN ROONEY

Plaintiff/Appellant

- and -

THE MINISTER FOR AGRICULTURE AND FOOD, THE MINISTER FOR FINANCE, THE TAOISEACH, IRELAND AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, DONAL MCDAID, PATRICK DELANEY, THE IRISH FARMERS' ASSOCIATION, ERAD, THE MANAGEMENT BOARD FOR DISEASE ERADICATION, ALAN GILLIS, PATRICK DELANEY, DENIS COFFEY, TERENCE O'CONNOR, DENIS G. HICKEY, JAMES NOONAN AND JOHN MALONE ? AS BOARD MEMBERS OF ERAD, THE MANAGEMENT BOARD FOR DISEASE ERADICATION, THE MINISTER FOR THE PUBLIC SERVICE and

THE OMBUDSMAN

Defendants/Respondents

Civil proceedings ? Motion for judgment in default of defence ? Motion to amend Statement of Claim ? Appellant seeking motions for judgment in default of defence and to amend Statement of Claim ? Whether the decisions of the High Court were unimpeachable

Facts: The plaintiff/appellant, Mr Rooney, brought before the Supreme Court on the 9th of December 2015 two outstanding aspects of 1987 proceedings, namely, a motion for judgment in default of defence refused by the High Court (Barron J) on the 19th of February 1990, and which the Supreme Court did not formally deal with on the 19th of December 1991, and the application to amend the Statement of Claim which was initiated in 2001 , re-entered on the 31st of July 2006, determined and refused by the High Court (Murphy J) on the 18th of November 2010 , and appealed to the Supreme Court.

Held by O?Donnell J that, having considered the matters which came before the Court on the 9th of December 2015, which concerned proceedings of considerable age and unusual factual and procedural complication, the order of Barron J was unimpeachable. O?Donnell J noted that the only possible issue in relation to it was the absence of a formal order extending time for delivery of the defence and the question of costs. However, in circumstances where the Department of Agriculture had already a defence delivered and on file, and the case proceeded to hearing and the special case was determined both in the High Court and Supreme Court, O?Donnell J held that any question of extending time for delivery of the defence was irrelevant; the defence delivered was treated as effective for the purposes of both the High Court and Supreme Court hearings, where in addition, considerable latitude was afforded to Mr Rooney in arguing his case. In those circumstances, O?Donnell J held that it would be an act of futility, which would only add to the surreal aspects of this case, if the Court were to go through the motions of extending time. O?Donnell J held that Mr Rooney may be entitled to complain about the time it took to bring these proceedings to their formal conclusion but that he could not doubt that he had received much more court time and attention than most litigants. O?Donnell J noted that Mr Rooney had two full opportunities to ventilate claims in relation to the non-statutory scheme in the High Court, and to have those adjudications appealed to and considered by the Supreme Court. O?Donnell J also noted that Mr Rooney has also had separate proceedings heard in the High Court in which he sought to set aside those judgments because they did not deal with what he considered to be the true issues in controversy, that is, the claims he sought to include in the proposed amended Statement of Claim. In addition, O?Donnell J noted that Mr Rooney had made numerous applications to seek to undermine, set aside or qualify the effect of the judgments in these cases. On this occasion O?Donnell J observed that the State respondents, as they were entitled to, advanced the argument that the proposed amendment should be refused on the grounds that it raised arguments which could plainly have been advanced and determined in the 1987 proceedings when in the High Court and Supreme Court in 1990 and 1991. O?Donnell J considered that argument well founded.

O?Donnell J held that the Court would dismiss Mr Rooney?s appeal against Barron J?s order and would dismiss the appeal against the order of Murphy J refusing to permit amendment of the Statement of Claim. Concerning costs, the Court would adjourn the case for a period more lengthy than normal to allow the parties to consider the entire position and whether it was possible to come to any form of agreed resolution in the light of this decision and its clear implications. If that was not possible, the Court would proceed to deal with costs on the 5th of April 2016.

Appeals dismissed.

Judgment of O'Donnell J. delivered the 28th day of January 2016

1 The matters which came before this Court on the 9th of December 2015, were in themselves relatively simple but concerned proceedings of considerable age and unusual factual and procedural complication. Mr. Rooney the plaintiff and appellant, has represented himself since the outset of these proceedings in 1987, but has in that time been able to qualify as a barrister in England, and be admitted to the Bar in Northern Ireland and subsequently in this jurisdiction. The appeals themselves concern two motions which would be familiar to the most junior lawyer. The first is perhaps the most basic and commonly encountered application brought in civil proceedings: a motion for judgment in default of defence (?the Motion for Judgment?). Rather ironically in the present context, the normal function of a motion for judgment in default of defence is to seek to ensure that proceedings continue to move towards a hearing at a reasonable pace. Hundreds of these motions are dealt with before the High Court each Monday, and rarely involve any contention, still less, appeals. The second matter is a motion which is also regularly encountered in these Courts, a motion to amend a Statement of Claim (?the Motion to Amend?). While sometimes such a motion can involve more argument than a standard motion for judgment in default of defence, nevertheless, it is normally dealt with by the application of familiar principles, and can be argued and disposed of quite quickly and involving few papers. In this case however, the hearing of both matters in this Court involved voluminous and almost impenetrable papers, lengthy preparation, and occupied considerable court, time although relatively little of that time was occupied by the substance of the motions themselves.

2 What makes these appeals remarkable however is that the proceedings themselves were commenced in 1987, and concerned events which occurred in 1983. The motion for judgment dates from 1990. The motion to amend the Statement of Claim, in the context of this case, is almost youthful having been commenced in 2001 and been determined in the High Court in 2010. It will be necessary to trace the very tangled path of these proceedings and some parallel proceedings in more detail, later in this judgment. But it is right to acknowledge that this lapse of time, whatever the explanations and excuses, is unacceptable. In 2013, the European Court of Human Rights (?ECtHR?) held that the delay in bringing the proceedings to a conclusion was itself a breach of Mr. Rooney's Article 6 rights to have his case determined within a reasonable time. It is true that the substance of this case was disposed of in 1991 and that some aspects of the delay were understandable if not excusable. However, some aspects of the delay were caused by Mr. Rooney's own actions, and by the multiplicity of proceedings he commenced, and by what proved to be a misplaced belief that a common sense solution could be found. It is also the case that on occasions judges went to considerable lengths to deal with the cases, and considerable latitude was extended to Mr Rooney. The fact remains however that the continued existence of these proceedings 28 years after they were first initiated is not justifiable, even in a system where the progress of litigation is controlled by the parties and not by the court itself. Insomuch as the delay has been contributed to or caused by the administration of justice within the courts, that is sincerely regrettable. Repeated court appearances impose a considerable stress not just on an individual member of the public, but also on those close to them. Litigation is not in itself an intrinsically desirable activity and repeated litigation is a curse which blights many lives, well beyond the central actor, and not limited to those on his own side of the case.

3 This case illustrates a number of truths which will be familiar to any person with experience of the law: the system of administration of justice is human; it is unavoidably imperfect; resources are limited; court time is expensive and scarce; errors can be made by even the most capable and well intentioned people; short cuts, to paraphrase Lord Scarman, can often be treacherous, exacting a heavy price in delay anxiety and expense; and once a case goes awry it is disproportionately difficult to right it and it often becomes prey to misunderstandings, misconceptions and misfortunes. It is often the case that a person who litigates on their own behalf has some sense of grievance about an issue which is neither fanciful nor necessarily completely ill founded; that rejection of a complaint, even if the correct and just outcome, can often generate obduracy and suspicion that the decision was made for reasons of prejudice; that litigants will often respond with misconceived applications and more intemperate allegations; that the inevitable rejection of such applications feeds an easily triggered sense of conspiracy, which often leads the litigant into conflict with the courts, and individual judges. Some litigants, and not just those who represent themselves, prefer the comfort of focusing exclusively on the debatable ruling or judicial comment reinforcing a sense of grievance rather than recognise the forest of problems in...