Rowland v an Post

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Judge: Mr. Justice Clarke
• Judgment Date: 27 March 2017
• Neutral Citation: [2017] IESC 20
• Docket Number: [Appeal No: 462/2011],[S.C. No. 462 of 2011]
• Court: Supreme Court
• Date: 27 March 2017

[2017] IESC 20

THE SUPREME COURT

Clarke J.

O'Donnell Donal J.

Clarke J.

MacMenamin J.

[Appeal No: 462/2011]

Between/

Thomas Rowland

Plaintiff/Appellant

and

An Post

Defendant/Respondent

Unfair procedures – Breach of contractual terms – Fair procedures – Appellant seeking an order restraining the respondent from continuing with a disciplinary process – Whether it was sufficiently clear that the disciplinary process had gone irremediably wrong

Facts: The plaintiff/appellant, Mr Rowland, was engaged by the defendant/respondent, An Post, as a sub-postmaster in the village of Bofeenaun, Ballina in County Mayo. In 2008 a process commenced as a result of which Mr Rowland was asked to respond to various issues raised by An Post. It was asserted on behalf of Mr Rowland that the procedures being followed by An Post were unfair and in breach of his contractual terms. Proceedings were commenced and interim and interlocutory injunctions sought and obtained. The matter came on for plenary hearing before Murphy J in the High Court in March, 2011 and on the 26th July the trial judge dismissed Mr Rowland’s claim. The principal conclusion reached was that the relevant process was still at an investigative stage and that, in that context, there had been no breach of fair procedures. Mr Rowland appealed that decision to the Supreme Court. An application was brought before the Supreme Court seeking an order restraining An Post from continuing with the process pending a determination of the appeal. In the context of the hearing of that application an undertaking was given on behalf of An Post that the process would continue in full compliance with the rules of constitutional justice. In those circumstances the Supreme Court did not grant the injunction sought and the process continued. Separate proceedings were commenced in the High Court in which it was asserted that the termination of the relevant contract was unlawful and various reliefs were sought. A question was raised by the Supreme Court at the hearing of the appeal as to what, of substance, remained for decision on the appeal. That question arose from the fact that the focus of the proceedings had been to prevent the process from going any further. The order sought was an injunction directed to that end. Mr Rowland suggested that, if the Supreme Court were persuaded that the trial judge was wrong in his conclusions, it would be open to the Court to make an appropriate form of declaratory order which might, potentially, have an effect on the second proceedings. Counsel expressed a concern that, as long as the judgment of the trial judge in the case remained in place, aspects of the argument which Mr Rowland might wish to put forward in the second proceedings might be precluded. The focus of the appeal was as to whether it would be appropriate for the Supreme Court to make some form of declaration concerning the process and, as part of the analysis which might lead to a determination of whether it would be so appropriate, an issue arose as to the extent to which the findings of the High Court in the case might bind the High Court in deciding the second proceedings.

Held by Clarke J that he was satisfied that the trial judge was correct to hold that the point had not been reached when it could be said that it was sufficiently clear, for the purposes of the established jurisprudence, that the disciplinary process in the case had gone irremediably wrong so as to warrant that a court should intervene by way of an injunction to halt the process.

Clarke J held that the trial judge’s ultimate conclusion was correct and that the appeal must be dismissed.

Appeal dismissed.

Judgment of Mr. Justice Clarke delivered the 27 ^th March, 2017.

1. Introduction

1.1 Much has happened since this case was heard in the High Court during March, 2011 and was the subject of a judgment on the 26 ^th July of that year. The case stems from the relationship between the plaintiff/appellant (‘Mr. Rowland’) and the defendant/respondent (‘An Post’) whereby Mr. Rowland was engaged by An Post as a sub-postmaster in the village of Bofeenaun, Ballina in County Mayo. Mr. Rowland had held that position since 1974.

1.2 Because the precise characterisation of the questions which became the subject of inquiry by An Post is itself the matter of some controversy I will simply use a neutral term of ‘issues’ to describe what emerged in 2008. A process commenced at that time, which it will be necessary to describe in somewhat more detail, as a result of which Mr. Rowland was asked to ‘comprehensively and credibly’ respond to various issues raised by An Post. Thereafter that process continued but it was asserted on behalf of Mr. Rowland that the procedures being followed by An Post were unfair and in breach of his contractual terms. In that context these proceedings were commenced and interim and interlocutory injunctions sought and obtained. The matter came on for plenary hearing before Murphy J. in the High Court in March, 2011 and, for the reasons set out in a judgment of the 26 ^th July of that year, ( Rowland v. An Post [2011] IEHC 272) the trial judge dismissed Mr. Rowland's claim. While it will be necessary to analyse the reasoning of the trial judge in more detail the principal conclusion reached was that the relevant process was still at an investigative stage and that, in that context, there had been no breach of fair procedures.

1.3 However, Mr. Rowland appealed that decision of the High Court to this Court. An application was brought before this Court seeking an order restraining An Post from continuing with the process pending a determination of this appeal. In the context of the hearing of that application an undertaking was given on behalf of An Post that the process would continue in full compliance with the rules of constitutional justice. In those circumstances this Court did not grant the injunction sought and the process continued.

1.4 While, in one sense, not material to the issues which directly arise on this appeal, it is nonetheless of some relevance to note that the process concerned did continue to a conclusion as a result of which Mr. Rowland's position as sub-postmaster was terminated. Separate proceedings have been commenced in the High Court (‘the second proceedings’) in which it is asserted that the termination of the relevant contract was unlawful and various reliefs sought. The second proceedings remain in being although they have not progressed to any significant extent. The reason why that subsequent history is of some relevance is that a question was raised by the Court at the hearing of this appeal as to what, of substance, remained for decision on this appeal. That question arose from the fact that the focus of these proceedings had been to prevent the process from going any further. The order sought was an injunction directed to that end. Clearly there could be no basis on which the Court could now grant the injunction sought for the very process which was sought to be restrained has now been completed. Against that background counsel for Mr. Rowland suggested that, if the Court were persuaded that the trial judge was wrong in his conclusions, it would be open to the Court to make an appropriate form of declaratory order which might, potentially, have an effect on the second proceedings. On the other side of the same coin counsel expressed a concern that, as long as the judgment of the trial judge in this case remained in place, aspects of the argument which Mr. Rowland might wish to put forward in the second proceedings might be precluded.

1.5 Thus the focus of the appeal was as to whether it would be appropriate for the Court to make some form of declaration concerning the process and, as part of the analysis which might lead to a determination of whether it would be so appropriate, an issue arose as to the extent to which the findings of the High Court in this case might bind the High Court in deciding the second proceedings.

1.6 In the particular circumstances of this case it seems to me appropriate to start by looking at the legal test for considering whether the process engaged in by An Post could properly have been interfered with by the High Court at the stage to which the process had progressed at the time of the trial.

2. The Legal Basis

2.1 It seems clear that the key question which the Court must address on this appeal is as to whether the overall conclusion of the High Court, which was in substance to the effect that any application to that court was premature, was correct. If that view of the High Court cannot properly be disturbed then it would follow that the High Court was correct to refuse the injunction sought and, irrespective of the developments which have occurred since then, it would equally follow that it would be inappropriate for this Court to consider making any order in favour of Mr. Rowland whether declaratory or otherwise.

2.2 It must, in that context, first be noted that the proceedings were commenced and progressed to trial at a time where the process, however it might be characterised, was still in train. It must, of course, be recalled that, just after the proceedings were commenced, interim and interlocutory orders were put in place which prevented the process going any further pending trial.

2.3 Those facts raise the question of the standard by reference to which a court should intervene, whether by injunction, declaration or any other means, in a process having a disciplinary or similar character, which is still ongoing. The trial judge placed some reliance in that regard to my decision in the High Court in Becker v The Board of Management of St Dominic's School & ors [2006] IEHC 130. It is true that Becker was a decision given on an application for an interlocutory injunction seeking to restrain an employment disciplinary procedure. There...