Ryan v Meath County Council

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Judge: Clarke C.J.,MacMenamin J.,Dunne J.
• Judgment Date: 02 February 2018
• Neutral Citation: [2018] IESCDET 24
• Court: Supreme Court
• Date: 02 February 2018

[2018] IESCDET 24

THE SUPREME COURT

DETERMINATION

Clarke C.J.

MacMenamin J.

Dunne J.

BETWEEN

MICHAEL RYAN

APPLICANT

AND

MEATH COUNTY COUNCIL

RESPONDENTS

AND

JOSEPH CONNOLLY

NOTICE PARTY

APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL TO WHICH ARTICLE 34.5.4° OF THE CONSTITUTION APPLIES

RESULT: The Court does not grant leave to the Applicant to appeal to this Court directly from the High Court.

REASONS GIVEN:

ORDER SOUGHT TO BE APPEALED

COURT: High Court

DATE OF JUDGMENT OR RULING: 21st December 2016

DATE OF ORDER: 19th May 2017

DATE OF PERFECTION OF ORDER: 24th August 2017

THE APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL WAS MADE ON 19th SEPTEMBER 2017 AND WAS IN TIME.

General Considerations

1 The general principles applied by this Court in determining whether to grant or refuse leave to appeal having regard to the criteria incorporated into the Constitution as a result of the 33rd Amendment have now been considered in a large number of determinations and are fully addressed in both a determination issued by a panel consisting of all of the members of this Court in B.S. v Director of Public Prosecutions (2017) IESCDET 134 and in a unanimous judgment of a full Court delivered by O'Donnell J. in Price Waterhouse Coopers (A Firm) v Quinn Insurance Ltd. (Under Administration) [2017] IESC 73. The additional criteria required to be met in order that a so-called “leapfrog appeal' direct from the High Court to this Court can be permitted were addressed by a full panel of the Court in Wansboro v Director of Public Prosecutions (2017) IESCDET 115. It follows that it is unnecessary to revisit the new constitutional architecture for the purposes of this determination.

2 Furthermore the application for leave filed and the respondent's notice are published along with this determination (subject only to any redaction required by law) and it is therefore unnecessary to set out the position of the parties.

3 In that context it should be noted that the respondent opposes the grant of leave.

Decision

4 As appears from the documents filed in relation to this application for leave to appeal, the applicant, (‘Mr. Ryan’), having failed in his challenge in the High Court, sought the certificate required by s. 50A(7) of the Planning and Development Act 2000 (‘the 2000 Act’) in order to appeal the judgment of the High Court to the Court of Appeal. For the reasons set out in a judgment delivered by Barrett J. on the 12th May, 2017 (...